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Vendor’s Privilege: Adheret Visceribus Rei 
L. David Cromwell 
As the price for an immovable, a purchaser assumed payment 
of the seller’s debt that was secured by an existing mortgage that 
the seller had granted a year earlier. More than ten years after 
recordation of the mortgage, but less than ten years after the act of 
sale was recorded in the mortgage records, a judgment creditor of the 
purchaser seized the immovable, arguing that the mortgage had lost 
its effectiveness for failure of timely reinscription. Unfortunately for 
the judgment creditor, however, she had overlooked a powerful 
security device that resulted by operation of law from the purchaser’s 
assumption of the mortgage debt: the vendor’s privilege. Affirming a 
ruling that the immovable remained subject to this vendor’s privilege, 
the Louisiana Supreme Court held it to be wholly immaterial whether 
the mortgage was reinscribed in a timely manner or whether the 
mortgage was recorded at all, for the failure of timely reinscription of 
the mortgage did not affect the vendor’s privilege that arose from the 
assumption in the act of sale “as a legal concomitant . . . without the 
requirement of any stipulation at all.”1 As authority for this 
proposition, the Court cited, without translation, an obscure Latin 
maxim: Adheret visceribus rei. 
The Court’s use of this Latin expression certainly suggests that the 
security device known as the vendor’s privilege, like many other 
creatures of the civil law, originated in Roman law. Indeed, support for 
that proposition can be inferred from Baker v. Frellsen,2 in which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court a year earlier invoked the same Latin 
phrase, in the process providing both a translation and an apparent 
indication that the vendor’s privilege finds its source in Roman 
law: 
[The vendor’s privilege] is a guarantee which attaches so 
tenaciously to the nature of the contract of sale on term, 
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that the Roman law says that it adheres to the very entrails 
of the thing, adheret visceribus rei.3 
Objection might be made to this statement on the ground that 
it, unfortunately, is without basis in historical fact and appears to 
have arisen from a mistaken belief that Latin words necessarily 
imply roots in Roman law. Indeed, the Supreme Court recanted 
just two years later in De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss,4 explaining, 
in a footnote, that the use of the word “Roman” in the Baker case 
was in error; instead of Roman law, the reference was intended to 
be “modern civil” law. The Court acknowledged that the vendor’s 
privilege was unknown to Roman law but rather is of Gallic 
creation. 
Whatever its origin, the vendor’s privilege has been a coveted 
and powerful form of security throughout Louisiana’s history. This 
Article begins with a short excursus recalling some central notions 
about the definition and nature of privileges and posits that there 
actually exist two different vendor’s privileges: the vendor’s 
privilege on movables and that bearing on immovables. After 
tracing the origin of both of these vendor’s privileges, this Article 
explores the policies underlying the privileges, requirements of 
registry, status of the privileges as real rights, events causing a loss 
of the privileges, and problems involving ranking. By focusing on 
the vendor’s privilege as an example, this Article seeks to 
illustrate, from a broader perspective, the reasons for the existence 
of privileges, the manner in which they relate to each other and to 
other forms of security, and the extent to which privileges can 
remain relevant in a modern civil law system. 
I. GENERAL NOTIONS OF PRIVILEGE 
Article 3186 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which was borrowed 
verbatim from the Code Napoléon,5 provides that “[p]rivilege is a 
right, which the nature of a debt gives to a creditor, and which 
entitles him to be preferred before other creditors, even those who 
have mortgages.”6 A privilege is thus a preference established by 
legislation and is an exception to the general rule of the Civil Code 
that the proceeds of the sale of an obligor’s property are distributed 
ratably among his creditors.7 A privilege is a form of real security.8 
                                                                                                             
 3. Id. at 828. 
 4. 34 La. Ann. 164, 166 (1882). 
 5. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2095 (Fr.) (1804).  
 6. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3186 (2015).  
 7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3134 (2015). As comment (a) to that article explains, 
this rule continues the familiar principle of article 3183 of the Louisiana Civil 




Privileges cannot be granted contractually; they can arise only by 
operation of law based upon the nature of the debt.9  
Planiol defines a privilège as “a disposition of the law which 
favors a creditor.”10 This definition not only underscores the rule 
that privileges arise only by operation of law but is true to the 
term’s Latin etymology—law made for private or particular 
interests: privilegium, from privus - legis.11 
Some privileges are general and operate on all property of the 
debtor, such as those securing funeral charges, law charges, and 
expenses of the last illness.12 Other privileges are special; that is, 
they operate only on specific property. One of the most important 
special privileges is that in favor of the vendor as security for the 
unpaid purchase price. The law itself grants the unpaid vendor this 
privilege; it is unnecessary for the vendor to obtain a mortgage, or 
even to obtain written recognition of the existence of the vendor’s 
privilege, for it to arise.13 
The definition of “privilege” contained in article 3186 has been 
criticized on the ground that it envisions merely rights of 
preference that exist upon property while in the debtor’s patrimony 
and that the general privileges comprise the only category of 
                                                                                                             
 
Code of 1870 that “the property of the debtor is the ‘common pledge of his 
creditors.’” Id. cmt. a. The reference in the source article to the concept of 
“pledge” was deleted, because the term was used in that article in a “non-
technical sense.” Id. 
 8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3137 cmt. c (2015). The fact that a privilege is a 
form of real security does not necessarily mean that it is a real right. Id. 
 9. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3185 (2015); see, e.g., Southport Petroleum Co. 
of Del. v. Fithian, 13 So. 2d 382, 383 (La. 1943); In re Liquidation of Hibernia 
Bank & Trust Co., 162 So. 644, 645 (La. 1935); State v. Miller, 126 So. 422, 
428 (La. 1930); Succession of Rousseau, 23 La. Ann. 1, 3 (1871).  
 10. 2 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW, 
pt. 2, No. 2544 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 11th ed. 1959) (1939). 
 11. LE PETIT LAROUSSE ILLUSTRE 822 (Larousse 2010). 
 12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3191, 3252 (2015). The need for explanation of the 
reasons for the existence of privileges has often afforded courts the opportunity 
to demonstrate their prowess in the use of poetic and figurative language, as 
evidenced by an early case providing this moving explanation for the privilege 
for funeral charges:  
[W]ere it not for the privilege which the law allows to those who dig 
the grave, furnish the coffin and drive the hearse, many a lifeless frame, 
deprived of sepulture, would rot in unnoted or forsaken homes. Were it 
not for that privilege, when Death enters a city and knocks at every 
door-watchful and indefatigable as it is, Charity would inevitably be 
unequal to the increased task which-otherwise-would be imposed upon 
it.  
Alter v. O’Brien, 31 La. Ann. 452, 454 (1879). 
 13. Conté v. Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965, 968 (1881). 




privileges that truly fits within this definition, even though the 
Code establishes other privileges, such as the special privileges on 
immovables, that include a right of pursuit in addition to a mere 
right of preference.14 It is asserted that those privileges constitute real 
rights that are inconsistent with the definition given in article 3186.15 
The degree to which vendor’s privileges can be viewed as real rights 
will be explored in substantial detail below.  
Among two or more competing privileges, the general rule is that 
they rank according to their nature rather than the date on which they 
arise.16 Privileges that are of the same rank are paid concurrently from 
the proceeds of the thing that they burden.17 These general rules are 
applied consistently only to privileges burdening movables,18 though 
there are instances under Louisiana law in which they continue to 
apply to immovables.19 
The last phrase of article 3186 is critical, for it contains the general 
rule of ranking of privileges upon immovables against mortgages. By 
their nature, privileges are preferred to mortgages, regardless of 
whether the mortgage may have previously arisen or become effective 
against third persons, unless some other provision of law provides to 
the contrary.20 It is for this reason that the general privileges that arise 
under the Civil Code outrank mortgages.21 Nevertheless, in order for 
                                                                                                             
 14. 2 BERNARD KEITH VETTER & THOMAS A. HARRELL, LOUISIANA 
CREDITORS’ SECURITY RIGHTS 154, 241–43 (1988). See also PLANIOL & 
RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2547 (observing that there are no general 
characteristics of privileges, except in the case of general privileges).  
 15. VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 243. 
 16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3187 (1870). 
 17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3188 (1870).  
 18. See 8 ROBERT BEUDANT & PAUL LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, COURS DE 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 325 (11th ed. 1948). 
 19. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3254–3270 (1870). A more modern 
example is found in the Private Works Act, which ranks privileges arising under 
its provisions by nature among themselves but by priority in time against 
mortgages and vendor’s privileges. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (Supp. 
2015). 
 20. See 3 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS § 290 
(6th ed. 1938). There are many exceptions to the general rule, such as the 
ranking provisions of the Louisiana Private Works Act, in Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 9:4821. Some French writers assert that the traditional rule that 
privileges by their nature outrank mortgages has been rendered illusory by the 
requirement of inscription, which now determines ranking for most privileges 
and mortgages alike. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, §§ 319–22. 
 21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3269 (1870). Under Roman law, general privileges 
ranked behind mortgages. The policy reason for reversing the ranking so that 
mortgages rank behind general privileges has been explained by the fact that the 
holders of general privileges usually have small claims that would often not be 
paid if those privileges ranked behind mortgages. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 
10, Nos. 2628–2631. See also VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 299. 




most privileges upon immovables to enjoy this favored ranking, the 
acts that evidence them must be filed for record within the period 
prescribed by Civil Code article 3274.22 If the act evidencing a 
privilege is not filed within that time, it takes effect against third 
persons from the date of registry and affords the holder of the 
privilege no preference over previously recorded mortgages.23 As 
will be seen, these rules are of particular importance when applied 
to the vendor’s privilege on immovables.  
It is fitting that the vendor’s privilege on movables24 and that on 
immovables25 arise under different articles of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, for they are actually entirely different privileges. If these two 
privileges can be seen as twins that share the same family name and 
several common attributes, they are fraternal twins at best, for they 
were born at different times and of different sources. Moreover, apart 
from the obvious difference in the domain of things upon which they 
operate, they are wholly different in their status as real rights, the 
means by which they are made enforceable against third persons, and 
their ranking against competing interests. 
II. THE GENESIS OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES 
At Roman law, no privilege existed in favor of the vendor.26 
However, no privilege was necessary, for so long as the price was 
unpaid, the vendor remained the owner of the thing.27 Indeed, it 
was impossible for the vendor to hold a privilege, because a person 
cannot have a privilege on his own property.28 As owner, the seller 
could revendicate the thing sold if he was not paid; however, 
revendication was unavailable if the vendor agreed to allow the 
vendee a term for payment of the price, because ownership 
transferred immediately to the vendee. In that case, the vendor was 
deemed to have trusted in the faithfulness of the buyer and held the 
status of only an ordinary creditor if the price was not paid when 
due.29 
                                                                                                             
 22. The period is 7 days if the property is located in the same parish where 
the act was passed; otherwise, it is 15 days. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2015).  
 23. Id. 
 24. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3217(7), 3227 (2015). 
 25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3249(1) (2015). 
 26. 21 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & P. DELOYNE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, DU NANTISSEMENT, DES PRIVILÈGES ET HYPOTHÈQUES ET 
DE L’EXPROPRIATION FORCÉE, TOME PREMIER No. 484 (2d ed. 1899). 
 27. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra 
note 10, No. 2604. 
 28. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508. 
 29. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2604; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE 
ET AL., supra note 26, No. 484; BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508. Modern 




For centuries, France followed these rules: the vendor under a 
sale without a term for payment of the price could avail himself of 
the right of revendication if the vendee failed to pay the price.30 The 
vendor under a sale on term was relegated to a personal action.31 In 
time, the vendor’s privilege arose as a creature of customary law.32 
Beginning in the 16th century, vendors of movables began to 
introduce a new practice to protect themselves—the thing sold was 
delivered under a precarious title, such as a fictitious lease. Because 
this kind of transaction did not transfer ownership, the vendor 
remained protected to the same extent as if he had sold without a 
term. Over time, this practice blurred the distinction between a sale 
on term and a sale without a term, and this distinction became 
viewed as a mere “subtlety.”33 The revision of the Coutume de Paris 
in 1580 introduced a new article providing that, when the thing sold 
is seized by another creditor of the vendee, the vendor can prevent 
the sale and “is preferred on the thing to the other creditors.”34 This 
same article was reproduced literally in the Coutume d’Orléans in 
1583.35 It is noteworthy that the word privilège was not expressly 
used;36 however, the concept proved so useful that it was adopted 
by the jurisprudence even in those parts of the country that 
otherwise followed the written law based on Roman tradition.37  
                                                                                                             
 
continental civil codes based on the German model continue to follow the 
Roman rule without establishing a privilege in favor of the vendor. 
 30. This right was expressly recognized in the Coutume de Paris article 176 
(1580): “Qui vend aucune chose mobiliaire sans jour & sans terme esperant 
estre payé promptement, il peut la chose poursuivre en quelque lieu qu’elle soit 
transportée, pour estre payé du prix qu’il l’a venduë.” 1 CLAUDE DE FERRIÈRE, 
NOUVEAU COMMENTAIRE SUR LA COUTUME DE LA PREVOSTE ET VICOMTE DE 
PARIS 370 (2d ed. 1688). 
 31. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2605. 
 32. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508; HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, 
LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE § 33, at 91 (1942). 
 33. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2606. 
 34. Coutume de Paris article 177 (1580): “Et neanmoins encore, qu’il eût 
donné terme, si la chose se trouve saisie sur le debiteur par autre creancier, il 
peut empecher la vente, et est preferé sur la chose aux autres creanciers.” See 
FERRIÈRE, supra note 30, at 374 (author’s translation). Ferrière explains that the 
Coutume gives to the unpaid seller, who is a privileged and preferred creditor, a 
special mortgage on the thing as security for the payment of the price. Id. at 375. 
 35. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2606. 
 36. Planiol observes that, when Pothier and Ferrière would speak of this 
right, they would refer to it alternately as either hypothèque or privilège. Id. 
 37. See Bessie Margolin, Civil Law: Vendor’s Privilege, 4 TUL. L. REV. 
239, 242 n.12 (1929) (quoting X PAUL PONT, EXPLICATION THEORIQUE ET 
PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL § 146 (3d ed. 1883)). See also DAGGETT, supra note 
32, § 4. Those areas of France that followed the customary law recognized first 
the existence of a vendor’s privilege in the case of all sales without a term and 




At this point in history, however, the birth of the vendor’s 
privilege on movables was yet incomplete. There remained a strict 
dichotomy between rights of the vendor under a sale without a term 
and those of the vendor under a sale with a term. The former still had 
the right of revendication; the latter had what became known as a 
vendor’s privilege. Ultimately, the evolving jurisprudence removed 
this distinction by confining to a very short period of time the delay 
within which the vendor under a sale without a term was permitted to 
exercise his right of revendication. If he delayed beyond that time, he 
was viewed as having tacitly agreed to payment of the price on term 
and thus became relegated to a mere privilege.38 Article 2102 of the 
Code Napoléon further confined this limitation on the exercise of the 
right of revendication to a period described as “la huitaine,” which 
was understood to be approximately one week running from the time 
of delivery. The same article also provides expressly that the vendor’s 
privilege is equally available whether the seller sold with or without a 
term.39 To the redactors of the Code Napoléon, there was a very 
compelling reason to provide for a vendor’s privilege in both kinds of 
sale: in contrast to both Roman law and ancient French law, the sales 
articles of the Code Napoléon force the transfer of ownership once 
agreement is reached upon the thing and the price, regardless of 
whether the sale was made on credit, and a privilege is therefore 
necessary to protect the unpaid vendor.40  
Essentially these same concepts have appeared in all three of 
Louisiana’s Civil Codes. Presently, the vendor’s privilege on 
movables is established by article 3227 of the Civil Code,41 
immediately followed by three articles providing for the right of 
                                                                                                             
 
later extended this privilege to credit sales. More time was required before the 
privilege was recognized in those areas where the traditions of Roman law were 
in vigor. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 485. 
 38. See FERRIÈRE, supra note 30, at 373 (explaining that, if the seller 
allowed additional time, such as seven or eight days or more, to pass before 
exercising his right of revendication, then, depending on the circumstances and 
the prudence of the judge, he was presumed to have tacitly trusted the buyer and 
had only the rights of a vendor on term).  
 39. After recent revisions to the French Civil Code, these rules are now 
found in article 2332. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.). 
 40. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 486. It has been 
asserted that the difference between protection granted to the unpaid seller under 
Roman law and the privilege afforded to him by the Code Napoléon is really a 
matter of form or technique in expressing the same idea: both systems provide 
the seller a real right and a right of preference until payment of the price. See 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 508.  
 41. The vendor’s privilege on movables is also provided for under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3217(7). 




revendication, which is called the right of restitution rather than 
revendication.42 It is little known that this right of restitution, which 
is a vestige of the old Roman rule of revendication, has been 
preserved in the Civil Code. These three articles permit the seller of 
a movable not sold on credit to reclaim the movable as long as it is 
still in the possession of the purchaser, provided that the claim for 
restitution is made within eight days, the translation given to the 
term of “la huitaine,” and the identity of the movable has not been 
lost.43 Nevertheless, this appears to be a seldom-used remedy 
indeed, as these articles have not been applied or interpreted in any 
reported Louisiana case since 1881.44 As will be discussed below, 
                                                                                                             
 42. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3229–3231 (1870). The French versions of the 
1825 Code and the Digest of 1808, borrowing from the Code Napoléon, used the 
word revendication, which was translated into English as restitution. It should 
be understood that this action in revendication, or restitution, is not founded on a 
claim of ownership and is wholly different from the revendicatory action 
available to the dispossessed owner of a movable under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 526. See XIII THÉOPHILE HUC, COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 
DU CODE CIVIL No. 100 (1900) (describing this view as the prevailing view). 
One French treatise explains that the French analogues to Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 3229 through 3231 do not use the term revendicate in a technical sense 
because, if they did, it would be essential that the seller retain the right of 
ownership in order to assert the action. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., 
supra note 26, No. 523. The seller’s right of revendication under these articles 
has been explained as a sui generis form of revendication having nothing in 
common with the ordinary right of revendication available to an owner. See 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 520. But see HUC, supra, No. 103 (asserting 
that the legislator used the word revendication because he intended a resolution 
of the sale of right). The Louisiana Civil Code avoids this confusion by using 
the term restitution rather than revendicate in Louisiana Civil Code articles 3229 
through 3231. 
 43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3229 (2015). As French writers explain, the text of 
the corresponding article of the Code Napoléon imposes four conditions on the 
right of revendication: (i) that the sale be made without a term, (ii) that the thing 
still be in the possession of the buyer, (iii) that the revendication be claimed 
within eight days from delivery, and (iv) that the thing sold still be in the same 
condition in which delivery was made. The first and fourth of these conditions 
existed under the customary law, but the other two were added by the Code 
Napoléon. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 522; 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 518; HUC, supra note 42, No. 104. 
 44. The last reported case to interpret these articles was Florsheim Bros. v. 
Howell, 33 La. Ann. 1184 (1881), in which the Court held that the seller of 
cotton had lost both his vendor’s privilege and his right of restitution, even 
though he had filed suit to enforce his rights within only two days after 
delivering the cotton to the buyer, because the buyer had surrendered possession 
to a cotton factory. The cotton in Florsheim was sold in Shreveport. In response 
to a previous holding of the Court in Campbell v. Penn, 7 La. Ann. 371 (1852), 
the Civil Code had been amended in 1854 to provide a five-day right of pursuit 
in favor of the vendor of agricultural products in the City of New Orleans. See S. 
Gumbel & Co. v. Beer, 36 La. Ann. 484 (1884). Act 63 of 1890 enacted special 




the reason that the right of restitution is provided for immediately 
after the article that establishes the vendor’s privilege on movables 
is that the right of restitution is designed to afford the unpaid seller a 
means of protecting his privilege against the risk of a second sale 
that would cause a loss of the privilege.  
But, what of the birth of the vendor’s privilege on immovables? 
Though it shares the same lineage, it was born later. Just as was the 
case with the sale of a movable, a privilege in favor of the vendor of 
an immovable did not exist under Roman law.45 The vendor of an 
immovable without a term continued to be viewed as owner and 
protected by the Roman rule of revendication.46 The 16th-century text 
of the Coutume de Paris did not provide for a privilege in favor of the 
vendor of an immovable on term. Accordingly, the courts of Paris, in 
the early 17th century, held that the vendor of an immovable on term 
had no privilege and was protected only by the tacit general mortgage 
that the law then attributed to sales made in notarial form.47 Thus, it 
was necessary for the vendor’s protection that the vendor on term 
stipulate a special mortgage, and this usage became so general that, in 
two judgments of the Parlement of Paris in 1628, it was held that the 
vendor of an immovable on term enjoyed a special mortgage and 
privilege on the immovable securing the payment of the price, even 
without having obtained a conventional mortgage.48 The vendor of an 
immovable became viewed as having a tacit privileged mortgage that 
                                                                                                             
 
legislation, now Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4541, extending the 
application of this rule to any chartered city or town of this state. Act No. 63, 
1890 La. Acts 51. This statute provides that the vendor’s privilege has 
precedence over any “warehouse privilege or claim for warehouse charges, or 
any privilege or claim by the holder of a warehouse receipt.” LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:4541 (2007). In John M. Parker Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 88 So. 68 (La. 
1920), the Court held that the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act impliedly 
repealed this provision insofar as negotiable warehouse receipts are concerned. 
Section 9:4541 mentions only a privilege and not the seller’s right of restitution. 
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4541 (2007). 
 45. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 564. 
 46. Id. 
 47. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2889. The usage of stipulating a 
mortgage in all acts creating obligations led the ancient customary law of France 
to find an implied general mortgage in all such acts executed under seal. See 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xx–xxi. See also M. BUGNET, 
1 OEUVRES DE POTHIER, COUTUME D’ORLÉANS, DE L’HYPOTHÈQUE, No. 6, at 
639 (2d ed. 1861). This custom of implying a general mortgage even in the 
absence of a formal stipulation was continued under legislation known as the 
law of 9 messidor An III, enacted during the French Revolution. BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xxviii.  
 48. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2889. 




was analogous to the privilege that the seller of a movable already 
enjoyed.49  
Legislation adopted during the French Revolution, known as the 
law of 11 brumaire An VII, confirmed the privilege of the vendor 
under the name of the “right of the preceding owner.”50 Shortly 
afterward, article 2301 of the Code Napoléon specifically provided for 
a privilege for the price in favor of the seller of immovables and 
movables alike.51 In Louisiana, the Digest of 1808 was even more 
explicit,52 providing that the privilege existed whether the estate was 
sold for ready money or on credit and regardless of whether a 
mortgage was expressly stipulated.53  
Thus, it can be seen that both of the vendor’s privileges were born 
out of the constancy of usage, but of different usages. For 
movables, the repeated usage was the practice of delivering a 
movable under a precarious title in order to place the vendor in the 
same position as if he had made a sale without term. In the case of 
immovables, the repeated usage was the stipulation of a special 
mortgage in favor of the vendor, a practice leading to the 
recognition of a tacit privileged mortgage.54 
III. THE POLICY BEHIND VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES 
In De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss,55 the Court succinctly stated 
the policy reasons for the vendor’s privilege: 
It would indeed be unjust to place an unpaid vendor on a 
footing of equality with the other creditors of the purchaser, 
and permit these to devour his substance . . . . It would be 
iniquitous to permit the property sold to become the prey of 
the creditors of the purchaser, without requiring, as condition 
precedent, the payment of its costs.56 
                                                                                                             
 49. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 565. 
 50. Id. Other reforms effectuated by the law of 11 brumaire An VII were to 
eliminate all conventional general mortgages and to make impossible the 
creation of mortgages for indefinite sums. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 
10, Nos. 2680–2686; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at xxxii. 
 51. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2374 (Fr.). 
 52. A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF 
ORLEANS art. 475 (de la Vergne ed. 1968) (1808) [hereinafter LA. DIGEST of 
1808]. 
 53. In the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code, as well as the 1870 Code, the latter 
proviso was omitted. 
 54. See discussion supra. 
 55. 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882). 
 56. Id. at 166–67. 




French writers gave essentially the same justification but in 
language that evokes other concepts of the Civil Code: The unpaid 
vendor has gratuitously augmented the common pledge of the 
vendee’s creditors, who are thus unjustly enriched at the vendor’s 
expense.57 Because the sales articles of the French Civil Code58—
and of course the Louisiana Civil Code as well59—force the 
immediate transfer of title to the vendee even though the price has 
not been paid, the privilege is necessary to prevent an inequity.60 
The vendor is privileged because he has augmented the patrimony 
of the vendee.61  
There is another policy reason for the vendor’s privilege based 
upon the justification that exists generally for most privileges: The 
existence of the privilege benefits the debtor by allowing him to 
obtain credit that would otherwise not be available to him.62 In the 
specific case of the vendor’s privilege, its existence facilitates sales 
that otherwise would simply not occur. For without a privilege, the 
seller either would refuse to sell on credit or would insist upon 
other security.63 This policy justification was invoked by the 
Supreme Court in W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell,64 in holding that the 
exemptions from seizure allowed by law65 cannot be asserted 
against a provisional seizure by writ of sequestration to preserve a 
vendor’s privilege on a movable66: 
The law of vendor’s privilege in this state operates to favor 
the vendor and the vendee alike. The long history of vendor’s 
                                                                                                             
 57. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2608. See also BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 567. 
 58. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1583 (Fr.). 
 59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2456 (2015). 
 60. See also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 483, 486. 
 61. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 2608–2609.  
 62. See VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 283. 
 63. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 484. 
 64. 269 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972). 
 65. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881 (Supp. 2015). 
 66. Justice Tate dissented, pointing out the incongruity in the majority’s 
interpretation that a debtor cannot claim the exemption from a temporary seizure 
but he may do so to prevent the sale of the exempted property under a writ of 
fieri facias issued in execution of the judgment in favor of the seizing creditor. 
Justice Tate believed that the case should have been controlled by Young v. 
Geter, 170 So. 240 (La. 1936), which held that a lessor’s privilege could not be 
asserted against property exempted by the predecessor provision to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 13:3881. If W. T. Grant truly stands for the proposition 
that a vendor can sequester goods that he cannot expose to an execution sale in 
the enforcement of his privilege, the practical effect of the decision would seem 
to be to permit the vendor to exercise, through sequestration, what is tantamount 
to a right of restitution, even when the conditions of Louisiana Civil Code article 
3229 are not satisfied. 




privilege in Louisiana demonstrates that it enables the 
purchaser to acquire property he may otherwise be unable to 
buy as much as it induces the vendor to sell. Without the 
benefits accorded the vendor, it may well be concluded that in 
a substantial number of instances the possession and title to 
property would not be surrendered to prospective purchasers. 
Because of it, many impecunious citizens are enabled to 
acquire property to foster their livelihood and provide for their 
sustenance.67  
The justification underpinning the priority that the law affords 
to a vendor’s privilege is the principle that no one can grant a 
greater right than what he himself holds. On this point, Planiol 
cites Pothier: 
As Pothier explains, the reason that he who has sold the 
heritage should be preferred to all the other creditors is that 
the owner has acquired the heritage only with the charge of 
the mortgage which his vendor has reserved on it in 
alienating it. The purchaser cannot mortgage it to his other 
creditors except subject to the charge of this mortgage, 
because he cannot transfer to them a greater right than he 
had on it himself.68 
IV. NATURE OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES 
The vendor’s privilege gives the seller the right to be satisfied 
from the proceeds of the thing sold with preference over other 
creditors of the buyer.69 It attaches automatically to anything that is 
sold—movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal.70 It is a 
                                                                                                             
 67. W.T. Grant Co., 269 So. 2d at 191. The Court also rejected the 
purchaser’s constitutional due process arguments, finding that the purchaser 
holds possession with the “implied-in-law” knowledge that he has acquired the 
right to possession subject to the vendor’s paramount right to seize the property 
without hearing upon a default in payment. Id. at 191. The Court’s holding on 
the constitutional due process claim was affirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). 
 68. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 3140. 
 69. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 483. 
 70. Id. No. 489. See also PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2610 
(explaining that the vendor’s privilege extends even to the sale of a credit); 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 513; HUC, supra note 42, No. 90. Louisiana’s 
revision of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in 2001, which brought 
the outright sale of many types of credits within its scope, included a non-
uniform provision designed to preserve vendor’s privileges arising from the sale 
of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Where 
the language of the model act provides that the seller of property of that nature 




matter of substantive right incident to a contract of sale and not a 
mere remedy for enforcing its execution.71 Because a vendor’s 
privilege arises by operation of law, the concurrence of both spouses 
is not required to establish it, even if it encumbers community 
immovables.72 A vendor’s privilege will arise only from a sale, and 
not from other kinds of transactions, such as a building contract.73 
Thus, there must be a transfer of ownership for a price.74 A vendor’s 
                                                                                                             
 
does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the property sold, the non-uniform 
Louisiana provision instead provides that the seller does not retain an ownership 
interest. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-318(a) (2002). Louisiana Official Revision 
Comment (a) to this section explains that the reason for the Louisiana variation 
was to be consistent with Louisiana law under which the seller of a thing 
acquires a vendor’s privilege by operation of law. 
 71. See, e.g., Willey v. St. Charles Hotel Co., 28 So. 182 (La. 1899); Deal v. 
Lexing-Powell, 824 So. 2d 541 (La. Ct. App. 2002). This rule was also cited in 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Fontaine, 539 So. 2d 986 (La. Ct. App. 1989), in which 
the court held that the plaintiff, which sold furniture to the defendant on credit, 
was entitled as a matter of law to a vendor’s privilege and had therefore stated a 
cause of action. An interesting defense that was mentioned, though not resolved, 
in the opinion was that no vendor’s privilege arose because the defendant had 
paid by credit card. Id. at 987. 
 72. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2347 cmt. a (2015) (stating that encumbrances 
such as a vendor’s privilege imposed by law are not subject to the requirement 
of concurrence by the spouses, cited approvingly in Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 
568, 570 (La. 1987)). Nevertheless, Magee held that a non-concurring spouse is 
entitled to notice of the foreclosure sale of former community property under 
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983). Magee, 502 So. 
2d at 572. 
 73. See Long Leaf Lumber, Inc. v. Summer Grove Developers, Inc., 270 So. 
2d 588, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that no vendor’s privilege existed in 
favor of a company that had contracted to install heating and air conditioning 
units in a building, since there was no contract of sale and no vendor–vendee 
relationship existed between the company and the owner). Of course, the 
company would be entitled to a privilege on the entire immovable under the 
Private Works Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2007); Long Leaf, 270 
So. 2d at 591–92. For a discussion of the difference between a sale and a 
building contract, see DIAN TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 
1:10, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 23 (2012).  
 74. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 73, § 1:9; BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 487. Thus, the contribution of an 
immovable to a partnership without stipulation of a price other than the 
allocation to the transferor of shares in the partnership does not give rise to a 
privilege. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 575. A donor has 
no privilege even if pecuniary obligations are imposed on the donee. AUBRY ET 
RAU, supra note 20, § 263. But see HUC, supra note 42, No. 109 (arguing that it 
is arbitrary to grant the privilege in the case of contracts of sale but not in other 
contracts that augment the debtor’s patrimony). For a case in which a buyer 
curiously but unsuccessfully asserted entitlement to a vendor’s privilege, see In 
re Bulk Sales Agreement, 365 So. 2d 547 (La. Ct. App. 1978), holding that a 




privilege does not arise from a loan transaction by which the 
purchaser borrows the money to be used to purchase the property.75  
The vendor’s privilege is accessory to the obligation that it 
secures and thus transfers automatically with the transfer of the 
instrument evidencing the price, without the need for a special 
stipulation to that effect.76 Accordingly, even though a loan 
transaction does not itself give rise to a vendor’s privilege, it is 
                                                                                                             
 
buyer of goods who made advance payments in an amount greater than the price 
of the goods ultimately purchased was not entitled to a vendor’s privilege.  
 75. See, e.g., Johnson v. Turner, 218 So. 2d 363, 365 (La. Ct. App. 1969) 
(holding that a creditor who lent a purchaser the funds with which to purchase 
property had no vendor’s privilege on the property purchased). By contrast, the 
Uniform Commercial Code grants purchase money security interest status not 
only to a consensual security interest in favor of the actual seller but also to a 
security interest held by a secured party that lent the purchaser the money with 
which to make the purchase. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103 (Supp. 2015). 
House Bill 266 of 2011, if passed by the Louisiana Legislature, would have 
amended Louisiana Civil Code article 3307 to provide that “when the proceeds 
of a mortgage are used by the mortgagor to purchase immovable property, the 
mortgagee shall have the same ranking as a vendor in accordance with the rules 
set forth in Article 3251.” H.B. 266, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2011). Though 
this bill did not proceed beyond assignment to committee, it spawned a 
resolution requesting the Louisiana State Law Institute to study the advisability 
of creating a purchase money special mortgage. H. Con. Res. 15, 2011 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (La. 2011). After a comprehensive study, the Law Institute 
recommended against adoption in Louisiana of the concept of a purchase money 
mortgage with special priority. See Louisiana State Law Institute, Report of the 
Louisiana State Law Institute to the Louisiana Legislature in Response to HCR 
No. 15 of 2011 (Nov. 12, 2014) (regarding purchase money mortgage) (on file 
with the Louisiana State Law Institute). The French Civil Code now grants to 
the lender of funds for the acquisition of an immovable a privilege upon the 
immovable, even in the absence of subrogation from the vendor, but only if it is 
provided in an authentic act that the funds were borrowed for this purpose and 
the vendor acknowledges in an authentic act that he has been paid from the 
borrowed funds. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2374(2) (Fr.). The reason for the 
requirement of authentic declarations concerning the use of the borrowed funds 
is to prevent a debtor from favoring one creditor to the prejudice of others by a 
false claim that the loan proceeds were used to acquire the immovable. See 
PHILIPPE SIMLER & PHILIPPE DELEBECQUE, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETES LA 
PUBLICITE FONCIERE § 419 (6th ed. 2012); JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, LA VENTE 
D’IMMEUBLES EXISTANTS No. 297, at 203 (1983); AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 
20, § 263; HUC, supra note 42, No. 114. 
 76. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 232, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 
TREATISE (4th ed. 2014); see also Perot v. Levasseur, 21 La. Ann. 529, 530 
(1869); see generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2645, 3136 (2015); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 10:9-203(f) (Supp. 2015). But see First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of 
Warner Robins, Ga. v. Delta Towers, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1331, 1343 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (making the rather astonishing statement that a vendor’s privilege is not 
an accessory obligation).  




possible for a creditor who finances the purchase price to acquire a 
vendor’s privilege through the simple expedient of having the 
seller sell the property on credit, thus creating a vendor’s privilege, 
and then assign to the creditor the instrument evidencing the 
buyer’s obligation to pay the price. The vendor’s privilege, as an 
accessory, is transferred with the assignment of the instrument. For 
many years, institutional lenders in Louisiana followed this very 
practice in order to gain the benefit of a vendor’s privilege. 
In the case of movables, the vendor’s privilege affords the 
seller automatic security in the form of a right to be preferred over 
other creditors of the buyer. Historically, the only other security 
device available to the seller was the pledge,77 but a pledge could 
be created only if the seller retained possession.78 In a time before 
recognition of chattel mortgages79 and certainly before security 
interests under the Uniform Commercial Code,80 the vendor’s 
privilege allowed the seller to deliver possession and yet retain 
security. This same benefit still exists today, regardless of whether 
the seller for some reason failed to arrange for the buyer on credit 
                                                                                                             
 77. For a comprehensive history of the development of mortgages and an 
explanation of the reasons why France did not retain the Roman rule permitting 
movables to be encumbered by mortgage, see DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 4. See 
also BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 326.  
 78. Under article 3152 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, delivery of the 
thing pledged was essential to the very existence of the contract of pledge, even 
between the parties. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3149 (2015) (requiring “the 
thing pledged . . . [to be] delivered to the pledgee or a third person who has 
agreed to hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee” to create an effective 
pledge of a corporeal movable”). 
 79. Chattel mortgages were not recognized in Louisiana until the enactment 
of the first chattel mortgage law, Act 65 of 1912, which allowed a debtor to 
grant security in corporeal movable property without the necessity of placing the 
creditor into physical possession. See Act No. 65, 1912 La. Acts 75. The 
impetus for the adoption of the chattel mortgage law came from Judge David B. 
Samuel, who had practiced law in Arkansas, where chattel mortgages were then 
extensively used. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 6. Wisely, however, there was 
no attempt to import Arkansas notions of chattel mortgage; instead, the chattel 
mortgage was fashioned upon the model of the civilian mortgage upon 
immovables. Id. Because of political opposition to an exemption provision 
contained in the act, Governor Luther T. Hall refused to sign it, instead allowing 
it to become law without his signature. Id. 
 80. Louisiana was the last state to adopt Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. See Act No. 528, 1988 La. Acts 1367, amended by Act No. 
135, 1989 La. Acts 417 (adopting “Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial 
Laws” effective January 1, 1990). With the enactment of Act No. 128, 2001 La. 
Acts 561, Louisiana finally embraced the title “Uniform Commercial Code” in 
place of “Commercial Laws,” which a quarter century earlier had been 
considered to be a more apt description of a set of laws that were derided as 
being neither uniform nor worthy of the term “code.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§10:1-101 cmts. (2003 & Supp. 2011). 




to grant him a consensual security interest.81 However, the sale 
must be a Louisiana sale; otherwise, no vendor’s privilege arises 
under Louisiana law.82 
For immovables, the privilege affords even greater rights and is 
much stronger. As discussed below, the vendor’s privilege on 
immovables is unquestionably a real right, giving the vendor who 
has properly recorded the act of credit sale the right to assert his 
privilege even after the immovable has passed into the hands of a 
third person. The vendor’s privilege exempts the seller from having 
to bear the general privileges as mere mortgagees are forced to do.83 
More importantly, timely recordation of the vendor’s privilege 
causes it to outrank even previously existing mortgages against the 
vendee.84 This includes not only mortgages that may be recorded 
within the period of time prescribed for recordation of the privilege 
but also pre-existing mortgages bearing against the vendee’s 
property.85 
                                                                                                             
 81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Ins. Co., 541 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (La. Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding that the failure of the seller of an item of farm equipment to 
obtain a chattel mortgage did not deprive him of his vendor’s privilege and he 
therefore retained an insurable interest in the equipment).  
 82. See McIlvaine v. Legaré, 34 La. Ann. 923, 926 (1882); Fred E. Cooper, 
Inc. v. Farr, 165 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 1964); see also MICHAEL H. RUBIN, 
LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS § 31.1 (LexisNexis 2011); cf. 
De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. New Orleans & W.R. Co., 26 So. 455 
(La. 1899) (holding that, where a contract of sale made in New York 
contemplated delivery and testing of the movables in Louisiana, and the buyer’s 
acceptance was dependent on the results of the test and the movables remained 
the property of the seller and at its risk until thus tested and accepted, the 
contract was a Louisiana sale creating a vendor’s privilege). But see Jones v. 
Bradford, 353 So. 2d 1348, 1352 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (appearing to assume, 
without discussion, that a vendor’s privilege arose from the sale of equipment in 
Mississippi and holding that the privilege continued to be effective after the 
equipment was subsequently removed to Louisiana without the seller’s consent). 
Under a modern conflicts of law analysis, the inquiry should focus upon whether 
Louisiana substantive law is applicable to the sale, rather than merely the situs 
of the thing sold or the parties. See generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, 
supra note 73, §§ 1:11–18. 
 83. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3267 (2015). 
 84. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3186, 3274 (2015). 
 85. Until recently, there was another significant advantage of a vendor’s 
privilege as compared to a mere conventional mortgage: Under former 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:2183, vendor’s privileges, unlike 
conventional and judicial mortgages, were not divested by the expiration of the 
three-year redemptive period following a tax sale. Conservative Homestead 
Ass’n v. Flynn, 150 So. 564 (La. 1933); Whitfield v. Jones, 270 So. 2d 153 (La. 
Ct. App. 1972). However, the 2009 revision of the law of tax sales removed this 
advantage. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 47:2121(C) (2009) (enacted by Act No. 
819, 2009 La. Acts 3105). See also PETER S. TITLE, LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS § 17:37 (2d ed. 2014). The holder of a vendor’s privilege is 




The vendor’s privilege secures not only the price itself but also 
interest accruing on the price,86 attorneys’ fees stipulated in the 
obligation representing the purchase price,87 and any other monetary 
obligation of the purchaser undertaken in the sale transaction.88 In 
one relatively recent case, the Supreme Court held that a vendor’s 
privilege even secured the purchaser’s obligation to pay the seller an 
additional amount of money in the event that a reversionary clause 
in the act of sale was found to be unenforceable.89 It has also been 
held that a buyer’s agreement to reimburse the seller for the amount 
needed to clear encumbrances on property that the buyer “traded in” 
was an integral part of the purchase price secured by the vendor’s 
privilege, rather than an obligation separate and distinct from the 
sale.90 If several things are sold at the same time with an allocation 
of the purchase price among them, the vendor’s privilege on each 
thing sold secures only the portion of the price allocated to that 
thing.91 
                                                                                                             
 
nonetheless entitled to notice of the tax sale, and without notice to him the tax 
sale is absolutely null. Padilla v. Schwartz, 11 So. 3d 6, 14 (La. Ct. App. 2009).  
 86. Caldwell v. His Creditors, 9 La. 265, 267–68 (1836). See also BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 490. 
 87. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCall Bros. Planting & Mfg. Co., 73 
So. 857, 858 (La. 1917). 
 88. VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, at 155; HUC, supra note 42, No. 
112. 
 89. Lessard v. Lessard Acres, Inc., 349 So. 2d 293 (La. 1977). The Court 
cited Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. McCall Bros. Planting & Manufacturing 
Co., 73 So. 857 (La. 1917), for the proposition that a vendor’s privilege secures 
payment of attorney’s fees stipulated in the promissory note even though that is 
only a conditional obligation and found that the same principle applied to the 
conditional obligation of the purchaser in Lessard to pay the seller an additional 
sum in the event the reversionary clause was unenforceable. Lessard, 349 So. 2d 
at 297. According to the majority opinion, there is no reason why the seller and 
purchaser could not agree that the price would include an additional amount if 
the purchaser failed to comply with obligations imposed upon him. Id. Justice 
Tate dissented, believing that the stipulated payment was merely a penalty in 
lieu of the reversion of the property to the seller and, not being part of the 
purchase price, was not secured by the vendor’s privilege. Id. at 299. See 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 490; AUBRY ET RAU, supra 
note 20, § 263; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91 (expressing the view that the 
vendor’s privilege does not include damages that are awarded by the courts or 
that are due under a clause for stipulated damages). 
 90. Scott v. Reed, 524 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. Ct. App. 1988).  
 91. See HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. For a modern case applying this rule, 
see Ford v. J & J Pallets, Inc., 623 So. 2d 91 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (where a sale 
contract executed in connection with the sale of a business allocated the total 
purchase price between inventory and other assets and provided that the 
purchase price for the inventory would be payable over time, the court held that 
the vendor’s privilege attached only to the inventory). The court distinguished 




A sale and resale of a thing made for the sole purpose of 
acquiring a vendor’s privilege on the object is recognized under the 
law. For instance, it is lawful for the parties to an out-of-state sale to 
enter into another sale–resale in Louisiana for the purpose of 
creating a vendor’s privilege.92 As is well known, building and loan 
associations for decades used the sale–resale transaction for the 
express purpose of creating a vendor’s privilege in the association’s 
favor—a practice that is discussed in detail below.  
As the cases cited in the introduction to this Article illustrate, the 
assumption of a debt due to one of the vendor’s creditors—such as a 
mortgagee—creates a vendor’s privilege in favor of that creditor on 
the thing sold.93 It has been held that, if the vendee assumes a debt 
secured by an outstanding mortgage that burdens only a portion of 
the estate sold to the vendee, the vendor’s privilege thus created in 
favor of the mortgagee nonetheless burdens the entire estate.94  
                                                                                                             
 
De La Vergne Refrigerating Machine Co. v. New Orleans & W.R. Co., 26 So. 
455 (La. 1899), in which the parties made no allocation of the purchase price 
between two items of equipment sold. Ford, 623 So. 2d at 94. 
 92. Pratt Eng’g & Mach. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 65 So. 100 (La. 1914); 
Edward J. Gay & Co. v. Crichlow & Donelson, 29 La. Ann. 122, 123 (1877). 
 93. De L’Isle v. Succession of Moss, 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882); Conté v. 
Cain, 33 La. Ann. 965 (1881); Franklin Press, Inc. v. Nat’l Diversified Corp., 
286 So. 2d 469, 472 (La. Ct. App. 1974). 
 94. Citizens’ Bank of La. v. Succession of Cuny, 38 La. Ann. 360 (1886). 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5383 appears to intend to alter this result, 
though the statute is awkwardly worded and written in a way that seems not to 
recognize that the assumption itself creates a new vendor’s privilege:  
In a transfer of more than one parcel of immovable property, no 
assumption in globo is created by the assumption by a purchaser of 
more than one vendor’s privilege and/or mortgage, unless the contrary 
is expressed in said transfer. In such cases, whenever separate parcels 
of immovable property are transferred to a purchaser who expressly 
assumes the payment of the vendor’s privileges and/or mortgages 
bearing against the immovable property purchased, each vendor’s 
privilege and/or mortgage shall be deemed to have each been assumed 
separately and distinctly as if only one parcel of immovable property 
had been transferred, and each such vendor’s privilege and/or mortgage 
shall continue to affect and bear against only the specific immovable 
property described in the instrument by which the vendor’s privilege 
and/or mortgage was originally created. Likewise, unless the contrary is 
expressed in said transfer, any resolutory condition or right to rescind 
arising in favor of the vendor as a result of the failure to pay any of the 
vendor’s privileges and/or mortgages shall be deemed to apply only to 
the immovable property affected by its respective vendor’s privilege 
and/or mortgage.  
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5383 (2007); VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, 
at 162 (explaining that this statute was “apparently intended to create a 
presumption that the vendor’s privilege on each piece of property is limited to 




As will be explored in considerable depth below in the 
discussion of whether vendor’s privileges constitute real rights, the 
vendor’s privilege on a movable is lost when the vendee sells and 
delivers the thing to a second buyer. Because the vendor does not 
have a general privilege on the property of the vendee, the vendor 
does not have a privilege on the cash price received by the vendee 
from the sale of the movable subject to the vendor’s privilege, even 
though that sale causes the loss of his privilege.95 However, if the 
second sale is made on credit, the original vendor’s privilege 
nonetheless continues to encumber the unpaid price owed by the 
second buyer.96 The vendor’s privilege similarly continues to exist 
upon proceeds of the sale of the thing by a receiver and proceeds 
of the judicial sale of a thing while the proceeds are still in the 
hands of the court.97 By special statute, the holder of a vendor’s 
privilege on movable property destroyed by fire has a privilege, 
with the rank of a vendor’s privilege, on the claim for money due 
to the vendee under insurance policies covering the property.98  
As a procedural matter, the assertion of a vendor’s privilege 
enables seizure of the property by sequestration before judgment.99 
Enforcement of the vendor’s privilege is subject to the Deficiency 
Judgment Act,100 and the creditor’s extrajudicial sale of the 
property subject to a vendor’s privilege, or a judicial sale without 
appraisement, will thus cause a loss of the creditor’s deficiency 
rights.101 
                                                                                                             
 
that part of the indebtedness that was assumed which is secured by a pre-
existing mortgage or privilege on that property, unless the parties provide to the 
contrary”). 
 95. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 496; 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232.  
 96. S.O. Nelson & Co. v. John C. Simpson-Hill, McLean & Co., 9 La. Ann. 
311, 313 (1854). For a discussion of the reasons why the privilege attaches to 
the unpaid price owed by the second buyer, see BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., 
supra note 26, No. 497, and BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511. But see 
HUC, supra note 42, No. 92 (questioning the soundness of this rule). 
 97. Millaudon v. New-Orleans Water Co., 11 Mart. (o.s.) 278, 279 (La. 
1822); Terry v. Terry, 10 La. 68 (1836). See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 
76, § 232; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. 
 98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4581 (2007). This principle is in accord with 
French doctrine. See AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 263; BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 499 (noting the insurance proceeds 
being assimilated to the price produced by the sale). 
 99. See W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 269 So. 2d 186 (La. 1972); see also 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3571 (2015). 
 100. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4106 (2006). 
 101. See Cormier v. Castille, 488 So. 2d 247, 248 (La. Ct. App. 1986); 
Justice v. Caballero, 393 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. Ct. App. 1981). In contrast, 




In an apparent attempt to strengthen the protections afforded by 
vendor’s privileges on immovables, the legislation that adopted a 
non-uniform version of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, effective January 1, 1990,102 also enacted Louisiana Revised 
Statutes sections 9:5550 through 9:5554, which somewhat 
surprisingly pair vendor’s privileges with collateral mortgages.103 
The definition given to the term “vendor’s privilege” in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:5550(2),104 which contemplates that a 
vendor’s privilege might secure a collateral mortgage note, reflects 
a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of a vendor’s 
privilege, which can arise only by operation of law and therefore 
could never secure a collateral mortgage note. Section 5554 
provides, in the case of both collateral mortgages and vendor’s 
privileges, that there is no requirement of registry of the pledge, 
transfer or assignment of, or the granting of a security interest in, 
the obligation secured by either.105 Section 5553 in effect makes 
                                                                                                             
 
enforcement of a security interest arising under the Uniform Commercial Code 
is exempt from the provisions of the Deficiency Judgment Act. See LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 10:9-626(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 102. Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417. 
 103. For a discussion of the nature and theory of a collateral mortgage, see 
Diamond Services Corp. v. Benoit, 780 So. 2d 367 (La. 2001), and First 
Guaranty Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978). See also Max Nathan, Jr., 
& H. Gayle Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497 (1973). A 
“collateral mortgage note” is defined in Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which, since 1990, has governed the granting of a security interest in a 
collateral mortgage note. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(d)(3) (Supp. 
2015). Apparently unaware of this change in the law in 1990, some courts 
appear to labor under the erroneous belief that the Civil Code articles governing 
pledge continue to apply to collateral mortgage notes. See, e.g., CadleRock Joint 
Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., 152 So. 3d 1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014); 
Nine-O-Five Royal Apartment Hotel, Inc. v. Atkins, 151 So. 3d 739 (La. Ct. 
App. 2014); Gulf Nat., L.L.C. v. Alfortish, Inc., 926 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 
2006); see also Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on Pledge, 75 LA. L. REV. 697, 
704 n.39 (2015); David S. Willenzik, Louisiana Future Advance Mortgages: A 
20-Year Retrospective, 75 LA. L. REV. 613, 695 (2015). 
 104. “‘Vendor’s privilege’ shall mean a vendor’s lien or vendor’s privilege 
on immovable property that secures a written obligation, such as a collateral 
mortgage note, negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument, or other written 
evidence of debt.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5550(2) (2007). 
 105. Although there may be no requirement of registry of the pledge, transfer 
or assignment, there is a consequence of failing to record the instrument. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3356 (2015). What the statute may have intended is that there 
is no requirement of registry in order for executory process to be available to 
enforce a collateral mortgage or vendor’s privilege. Act 135 of 1989 made 
substantial changes to the articles of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing upon 
the requirements for executory process. See Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417. 




certain defenses, other than the defense of forged signatures, 
personal to the original obligor and precludes other persons from 
raising them as a basis for extinguishment of a vendor’s privilege 
if the original obligor does not do so. Included among these 
defenses are the invalidity or extinguishment of the underlying 
obligation and the lack of registry of the transfer, assignment, or 
pledge of the obligation secured by the vendor’s privilege. As yet, 
only one case has applied this statute, holding that a third possessor 
may not assert prescription of an obligation secured by a vendor’s 
privilege on an immovable when the original obligor has not raised 
this defense.106 
V. THE PRIVILEGE DISTINGUISHED FROM 
THE RIGHT OF DISSOLUTION 
The vendor’s privilege is, of course, but one arrow in the 
quiver of the seller, who also enjoys the right of dissolution of the 
sale in the event the vendee fails to pay the price.107 The exercise 
                                                                                                             
 106. Giddens v. Giddens, 722 So. 2d 114 (La. Ct. App. 1998). The opinion 
might be criticized on both the ground that it treats the accrual of liberative 
prescription as an extinguishment of the prescribed obligation and the ground 
that it ignores Louisiana Civil Code article 3453, which specifically provides 
that persons having an interest “in the extinction of a claim or of a real right by 
prescription may plead prescription, even if the person in whose favor 
prescription has accrued renounces or fails to plead prescription.” On the former 
ground, see Louisiana Civil Code article 3447, which provides that liberative 
prescription is a means of barring an action (rather than a means of extinction of 
an obligation), and Louisiana Civil Code article 3277, which lists both 
extinction of the debt secured by a privilege and prescription as separate causes 
for the extinction of a privilege. On the latter ground, see Louisiana Civil Code 
articles 3453 and 3447. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (1870); AUBRY ET 
RAU, supra note 20, § 292 (asserting on the basis of the article of the French 
Civil Code analogous to Louisiana Civil Code article 3453, that a third 
possessor can plead prescription even if the debtor has renounced it).  
 107. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2561–2653 (2015). Under the Code Napoléon, the 
unpaid seller of a movable is granted four different rights correlative to the 
buyer’s obligation to pay the price: (i) the right of retention until payment is 
made; (ii) the vendor’s privilege; (iii) the right of dissolution; and (iv) the right 
of revendication discussed above. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra 
note 26, No. 482. The unpaid seller of an immovable enjoys only the first three 
of these, but his rights are nonetheless much stronger because his privilege 
entails a right of pursuit, obviating the need for the right of revendication 
accorded to the seller of a movable. Id. No. 566. In a credit sale of either a 
movable or an immovable, the seller is afforded only the vendor’s privilege and 
right of dissolution. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 507. The Louisiana 
Civil Code recognizes all four of these rights, in addition to the remedy of 
stoppage in transit allowed to the seller of a movable under Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2614. That remedy was borrowed from Article 2 of the model 
Uniform Commercial Code, which has not been adopted in Louisiana.  




of this right is, of course, antithetical to the vendor’s privilege. 
With the exercise of the right of dissolution of the sale, the vendor 
undoes the sale and must return whatever portion of the price that 
has been paid.108 Enforcement of the vendor’s privilege, on the other 
hand, is an affirmation of the sale by which the vendor seeks to 
enforce the vendee’s obligation to pay the price.109 The right of a 
vendor to seek dissolution of a sale upon non-payment of the price 
and the vendor’s privilege are distinct remedies, neither of which is 
dependent on the existence of the other.110 Thus, the Supreme Court 
has held that a provision in an act of sale to the effect that the 
vendee’s obligation to pay the price would be a personal obligation 
and that no “lien” would exist in favor of the vendor does not waive 
the vendor’s separate right of dissolution.111 Another difference 
between the two alternative rights is recordation: Where immovables 
are concerned, the vendor’s privilege must be evidenced by a 
recordation in the mortgage records.112 On the other hand, the right of 
dissolution can be asserted against third persons113 without the 
necessity of recordation in the mortgage records, so long as the act 
conveying the immovable to the vendee does not reflect that the 
price was paid.114 The fact that the vendor has lost, or failed to 
                                                                                                             
 108. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2561 cmt. e (2015). See also Lee v. Taylor, 21 La. 
Ann. 514 (1869); Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 17 So. 2d 264, 268 (La. 
1944); see generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 73, §§ 15:9–
22. 
 109. Robertson v. Buoni, 504 So. 2d 860, 862 (La. 1987). 
 110. Id. at 863; Johnson v. Bloodworth, 12 La. Ann. 699 (1857); Louis 
Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 17 So. 2d 264 (La. 1944). See also Shapiro v. 
Kimbrough, 20 So. 2d 24, 29 (La. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that a previous suit 
for judgment on the note secured by the vendor’s privilege is not a bar, under a 
theory of either estoppel or res judicata, to a subsequent claim for dissolution). 
Shapiro v. Kimbrough cites Canal Bank v. Copeland, 15 La. 75 (1840), for the 
proposition that “a previous suit for the specific performance of a contract, far 
from being a bar to subsequent action for its rescission, is by our law considered 
as one of the preliminary steps to be resorted to.” Shapiro, 20 So. 2d at 29. 
 111. Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248, 252 (La. 1975) (holding that in order 
for the seller to waive his separate and independent right to dissolve the sale, he 
must express his intent to do so in words that make specific reference to the 
action to dissolve as distinguished from the action to enforce the contract).  
 112. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3271, 3274 (2015). See discussion infra Part VI. 
 113. The right to dissolution of the sale of an immovable for non-payment of 
the price is not contingent on the absence of a third-party purchaser, and a 
vendor seeking dissolution of the sale may do so even after the property has left 
the hands of the original purchaser. See Buoni, 504 So. 2d 860. 
 114. See, e.g., City Bank & Trust Co. v. Caneco Constr., Inc., 341 So. 2d 
1331 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the seller was barred by both the parol 
evidence rule and the public records doctrine from seeking to enforce to the 
prejudice of a mortgagee either the seller’s right to dissolve or its vendor’s 
privilege, where the act of sale recited that the purchase price had been paid in 




preserve, a vendor’s privilege presents no obstacle to the exercise 
of the separate right of dissolution.115  
Until the revision of the sales articles of the Civil Code in 
1993, there was another interesting distinction between the 
vendor’s privilege and the right of dissolution. Following prior 
jurisprudence, Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White116 held that the 
action to dissolve a sale for the non-payment of the purchase price 
is a personal action that prescribes in 10 years,117 running from the 
moment the buyer defaults on the payment of the credit portion of 
the price. Applying the rule that the right of dissolution is 
independent of the vendor’s privilege and is not dependent on the 
preservation of the privilege, the Court reaffirmed earlier holdings 
to the effect that the right of dissolution may be exercised even if 
the notes given to evidence the price have prescribed.118 The Court 
rejected an argument that this rule was altered by a 1924 
amendment to Civil Code article 2561 making the right of 
dissolution an accessory to the credit representing the price.119 
Nevertheless, the rule established in Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. 
was ultimately altered in the 1993 revision of the law of sales: If an 
instrument is given to evidence the price, the right of dissolution 
now prescribes at the same time and in the same period as the 
                                                                                                             
 
full, and rejecting arguments that mortgagee, as the drawee bank, knew that a 
check given to the seller for the remaining balance of the purchase price had 
been returned for insufficient funds). 
 115. Stevenson v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 461, 464 (1880). See also LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2561 cmt. h (2015). 
 116. 17 So. 2d 264, 269 (La. 1944). See supra note 110. 
 117. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499 (2015). 
 118. See, e.g., Sch. Dirs. v. Anderson, 28 La. Ann. 739, 741 (1876) (holding 
that “the prescription of the notes given as evidence of the price does not affect 
[the right of action to dissolve a sale], the right to dissolve not being an 
accessory to but different from the right to enforce the payment of the price”); 
see also Templeman v. Pegues, 24 La. Ann. 537, 543 (1872) (spawning a dissent 
by Justice Howe complaining that, under the majority’s holding, “the action to 
dissolve still exists—wandering about like a disembodied evil spirit”—a result 
he viewed to be “not a trifle worse than the system of unrecorded tacit 
mortgages from which we boast a recent deliverance”). 
 119. According to the court’s opinion:  
By amending and reenacting Article 2561 of the Code so as to provide 
that ‘This right of dissolution shall be an accessory of the credit 
representing the price’, the Legislature evidently did not intend to put 
the ‘right to dissolve’ on ‘all-fours’ with the accessory right of 
mortgage and vendor’s privilege ‘as regards the term of its existence’. 
In other words, it did not intend to change the prescriptive period 
applicable to actions to enforce the resolutory condition.  
Louis Werner Saw Mill Co., 17 So. 2d at 269.  




instrument.120 The vendor’s privilege, being an accessorial right, is 
also extinguished when the underlying obligation prescribes.121  
It is equally important, in the case of the sale of movables, not 
to confuse the seller’s right of dissolution with the right of 
revendication, or restitution as it is known in Civil Code articles 
3229 through 3231. Originally, the right of revendication afforded to 
the unpaid seller who did not grant a term for payment was viewed 
in France as a simplified and expeditious means of dissolving a sale 
when the conditions for its exercise were satisfied.122 In time, 
however, this theory was rejected. Unlike the action in dissolution, 
exercise of the right of revendication leaves the contract intact, its 
goal being simply to return possession of the thing sold to the seller 
so that he can again exercise his right of retention.123 The right of 
revendication, leading to restoration of the seller’s right of 
retention,124 protects the seller against the possibility of loss of the 
vendor’s privilege, which would be extinguished by the buyer’s 
further alienation of the movable.125 
                                                                                                             
 120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2561 (2015). 
 121. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (2015). See, e.g., Dassau v. Seary, 158 So. 2d 
243, 244–45 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (holding that where a promissory note secured 
by a vendor’s privilege on an immovable contained an automatic acceleration 
clause, it prescribed five years after default and the vendor’s privilege of 
necessity became unenforceable, because the principal obligation had 
prescribed).  
 122. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 521. 
 123. The seller who exercises the right of revendication finds himself in 
exactly the same place in which he was before delivery. Exercise of the right of 
revendication is not antithetical to exercise of the right of dissolution. Once the 
seller regains possession, he can either enforce payment of the price through the 
exercise of his privilege or, if he prefers, institute an action to dissolve the sale. 
However, the seller does not necessarily demand the dissolution of the sale by 
exercising his right of revendication. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra 
note 26, Nos. 520–536. Although Huc admits that this is the prevailing view, he 
maintains that a better interpretation of the article allowing the right of 
revendication is that it enables the seller to dissolve the sale of right under the 
limited circumstances of the article, without incurring the delay and risks 
inherent in pursuing a judicial action for dissolution. HUC, supra note 42, Nos. 
100–102. 
 124. The seller’s right of retention, found presently in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 2487, is founded on the idea that, in the synallagmatic contract of sale, it 
is the buyer who should first perform by paying the price. Of the two parties to 
the sale, the buyer places himself less at risk by being the first to perform since, 
as owner of the thing sold, he can revendicate the thing in the hands of the seller 
and force delivery without coming into competition with the seller’s creditors. 
The right of retention does not exist in the case of a credit sale because the seller 
has agreed to grant the buyer credit and therefore must perform first. See 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 507.  
 125. Though Louisiana Civil Code articles 3229 through 3231 contemplate 
that the seller can “prevent the resale” of the thing sold, he cannot undo a resale 





To affect third persons, a vendor’s privilege on an immovable 
must be recorded in the mortgage records by the express command 
of article 3271 of the Civil Code.126 Recordation in the conveyance 
records alone is insufficient to preserve the privilege.127 In order 
for the privilege to enjoy a preference over previously recorded 
mortgages, it must be recorded within the period prescribed by 
article 3274 of the Civil Code.128 If not recorded within that period, 
the privilege enjoys no preference over mortgages that were 
previously filed and has “effect against all parties from date of 
registry.”129 Vendor’s privileges on immovables are subject to the 
same requirements of reinscription that apply to mortgages.130  
On the other hand, the law generally excuses the requirement 
of recordation of privileges on movable property, except as 
otherwise prescribed by law.131 Because the law does not otherwise 
prescribe, the vendor’s privilege on movables thus exists without the 
                                                                                                             
 
that has already been made. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3229–3231 (2015); Hill v. 
Morgan, 4 Mart. (n.s.) 475, 480 (La. 1826). 
 126. See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3338, 3346 (2015); LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 
19 (1921); Morrison v. Trudeaux, 1 Mart. (n.s.) 384 (La. 1823). Registry is 
unnecessary for the preservation of the privilege between the parties. See 
Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 186 So. 338, 341 (1939) (interpreting Louisiana 
Civil Code article 3271 to refer only to the rights of third persons and not the 
immediate parties to the contract of sale).  
 127. Verges v. Prejean, 24 La. Ann. 78, 78–79 (1872); White v. Union Bank, 
6 La. Ann. 162, 164 (1851). Woodward v. Investors-Ryan, 600 So. 2d 855, 858 
(La. Ct. App. 1992), applied this rule to an assumption deed, holding that its 
recordation in the conveyance records did not preserve the vendor’s privilege 
arising from the assumption. See also Comm’r of Ins. v. Terrell, 647 So. 2d 445 
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that where an act of sale did not mention a 
promissory note that had been given to evidence the unpaid purchase price or 
otherwise indicate that the sale was made on credit, but at the same time a 
mortgage was executed to secure this note, any vendor’s privilege the seller 
might have had was not properly preserved by the recordation of the act of sale 
only in the conveyance records, and the vendor’s privilege was therefore 
subordinate to a previously recorded judgment against the purchaser. The court 
rejected arguments that anyone looking at the recorded act of sale and mortgage 
should have seen that the transaction was in the nature of a credit sale and would 
have been put on notice of the existence of the vendor’s privilege). 
 128. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2015). The period is 7 days if the property is 
located in the same parish where the act was passed; otherwise, the period is 15 
days. 
 129. Id. 
 130. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3357–3365 (2015). 
 131. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921).  




requirement of recordation.132 However, under the express wording of 
the Civil Code, the vendor’s privilege is lost when the vendee no 
longer possesses the movable.133 Thus, in the absence of an 
assumption, a second buyer who obtains possession of a movable 
takes free of a vendor’s privilege held by his seller’s vendor.134 
Recordation of the vendor’s privilege on a movable does not cause it 
to follow the movable into the hands of a third person, nor does 
recordation of some other privilege on a movable give that privilege 
priority over an unrecorded vendor’s privilege on the same 
movable.135  
At one time, there was considerable controversy over whether a 
vendor’s privilege on a movable had to be recorded in the mortgage 
records in order to remain enforceable against third persons after the 
movable became immobilized. As more fully discussed below, that 
controversy appears to have been resolved by a number of holdings to 
the effect that no registry is required.136 
VII. VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES AS REAL RIGHTS 
If the Latin maxim adheret visceribus rei is a reliable guide, it 
would seem that vendor’s privileges must necessarily constitute 
real rights, for adhering to the very viscera of a thing might even 
be viewed as somewhat of a definition of a real right. As it turns 
out, this inference would undoubtedly be correct in the case of 
immovables. In contrast, for the vendor’s privilege on movables, 
the issue is as complex as its resolution is uncertain.  
Before turning to the interesting question of the status of vendor’s 
privileges as real rights, it is useful to formulate a workable definition 
of what is meant by the term.137 In a comprehensive article on the 
subject written in 1963,138 Professor A. N. Yiannopoulos writes that 
                                                                                                             
 132. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232. 
 133. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3227 (2015). 
 134. This issue is considered in depth below in the discussion of whether 
vendor’s privileges constitute real rights. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 135. German v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 5 Teiss. 184, 187 (La. Ct. App. 1908). 
 136. Nonetheless, the very existence of the vendor’s privilege following 
immobilization is now doubtful, irrespective of the recordation issue. See 
discussion infra Part VIII.E. 
 137. The term real right is nowhere defined in the articles of the Louisiana 
Civil Code. But see LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmts. b, d (2015); LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1763 cmt. b (2015). Article 1763 defines a real obligation as the duty correlative 
and incidental to a real right, and comment (b) to that article includes a 
definition of a real right as “a right in a thing that can be held against the world.” 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1763 & cmt. b (2015). 
 138. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law: 
Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161 (1963) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, Real Rights]. 




the traditional definition of a real right in France is “said to involve 
subjection of a thing, in whole or in part, to the authority of a person 
by virtue of a direct relationship which can be asserted against the 
world.”139 He concludes that real rights are ultimately distinguishable 
from personal rights in France by the presence of two essential 
attributes: the right to follow and the right of preference.140 It seems 
to be a fair inference from his work that these same two defining 
characteristics are, or at least should be, observed in Louisiana.141 
Privileges, of course, by their very nature always involve a right of 
preference. It follows then that a privilege can be classified as a real 
right only if it also entails a right of pursuit of the thing sold in the 
hands of third persons.142 
There is little doubt of the nature of vendor’s privileges on 
immovables as real rights.143 Planiol refers to them as “veritable 
mortgages” and includes them among the “privileged mortgages.”144 
But, he emphatically insists that privileges on movables—the 
vendor’s privilege included—are mere rights of preference: 
But for all the other privileged creditors [i.e., other than those 
holding special privileges on immovables and pledges], no real 
right exists. Only those are real rights which protect a person 
against all others in the total or partial possession of a thing. 
Such are ownership, usufruct, servitudes, emphyteusis,145 
                                                                                                             
 139. Id. at 171. 
 140. Id. at 174. In French terminology, these characteristics are known as the 
droit de suite and the droit de préférence. At Roman law, privileges conferred 
only a right of preference assertable against the creditors of the debtor and did 
not include any right of pursuit. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 
26, at i. 
 141. See also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 215. 
 142. F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS No. 314 (2d ed. 
1878) (asserting that, even though privileges on movables do not include a right 
of pursuit, it would be error to conclude that they are not real rights, for the fact 
that a right exists in a thing suffices for the right to be considered a real right). 
According to Laurent, the absence of a right of pursuit results not from the 
nature of privileges on movables but rather from application of the doctrine of la 
possession vaut titre. See also id. No. 485 (specifically referring to the vendor’s 
privilege on a movable as a real right). 
 143. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232. For recent cases affirming the 
principle that a vendor’s privilege on an immovable follows the property into the 
hands of third persons, see Newman v. Livingston Parish Police Jury, 603 So. 2d 
250, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1992), and Verret v. Rougeau, 579 So. 2d 1239, 1240 
(La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 144. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 2548, 2886. See also BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, at ii; VETTER & HARRELL, supra note 14, 
at 155. 
 145. Professor Yiannopoulos describes emphyteusis as an institution of 
Greek law borrowed by Roman law consisting of “a contract according to which 




pledge; such is also the mortgage, because it tends to leave the 
thing to the creditor and authorizes the latter to transfer the 
ownership to another. In privileges there is nothing like that: It 
is a simple right of priority between creditors, a permit to come 
in out of turn in the division of the price, and it is thus that the 
law looks upon it in defining it “as a right which the creditor 
has to be preferred.”146 
Laurent147 and Aubry and Rau148 are in accord. However, a 
number of French commentators disagree. For instance, in response to 
the argument that the vendor of a movable has no right of pursuit 
because a creditor is not permitted to seize things that have been 
alienated by his debtor, Baudry-Lacantinerie counters that “all 
privileges, the privileges on movables like privileges on immovables, 
are real rights” and that “real rights engender a right of pursuit.”149  
In Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Leger,150 the court embraced the 
notion that a vendor’s privilege on a movable, unlike a duly recorded 
chattel mortgage, is a mere right of preference giving the creditor no 
right of pursuit: 
Furthermore, the courts of this state should note a difference 
between a privilege which confers a right of preference and 
                                                                                                             
 
one delivered to another a piece of land either in perpetuity of for a long period 
of time, the recipient undertaking the obligation to cultivate the land and to pay 
an annual rent.” Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 185. See also 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 225. Emphyteusis was known under the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as the “rent of lands” governed by articles 2779 
through 2792. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 225. These articles were 
left intact without revision in the 2004 revision of the law of lease, but the real 
right known as the rent of lands was suppressed in the 2012 adoption of the 
annuity charge. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2787 (2015), enacted by Act No. 258, 
2012 La. Acts 1698. 
 146. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2548. See also BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 361–363 (explaining that, on account of 
the rule of la possession vaut titre, privileges on movables, whether general or special, 
confer only a right of preference and no right of pursuit). 
 147. According to Laurent, the fact that the Civil Code provides that the 
vendor’s privilege on a movable is lost when the buyer no longer has possession 
does not mean that it necessarily continues to exist so long as the buyer retains 
possession. Upon the buyer’s alienation of the thing, the privilege is lost because 
it is no longer within his patrimony and his creditors thus no longer have 
recourse against it. See LAURENT, supra note 142, Nos. 478–479. 
 148. AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 261. 
 149. “On peut répondre tout d’abord que tous les privilèges, les privilèges 
sur les meubles comme les privilèges sur les immeubles, sont des droits réels. Or 
the droits réels engendrent un droit de suite . . . . ” BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET 
AL., supra note 26, No. 495 (author’s translation). 
 150. 169 So. 170 (La. Ct. App. 1936). 




one which also gives the additional right to follow the property 
on which it rests into the hands of a third person or persons. . . . 
 
This distinction is marked by the French commentators in 
apt phrases. Under their nomenclature, privileges of the first 
class, which are by far the most numerous, confer a “droit de 
preference” only, while those of the second class confer in 
addition a “droit de suite.” It is the holder of a privileged 
debt of the first class who is obliged to intervene by way of 
third opposition and to ask for a separate appraisement and 
sale of the property on which he has a privilege in order to 
preserve his rights when said property is seized in globo with 
other property of the debtor by a third person. The reason is 
obvious. In such a case, the property passes to the purchaser 
free of encumbrances. The contest for preference is then 
fought out over the proceeds. . . . 151 
Professor Yiannopoulos asserts that the entire controversy of 
whether privileges on movables create real rights is “without 
purpose” in Louisiana because, contrary to the practice in France 
where legal classification drives the consequences, Louisiana 
courts “are seldom inclined to derive practical consequences from 
abstract qualifications” (i.e., abstract labels). He maintains that the 
process is in effect reversed in Louisiana, with the classification of 
the privilege as real or personal being made “only in light of its 
function.”152 Thus, the question becomes whether, from a functional 
standpoint, the vendor’s privilege on a movable can be regarded as a 
real right. Under both the Code Napoléon and the Louisiana Civil 
Code, the vendor’s privilege on a movable exists only for as long as 
the movable remains in the possession of the vendee.153 Thus, 
continued possession—rather than continued ownership—by the 
vendee appears to be the critical factor. It is clear that if the vendee 
re-sells the thing to a third person who has taken possession, the 
                                                                                                             
 151. Id. at 173–74. As the court in Liquid Carbonic notes, it is not only a 
private sale that will cause the holder of a privilege to lose his rights; the same 
effect will result from a judicial sale, even if the sale is made at the instance of a 
creditor holding an inferior privilege or an unsecured creditor. In order to 
preserve his rights, the holder of the superior privilege must intervene to assert 
his rights to the proceeds from the sale. In any event, he has no right of pursuit 
against the property, even though his right is superior to that of the seizing 
creditor. 
 152. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 223–24; 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 231. 
 153. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3217, 3227 (2015); CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2102 
(Fr.) (1804). The same rule is found in article 2332 of the current French Civil 
Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.). 




privilege is lost, even if the original vendor and vendee have 
attempted to derogate from this rule by agreement.154 But, the 
vendee might very well have sold the thing to a second buyer, yet 
remain in physical possession. Does the original vendor’s privilege 
persist? Planiol observes that the concept that a vendor’s privilege is 
available “as long as the effects sold are still in the possession of the 
debtor” is borrowed from ancient authors, who probably meant “not 
having been alienated by him.”155 According to Planiol, it is not the 
fact of possession but rather the fact of alienation that must be 
considered. Thus, if the buyer pledges or deposits the thing sold, the 
privilege still subsists, because the buyer is still the possessor of the 
thing by the intermediation of another. In the situation in which the 
buyer has alienated the thing but has not yet delivered possession, 
Planiol notes that some authors believe that the privilege subsists 
because the thing is still in the possession of the buyer, but he argues 
that this is error because the original vendee now holds precariously 
for his own buyer. Since the thing has passed from the patrimony of 
the original seller’s debtor, it is no longer the common pledge of his 
creditors, and to seize it again despite the alienation would give him 
a right of pursuit that the law does not permit. 
As Planiol himself observes, his views on this issue are by no 
means universally accepted. For instance, Beudant156 argues that the 
possession requirement is a simple application of article 2279 of the 
French Civil Code: En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre.157 
Thus, the vendor’s privilege is lost when the thing is sold and 
delivered to a third person who is in good faith, that is, who is 
unaware of the continued existence of the vendor’s privilege.158 
Mere alienation does not cause a loss of the privilege or a right of 
pursuit to enforce it, because delivery of “real possession” is 
essential to the third person’s ability to invoke the protection of la 
possession vaut titre.159 
                                                                                                             
 154. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 491; BEUDANT 
ET AL., supra note 18, § 511; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. 
 155. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2618. 
 156. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511. 
 157. In English: With respect to movables, possession is equivalent to title 
(author’s translation). See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2276 (Fr.) (formerly article 
2279).  
 158. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., 
supra note 26, No. 491; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. 
 159. BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 511. Similarly, Baudry-Lacantinerie 
asserts that the vendor’s privilege on a movable can still be exercised if the 
buyer has sold the thing to a second buyer who has not yet taken possession; 
however, if possession has been delivered to the second buyer, exercise of the 
original seller’s privilege is “paralyzed” by application of the doctrine of la 
possession vaut titre. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 495. 




Dreyfous v. Cade160 is an early example of the application in 
Louisiana of the rule that delivery of possession to a second buyer 
will cause a loss of the vendor’s privilege. In that case, the buyer 
of certain items of agricultural equipment on credit placed them on 
his plantation for its service and improvement and then sold both 
the plantation and the equipment to a third person. Afterward, the 
original seller of the equipment sought to enforce a vendor’s 
privilege against the second buyer. The Court held that, with very 
limited exceptions,161 the vendor’s privilege on movable property 
exists only so long as the property remains in the possession of the 
vendee.162 Because the equipment had left the possession of the 
original buyer, the vendor’s privilege was no longer enforceable.163 
The Court held that this result was not altered by the fact that the 
second buyer “may have known of the embarrassed circumstances 
of his immediate vendor.”164 On this point, the Court’s holding 
                                                                                                             
 
According to Baudry-Lacantinerie, if there has been no delivery, there is no real 
exercise of a right of pursuit, because the exercise of a right of pursuit 
presupposes that the thing is in the hands of a third person. 
 160. 70 So. 231 (La. 1915). 
 161. See, e.g., Act No. 63, 1890 La. Acts 51 (allowing the seller of 
agricultural products of the United States in any chartered city of the state to 
have a special privilege for a period of five days after delivery, within which he 
can seize the products in whosoever hands they may be found); see also supra 
note 44. 
 162. The jurisprudence has held that delivery of a warehouse receipt or bill 
of lading covering goods that are affected by a vendor’s privilege is considered 
to constitute actual delivery of the goods, extinguishing the vendor’s privilege. 
See, e.g., Fetter v. Field, 1 La. Ann. 80, 83–84 (1846); Laughlin v. Ganahl, 11 
Rob. 140, 143 (La. 1845).  
 163. Another factor behind the Court’s decision in Dreyfous was that the 
equipment, with the plaintiff’s knowledge, had become immovable by 
destination and, since the contract out of which the privilege arose was 
unrecorded, the Court found that it became utterly null and void against the 
purchaser of the plantation under the rule of McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 (La. 
1909). See Dreyfous, 70 So. at 233. The Court’s holding on this point would 
now appear questionable in light of subsequent jurisprudence. See discussion 
infra Part VIII.E. 
 164. Dreyfous, 70 So. at 232. Professor Daggett maintains that the Court’s 
holding on this point applies only in the absence of fraud, and if the resale is 
made in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the vendor’s privilege, the court 
will not further the vendee’s purpose by decreeing the privilege lost. See 
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51. For another case holding that a second buyer’s 
knowledge of the existence of an existing vendor’s privilege on a movable does 
not cause the vendor’s privilege to survive a sale to that buyer, see Queen City 
Broad. Co. v. Wagenwest, Inc., 264 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1972). In Queen 
City, the court held that where equipment is sold subject to, but without 
assumption of, a debt owed to the seller’s own vendor, the vendor’s privilege is 




diverges from the views of most French writers, who maintain that 
the vendor’s privilege is not lost when possession is delivered to a 
second buyer who knows of the existence of the privilege because 
that second buyer is not in good faith and therefore not protected 
by the doctrine of la possession vaut titre.165 
But what of Planiol’s example of the pledge of a thing that is 
burdened by a vendor’s privilege? Planiol, and most if not all other 
French writers, maintain that the privilege persists, because the 
thing still belongs to the vendee and remains in his possession by 
virtue of the precarious possession exercised by his pledgee.166 The 
Supreme Court was presented with precisely this issue in Pierson 
v. Carmouche167 on certification of a question from the court of 
appeal. The question was formulated as follows:  
May a purchaser on credit of movable property validly give 
it in pledge to a third person, who knows that he has not 
paid the price (but is otherwise in good faith), so as to vest 
in the pledgee a right superior to that of the vendor, whose 
privilege thereupon ceases by reason of the property having 
passed out of the possession of the vendee?168  
Though the Supreme Court answered the question in the 
affirmative, its opinion recites no facts, and it is impossible to 
determine whether the Court held that the vendor’s privilege was 
wholly lost or that the vendor’s privilege was simply outranked by the 
rights of the pledgee.169 The only support given by the Court for its 
                                                                                                             
 
extinguished, rejecting an argument by the original vendor that the second 
vendee’s knowledge of the existence of the vendor’s lien should preserve it. Id.  
 165. See supra note 158.  
 166. See, e.g., BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 492–493 
(expressing the view that the buyer still possesses the thing after he delivers it to 
pledgee, lends it to a friend or deposits it with a depositary. All of those persons 
possess under precarious title for the buyer as owner. Thus, even though the 
buyer does not physically detain the thing under these circumstances, the 
privilege of his vendor is nonetheless preserved. The rule that the pledgee is 
preferred to the vendor under these circumstances results from application of the 
doctrine of la possession vaut titre, at least if the pledgee is in good faith.); see 
also LAURENT, supra note 142, No. 483; HUC, supra note 42, No. 91. 
 167. 84 So. 59 (La. 1920). 
 168. Id. at 59. 
 169. Professor Yiannopoulos cites Pierson v. Carmouche for the proposition 
that “a pledge constituted on a thing subject to a vendor’s privilege involves 
transfer of possession and terminates the privilege of the vendor.” 
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 226 n.301. On the other hand, 
Professor Daggett appears to espouse the view that Pierson v. Carmouche 
should be interpreted as a ranking case rather than a case involving the outright 
loss of a vendor’s privilege. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51; see also Ralph 




answer to the question was the holding of Dreyfous v. Cade; however, 
that case involved a second sale (an alienation) and not a mere pledge 
by the purchaser. If Pierson means that the vendor’s privilege is lost 
when the purchaser pledges the property, it would certainly contradict 
the concepts expressed by Planiol and other French writers.  
A Comment appearing in the Tulane Law Review in 1929 
addressed this very topic—the kind of possession by a vendee 
necessary to maintain the continued validity of a privilege in favor of 
his vendor.170 Though the student author of this Comment, Bessie 
Margolin,171 certainly could not have envisioned it at the time, her 
scholarly research and thoughtful analysis would, nearly four decades 
later, persuade the federal courts to hold that the vendor’s privilege on 
a movable is effective against a bankruptcy trustee.  
In the 1968 bankruptcy case of In re Trahan,172 the issue facing 
the court was whether the vendor’s privilege held by a seller that had 
supplied merchandise to a furniture store was enforceable against the 
bankruptcy trustee after the furniture store applied for bankruptcy 
relief. Two years earlier, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 
order to invalidate any statutory lien that was not perfected or 
enforceable on the date of a bankruptcy filing against one acquiring 
the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor on that date. 
Finding first that a vendor’s privilege meets the definition of a 
“statutory lien,” the court noted the rule under the Civil Code that if 
the original vendee resells the thing to a third-party purchaser who 
                                                                                                             
 
Slovenko, Of Pledge, 32 TUL. L. REV. 59, 69 (1958) (opining that the vendor’s 
privilege is surely not lost when the vendee lends or bails the property).  
 170. See Margolin, supra note 37. 
 171. For a recent biography of Bessie Margolin, see Marlene Trestman, Fair 
Labor: Remarkable Life and Legal Career of Bessie Margolin (1909-1996), 37 
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 43 (2012). The daughter of Russian immigrants, she spent her 
childhood from age four at the New Orleans Jewish Orphans home. Id. at 42–43. 
After two years at Newcomb College, she transferred to Tulane University to 
begin the study of law. Id. at 46. In 1930, at age 21, she received both a 
bachelor’s degree and her law degree from Tulane, having served as civil law 
editor of the Tulane Law Review, in which she wrote three comments, including 
one on vendor’s privileges, cited supra note 37. Id. at 46–47. Three years later, 
she received her doctorate of juridical science from Yale University, but her 
credentials entitled her to no better offer of employment on Wall Street than in a 
firm’s law library. Id. at 47–48. Undaunted, she seized upon the opportunity to 
join the legal staff of the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority. Id. at 48. 
Later, she had an outstanding career at the Department of Labor in the 
enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Equal Pay Act, arguing 26 
cases before the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 49–54. Retired Chief 
Justice Earl Warren was the speaker at her formal retirement dinner in 1972. Id. 
at 69. She died in 1996 at age 87. Id. at 70. 
 172. 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1968). 




takes possession, the privilege of the original vendor is lost. 
Nonetheless, the court held that a vendor’s privilege survives a 
bankruptcy filing.  
In reaching this holding, the court quoted extensively from Bessie 
Margolin’s Comment, in which she outlined the majority view of the 
French commentators that a resale of the property by the vendee does 
not divest the original vendor of his privilege unless there is actual 
physical delivery to the second vendee, the views of Planiol and other 
members of the vocal minority notwithstanding. The court also cited 
her analysis that three additional articles found in the 1870 
Louisiana Civil Code but not found in the French Civil Code—
articles 1922, 1923 and 2247173—were even greater justification in 
Louisiana for the majority view of the French commentators that a 
vendor’s privilege survives a subsequent sale by the vendee when 
unaccompanied by delivery. Those articles provided that the sale of 
a movable does not affect third parties until actual delivery of the 
object is made and that creditors of a seller may still seize a movable 
he has sold while it remains in his possession. In holding that the 
vendor’s privilege survived the bankruptcy filing, the Trahan court 
placed great weight upon the argument that, because a sale 
unaccompanied by delivery is not effective against third persons, 
and because the seller’s creditors, including presumably his own 
unpaid vendor, still have the right to seize his assets, the vendor’s 
privilege should remain effective until delivery occurs.174 The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the Trahan ruling in a per curiam opinion.175 
                                                                                                             
 173. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015). 
 174. The court also reviewed the jurisprudence, including Continental Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Succession McCann, 92 So. 55 (La. 1922), which reaffirmed that 
a vendor’s privilege primes a subsequently arising chattel mortgage and rejected 
an argument that the execution of the mortgage was an alienation causing the 
loss of the vendor’s privilege. Another case cited was Flint v. Rawlings, 20 La. 
Ann. 557 (1868), in which the Court held that a vendor’s privilege on movables 
continues as long as the vendee has possession, but is lost by a subsequent sale 
and actual delivery to a third person. Regardless of whether the second sale is 
simulated or real, it has no effect upon the vendor’s privilege in the absence of 
actual delivery. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. at 626. The court also cited Wilson v. 
Lowrie, 101 So. 549, 550 (La. 1924) (holding that a vendor’s privilege on 
drilling pipe was lost when the vendee sold and delivered the pipe to a third 
person). A final case cited by the Trahan court was Alex Kuhn & Co. v. Embry, 
35 La. Ann. 488 (1883), which appears to provide scant authority for the 
proposition for which it is cited. In that case, the vendor sought sequestration of 
mules for fear that the defendant might dispose of them. Alex Kuhn, 35 La. Ann. 
at 488. The plaintiff established by evidence that the defendant had in fact sold 
the mules. Id. at 488–89. The Court found that the fact of the sale of the mules 
justified the plaintiff’s apprehensions regarding their potential disposition by the 
defendant. Id. There was no discussion of the possible extinguishment of the 
vendor’s privilege or the effect of the non-delivery of the mules. Id. at 489. 




The Trahan analysis was rejected by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of In re J.R. Nieves & 
Co.,176 which involved a consideration of whether a vendor’s 
privilege arising under the Puerto Rican Civil Code was avoidable 
in bankruptcy. The Nieves court felt that the reality of whether the 
bankrupt vendee still had possession was irrelevant to the issue and 
that it would be “ridiculous” to require a debtor to bring all of his 
possessions to the bankruptcy trustee at the time he files his 
bankruptcy petition. As the court put it, when Congress spoke of a 
hypothetical purchaser, “it contemplated a full blooded, not an 
anemic, purchaser.”177 The court did concede that Louisiana sales 
law is different from that of Puerto Rico, which apparently does 
not allow ownership of a movable to transfer in the absence of 
delivery. Thus, the possibility relied upon by the Trahan court of a 
hypothetical purchaser having acquired ownership even though not 
yet in possession did not exist under Puerto Rican law.  
After the new Bankruptcy Code was adopted in 1978, a 
Louisiana bankruptcy court considered in the case of In re 
Hughes178 whether the holding of Trahan remained valid. Voiding 
the vendor’s privilege, the court found the Trahan analysis to be 
faulty because it “overlooked the fundamental issue of whether the 
device could be defeated by a bona fide purchaser by improperly 
emphasizing whether or not such a purchaser existed in the case 
under consideration.”179 The Hughes court based its holding at 
least in part upon legislative history indicating a desire to adopt a 
stronger position toward statutory liens under the Bankruptcy 
Code. The court invited the Fifth Circuit to examine more closely 
this “vexing problem” in light of the adoption of the Bankruptcy 
Code. The Fifth Circuit did in fact consider the issue the following 
year in In re Tape City USA,180 but it re-affirmed the Trahan 
holding under the new Bankruptcy Code without even a passing 
mention of either Nieves or Hughes.   
Ironically, even though the Trahan court would later quote her 
summation of the majority view of the French commentators in 
support of its holding, Margolin actually wrote that “[t]he real right 
argument is weak and has been ably refuted by those 
                                                                                                             
 
Indeed, it is not clear from the case whether the mules were ever delivered to the 
second purchaser or from whose hands they were seized. Id. 
 175. In re Trahan, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 176. 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971). 
 177. Id. at 192. 
 178. 9 B.R. 251 (W.D. La. 1981). 
 179. Id. at 256. 
 180. 677 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1982). 




commentators in the minority who say that the vendor’s privilege 
is lost by a resale even though there has been no delivery.”181 She 
felt that a more convincing reason in support of the majority view 
was that the word “possession” in article 2102 of the French Civil 
Code,182 which provides that the privilege exists only so long as 
the original buyer remains in possession, refers to physical 
possession. Those French commentators in the majority support 
this argument by citing the rule of la possession vaut titre under 
article 2279 of the French Civil Code.183 As the argument goes, the 
unmodified use of the word “possession” in article 2279 must 
plainly mean physical possession, and the article should be used to 
interpret what is meant by the same word in article 2102.184 
However, Margolin felt that the majority took an inconsistent view 
when confronted with the issue—faced by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in Pierson—of whether a vendor’s privilege is extinguished 
when the vendee enters into a pledge, loan, or bailment of the thing 
sold. She points out that, in that case, the French commentators 
almost unanimously agree that the privilege is not lost, even 
though the vendee no longer has physical possession and exercises 
only civil possession.185 Margolin favored the consistent “civil 
possession” theory of article 3227 of the Louisiana Civil Code (as 
opposed to actual possession) because that theory would allow the 
object in question to be pledged, loaned, or bailed without 
destruction of the vendor’s privilege. Consistently applied, this 
theory would, of course, mean that a privilege is lost if there is a 
sale to a purchaser who does not take immediate physical delivery. 
The second purchaser would have civil possession, and the original 
vendee’s mere physical possession would be insufficient to 
maintain the vitality of the vendor’s privilege. She asserted that 
this rule would make little practical difference, because the original 
vendor would still have the right to seize the property as a general 
                                                                                                             
 181. Margolin, supra note 37, at 245. 
 182. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332 (Fr.). 
 183. See discussion supra Part VII. 
 184. This reasoning has even greater appeal when it is remembered that the 
limitation arising under former article 2102 of the French Civil Code (now 
article 2332) is itself a specific application of the doctrine of la possession vaut 
titre. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 491; BEUDANT ET 
AL., supra note 18, § 511. 
 185. See, e.g., BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 492. It 
might be countered, however, that this view is not necessarily as inconsistent as 
Margolin asserts. Beudant explains that, when the thing is delivered to another 
person under a loan, lease or deposit, that person possesses precariously for the 
owner, who thus continues to have possession. It is different when the thing is 
pledged, for in that case the pledgee is a “quasi-possessor.” BEUDANT ET AL., 
supra note 18, § 511.  




creditor of his vendee under article 1923 of the 1870 Code.186 But, 
if that were the case, the unpaid vendor would be in competition 
with all other creditors of his debtor and would not enjoy the 
preference over other creditors that is the very purpose of his 
privilege. More importantly, however, federal bankruptcy law has 
developed in a way Margolin could not have anticipated so that 
there is now a huge practical and legal difference: Following her 
civil possession theory, with the result that the privilege is lost 
immediately upon the vendee’s sale to a second buyer irrespective 
of delivery, would mean that the vendor’s privilege on a movable 
would of necessity be a voidable statutory lien in bankruptcy court. 
In Louisiana, attempting to interpret the possession requirement 
of Civil Code articles 3217(7) and 3227 on the basis of la possession 
vaut titre would rest on precarious footing indeed, because that 
doctrine is of questionable effect in this state and may not apply at 
all.187 Perhaps a better approach would be to return to the literal text 
of these code articles, which use the word “possession” without 
any qualification. When these articles speak of possession, they 
must mean exactly that—any kind of possession, whether 
exercised corporeally by the vendee or exercised by a precarious 
possessor on his behalf. Thus, when the vendee retains physical 
possession after a second sale, the privilege held by his vendor is 
preserved. If the vendee delivers physical possession to someone, 
such as a pledgee, whose possession is precarious, the vendor’s 
privilege is still preserved, since the precarious possession is for 
the benefit of the vendee.188 Only when the vendee fully 
relinquishes possession is the privilege lost, as when the vendee 
delivers physical possession to a second buyer.  
Purists might object that this approach improperly transforms 
the vendor’s privilege on a movable into a real right, because the 
privilege would survive a second sale that is unaccompanied by 
delivery. Although there is certainly room for disagreement on that 
issue among French commentators, that objection would appear 
                                                                                                             
 186. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015). 
 187. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 did not include a provision analogous 
to French Civil Code article 2279. The 1979 revision of the Civil Code articles 
in the law of property enacted a new article 520, which provided that a 
transferee in good faith and for fair value acquires ownership of a corporeal 
movable if the transferor had possession with the consent of the actual owner. 
However, that article was repealed by Act 125 of 1981, while the surrounding 
articles that presupposed its existence were left intact, thus creating considerable 
uncertainty over the rights of a good faith transferee. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra 
note 76, § 232; see also Tanya Ann Ibieta, Comment, The Transfer of 
Ownership of Movables, 47 LA. L. REV. 841 (1987). 
 188. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2015). 




unfounded under the Louisiana Civil Code because of its rule that 
transfer of ownership of a movable is effective against third persons 
when possession is delivered to the transferee and, until that occurs, 
creditors of the transferor can seize it.189 Thus, until possession is 
delivered to the transferee, the alienation that Planiol and others argue 
extinguishes the privilege is simply not effective as to third persons, 
including the transferor’s unpaid vendor and other creditors, who may 
ignore the alienation altogether. Moreover, there is a justification for 
the survival of the privilege under these circumstances: Since all of the 
transferor’s creditors continue to have recourse against the thing, a 
privilege is necessary so that the unpaid vendor will still be preferred 
over those creditors in the proceeds of the thing. To the extent that this 
causes the vendor’s privilege on a movable to function as a real 
right,190 it is a very limited and ephemeral one that owes its existence 
more to the rules on transfer of ownership of a movable than to the 
rules applicable to privileges.  
There is at least one circumstance under which a vendor’s 
privilege on a movable will appear to survive a second sale by the 
vendee even after delivery has been made to the second buyer: when 
this second buyer assumes payment of the debt owed by his seller to 
the original vendor. Under those facts, the court in Central Finance 
Co. v. Keating191 held, based on De L’Isle,192 that the original 
vendor was entitled to assert a vendor’s privilege against the second 
buyer, notwithstanding the original vendee’s loss of possession.193 
                                                                                                             
 189. LA. CIV. CODE art. 518 (2015). 
 190. Because the vendor’s privilege on a movable exists only for as long as it 
remains in the possession of the vendee, Professor Yiannopoulos is emphatic 
that, as to movables, “it is quite clear from the Code and the cases that the 
vendor’s privilege is merely a right of preference which may be exercised as 
long as the thing remains in the physical possession of the debtor.” 
Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 229. See also YIANNOPOULOS, 
supra note 76, § 232. Professor Daggett observes that:  
The question of whether or not the vendor’s privilege confers a real 
right in the property or creates merely a preference unattached to the 
property itself has not been definitely settled. The court has not 
committed itself in so many words, but the trend of the decisions 
indicates that the court considers it a real right in the property which 
has not been paid for.  
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 36, at 94. 
 191. 6 La. App. 155 (Ct. App. 1927). 
 192. 34 La. Ann. 164 (1882). 
 193. See Central Finance, 6 La. App. at 155; see also Cormier v. Castille, 
488 So. 2d 247 (La. Ct. App. 1886) (holding that the original sellers’ vendor’s 
privilege was not lost when the property was sold to a second buyer who 
assumed the debt owed to the original sellers in an act in which the original 
sellers joined and the original buyer remained bound as a solidary co-obligor); 
cf. Queen City Broad. Co. v. Wagenwest, Inc., 264 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 




What the court must have meant, and all that De L’Isle would have 
supported, is that a new vendor’s privilege arose in favor of the 
original vendor by virtue of the second buyer’s assumption of the 
balance still owed to him.194 
VIII. LOSS OF VENDOR’S PRIVILEGE 
As discussed in the preceding section, alienation of a movable 
burdened by a vendor’s privilege, coupled with delivery, causes the 
loss of the vendor’s privilege. Alienation of an immovable subject to 
an unrecorded vendor’s privilege will also cause a loss of the privilege 
by operation of the public records doctrine.195 As an accessorial right, 
a vendor’s privilege is, of course, extinguished when the vendee’s 
obligation to pay the price becomes extinguished for any reason and 
also when that obligation prescribes.196 A number of other events can 
also deprive the vendor of his privilege. 
A. Novation 
Does a vendor’s action in accepting a note to evidence the 
purchase price extinguish the privilege, on the theory that the 
                                                                                                             
 
1972) (holding that where equipment is sold subject to, but without assumption 
of, a debt owed to the seller’s own vendor, the vendor’s privilege is 
extinguished). 
 194. There are a few cases involving unusual circumstances under which a 
vendor’s privilege on a movable was held to survive a second sale. In Hooper v. 
Maruka Machinery Corp. of America, 525 So. 2d 1113 (La. Ct. App. 1988), the 
court held that a vendor’s privilege upon an item of equipment continued to 
exist after it was sold to a second buyer that immediately leased it back to the 
original buyer. The court’s rationale did not, as might have been expected, focus 
upon the continued possession by the original buyer but rather the facts that the 
majority stockholder of the original buyer was the managing partner of the 
second buyer and that this person had concocted a scheme, apparently not in 
good faith, which, if followed, would effectively “remove the teeth” from a 
vendor’s privilege. See also Warren Refrigerator Co. v. Fosti Midstream Fueling 
& Serv., Inc., 462 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a vendor’s 
privilege on a movable is viable so long as the right to possession of the 
movable remains in the vendee, although others “without color of right” have 
taken physical possession of the movable). 
 195. See Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 226. 
 196. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277 (1870). See also AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, 
§ 292; HUC, supra note 42, No. 112. Thus, where a buyer tenders payment of the 
entire remaining balance of the purchase price before the seller files suit seeking 
to enforce a contractual right of retrocession, both the right of retrocession and 
the seller’s vendor’s privilege are extinguished. Vermilion Sand Co. v. H. & D. 
Sand & Gravel Co., 304 So. 2d 378 (La. Ct. App. 1974). See also Cormier v. 
Ransom, 420 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1982). 




acceptance of the note constitutes a novation of the vendee’s 
obligation to pay the price? Although there might once have been 
some disagreement on this point among French writers,197 the 
Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 added an express provision to the effect 
that the vendor nonetheless enjoys the privilege even though he may 
have taken a note, bond, or other acknowledgment from the vendee.198 
The same rule applies even if the note is not made payable to the 
vendor but, by arrangement between the parties, is payable to a third 
person.199  
B. Waiver 
In Pratt v. Hart Jewelry Co.,200 the court found an implied 
waiver of the vendor’s privilege when a husband purchased a gold 
purse from a jeweler and, in the jeweler’s presence, donated it to 
his wife.  
The long-established rule is that a vendor’s privilege and a 
mortgage may co-exist on the same property, and one of them might 
be renounced or extinguished without affecting the other.201 In 
Succession of Osborn,202 the Court held that a vendor, by knowingly 
accepting part payment of the purchase price from a third person 
                                                                                                             
 197. See Margolin, supra note 37, at 240 n.7. 
 198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3194 (1825). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3227 
(1870); Adler v. Burton Lumber Co., 15 So. 156 (La. 1894) (observing that no 
extinguishment resulted from vendor’s acknowledgment that payment had been 
made by the giving of notes). 
 199. See Jeckell v. Fried, 18 La. Ann. 192 (1866) (holding that where the 
seller was indebted at the time of the sale to a third person and, by agreement of 
the parties, the note given for the purchase price was made payable to this third 
person in order to satisfy a debt owed to him by the seller, the holder of the note 
was entitled to a vendor’s privilege on the property sold). But see Cottonport 
Bank v. Dunn, 21 So. 2d 525 (La. Ct. App. 1945) (finding a lack of sufficient 
proof in the record to demonstrate the arrangement between the parties and why 
the note in question was made payable to a bank rather than the vendor of the 
equipment). Professor Daggett infers a number of other rules from the caselaw: 
The execution of a renewal note does not constitute a novation or destroy the 
privilege. A compromise between the vendor and vendee as to the price, 
whereby a new note is made changing the amount of the debt and extending the 
term, does not destroy the privilege. However, where a note of a third party is 
given, particularly without the purchaser’s endorsement, the giving of the note 
constitutes payment of the price and the vendor’s privilege is extinguished. This 
is especially true where the third party’s note is endorsed without recourse. See 
DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51. 
 200. 14 Teiss. 94 (La. Ct. App. 1916). 
 201. Graves v. Joyce, 590 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel. 
Landry v. Broussard, 177 So. 403 (La. Ct. App. 1937); Boner v. Mahle, 3 La. 
Ann. 600 (1848). 
 202. 4 So. 580 (La. 1888). 




who lent funds to the purchaser on the condition that the vendor 
allow the third person’s mortgage to be a first mortgage, had 
renounced the rank of his vendor’s privilege in favor of the third-party 
lender.203 By contrast, in Howard v. Thomas,204 the Court in effect 
held that a seller’s agreement not to reserve a special mortgage on the 
land did not constitute a waiver of his vendor’s privilege. In Citizens 
Bank of Louisiana v. Cuny,205 the vendor caused to be written on the 
face of the act of sale, at the time it was recorded, a recitation to the 
effect that he was releasing the mortgage stipulated in the act of sale 
“without, however, acknowledging the payment of the price of the 
purchase money.”206 The Court found this not to constitute a 
renunciation of his vendor’s privilege.207 In Bacchus v. Moreau,208 the 
Court held that, because a mortgage and a vendor’s privilege are 
distinct rights, an act of sale providing that a mortgage is reserved 
only on a certain portion of the property sold does not constitute a 
waiver of the vendor’s privilege on the remainder of the property. 
Similarly, in Boner v. Mahle,209 the Court held that the vendor’s 
failure to take a mortgage on the property sold, though he did take 
a mortgage on other property, could not be construed to be a 
waiver of his vendor’s privilege on the property sold. According to 
the Court, the implied renunciation of the important right of a 
vendor’s privilege “should be established, not by doubtful, but by 
clear and cogent inferences from the language of the parties.”210  
                                                                                                             
 203. See Osborn, 4 So. at 580; see also Hyster Co. v. Reeves, 541 So. 2d 363 
(La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that, even though an unrecorded vendor’s privilege 
would ordinarily prime a chattel mortgage that is later recorded in compliance 
with the vehicle certificate of title law, the seller through its conduct waived its 
right to assert the vendor’s privilege by failing to note the vendor’s privilege on 
the vehicle’s certificate of origin and failing to record its chattel mortgage in the 
proper records, thus showing no reliance on the vendor’s privilege and an 
apparent intent for the buyer to deal with third parties in a way that would defeat 
the vendor’s privilege). According to the opinion, a vehicle dealer who sells a 
vehicle to another on credit and gives the vendee sufficient paperwork to allow 
that vendee to obtain a clear certificate of title waives his vendor’s privilege. 
 204. 3 La. 109 (1831). 
 205. 12 Rob. (La.) 279, 280 (1845).  
 206. Id. 
 207. Apparently it was significant to the court that no third person had relied 
to his prejudice on the gratuitous release of the mortgage.  
 208. 4 La. Ann. 313 (1849). 
 209. 3 La. Ann. 600 (1848). 
 210. Id. at 603. Compare id., with Hunter v. Sandel, 160 So. 87 (La. 1935). 
In Hunter, a co-owner sold by credit sale all of her interest in the property to her 
three co-owners, each of whom executed a promissory note and granted a 
mortgage on other lands he owned as security for his own note. Hunter, 160 So. 
at 87. The Court held that the vendor waived her vendor’s privilege on the 
interest she sold, although it would appear that the actions relied upon by the 
Court as evidence of waiver were, at least viewed individually, scant evidence of 




Pelican Homestead & Savings Ass’n v. Royal Scott Apartments 
Partnership211 involved a simultaneous closing at which the same 
notary public passed an act of cash sale from the vendors to the 
vendee, a first mortgage from the vendee in favor of a building and 
loan association, and a second mortgage from the vendee to the 
vendors as security for a portion of the sales price which apparently 
remained unpaid. The act of cash sale recited that the entire 
purchase price had been paid, and the second mortgage in favor of 
the vendors specifically subordinated the mortgage to the rights of 
the building and loan association. Nonetheless, at the time of the 
foreclosure by the association, the vendors intervened, claiming that 
their vendor’s privilege was superior to its rights. The court rejected 
this claim primarily on the ground that the act of sale by its terms 
gave “full acquittance and discharge” for the purchase price,212 thus 
expressing a clear intent to waive the vendor’s privilege.213  
                                                                                                             
 
a waiver. First, the obligation to pay the purchase price was intended to be the 
several obligations of each of the vendees, whereas the Court believed that 
retaining a vendor’s privilege would necessitate joint liability. Secondly, the act 
of sale used the words “said $50,000 being paid as follows,” thus indicating the 
promissory notes were taken as final payment for the balance. Third, the 
promissory notes were paraphed for identification “with this act of mortgage” 
rather than with the act of sale. The pact de non alienando was contained only in 
the mortgages, and not in the act of sale. Finally, the act of sale was recorded in 
the mortgage records only in those parishes where the specially mortgaged 
property was located, and not in other parishes in which the property sold was 
located. A more recent case finding an implied waiver of the vendor’s privilege 
is Graves v. Joyce, 590 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1991), in which a credit sale 
provided that “this mortgage” did not encumber specified lots. According to the 
court, the language in the credit sale declared an intent by the vendor to release 
certain lots and any third person relying on the public records would not have 
been alerted by the language of the release that the vendor intended to preserve 
his vendor’s privilege on the lots released from the mortgage. Id. at 1263. 
 211. 541 So. 2d 943 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
 212. Id. See also City Bank & Trust Co. v. Caneco Constr., Inc., 341 So. 2d 
1331 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Alison Mtg. Inv. Trust v. BPB Contractors, Inc., 362 
So. 2d 1203 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that, where an act of sale recited that 
the vendor had been paid in full, even though the seller had in fact taken two 
promissory notes for a large portion of the purchase price, any vendor’s 
privilege that the seller might have retained was subordinate to a mortgage 
executed in favor of a third-party lender, notwithstanding the fact that the 
lender’s representative was present at the closing of the sale and knew that a 
portion of the purchase price had been paid in notes). Both cases cite McDuffie 
v. Walker for the rule that even actual knowledge is not a substitute for the 
requirement to properly record privileges. See McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 
(La. 1909). Another case held that where the mortgage records stated that partial 
payment had been made in cash when in fact drafts were given for the partial 
payment, the holder of the drafts could not be paid from the proceeds of the 
property in preference to innocent persons to whom notes given for the 




Must the vendor’s spouse concur in granting a waiver or 
subordination of the vendor’s privilege burdening an immovable? One 
case, in dicta, suggests that the concurrence of both spouses is required 
for subordination, because a vendor’s privilege on an immovable is an 
incorporeal immovable and, according to the court, subordination is an 
alienation of the right to a preference in ranking requiring the 
concurrence of both spouses.214 The same logic would, a fortiori, 
apply to an outright waiver of the vendor’s privilege encumbering an 
immovable. 
C. Transformation into Another Movable 
There is no textual provision in either the Code Napoléon or the 
Louisiana Civil Code that directly addresses the issue on whether a 
vendor’s privilege survives the transformation of the thing into 
another movable, as when a block of stone is transformed into a 
statue,215 hops into beer,216 wheat into flour, or grapes into wine.217 
The French article allowing the right of revendication to the unpaid 
seller of a movable218 requires that the thing be “in the same 
                                                                                                             
 
remainder of the purchase price had been transferred. See Durham v. Heirs of 
Daughtery, 30 La. Ann. 1255 (1878); see generally HUC, supra note 42, No. 112 
(indicating that the vendor’s privilege on an immovable “can exist only on the 
condition that the act of sale reveal to third persons the amount of the price and 
the fact that it has not been paid”). 
 213. The court also observed that the language of subordination in the second 
mortgage furnished at least some support for a finding of a waiver of the 
vendor’s privilege. Curiously, the court felt that its finding of waiver was further 
bolstered by the absence of any recordation of the vendor’s privilege in order to 
protect the vendors against third persons. It would appear that that fact alone, 
irrespective of the issue of waiver or subordination, would have been sufficient 
to defeat the claims of the vendors, since they had not preserved their privilege 
against third persons, and the building and loan association was a third party to 
the sale.  
 214. Cf. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Warner Robins, Ga. v. Delta 
Towers, Ltd., 544 So. 2d 1331 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Nevertheless, the court held 
that the spouse who did not sign the act of subordination had nonetheless 
renounced her right to concur by executing a modification agreement containing 
a declaration that her husband was the owner and holder of the note secured by 
the vendor’s privilege and in any event had ratified the subordination by signing 
tax returns taking advantage of the substantial tax benefits attributable to the 
subordination.  
 215. See Margolin, supra note 37, at 240 n.5. 
 216. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2614. 
 217. See BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512. 
 218. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2101(4) (Fr.). See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 
2332(4) (Fr.). 




condition.”219 Because of the absence of any similar textual limitation 
on the vendor’s privilege,220 Planiol notes that an argument has arisen 
that the privilege should persist so long as the identity of the thing can 
be followed through its transformations.221 Interestingly, the 1825 
Louisiana Civil Code dropped the “same condition” requirement in 
the article governing revendication under the Digest of 1808,222 
substituting the formulation that “the identity of the objects be 
established.”223 Arguably, this more liberal standard should also 
apply by analogy to the vendor’s privilege.224 
                                                                                                             
 219. In French this phrase is: “dans le même état,” a phrase that was 
translated in the English version of the Digest of 1808 as “in the same 
condition.” See LA. DIGEST OF 1808, supra note 52. A more literal translation 
would be “in the same state.” 
 220. One French treatise indicates that the absence of this limitation on the 
vendor’s privilege cannot be logically explained, speculating that the redactors 
of the Code Napoléon had perhaps forgotten that they had modified the 
principles of transfer of ownership and that the Roman notions of revendication 
based on ownership therefore no longer applied. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET 
AL., supra note 26, No. 534; cf. LAURENT, supra note 142, No. 485 (expressing 
the view that, in theory, the privilege should be subject to the requirement of 
being “in the same condition” that applies to the right of revendication, which is 
established merely to conserve the privilege, but the legislator has nonetheless 
wisely chosen not to include that requirement as a condition for the exercise of 
the privilege, since the vendor has enriched the patrimony of the debtor, 
regardless of the fact that the thing sold may have later changed in state). 
 221. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2614. See, e.g., BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, No. 501 (expressing the view that the 
vendor’s privilege persists notwithstanding the transformations in the thing sold, 
so long as the thing sold is still be recognizable). Thus, if the buyer of wood has 
transformed it into charcoal, the seller can still exercise his privilege on the 
charcoal; however, the seller of hops cannot exercise his privilege on the beer 
made with them. See also BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512 (asserting that 
the thing subject to the privilege must remain recognizable, if not in the same 
condition); cf. HUC, supra note 42, Nos. 96–98 (acknowledging the prevailing 
rule that a change in the state of the thing is no obstacle to enforcement of the 
vendor’s privilege, but arguing that a thing that has changed in condition is 
necessarily no longer recognizable and that application of the “in the same 
condition” rule to the vendor’s privilege would place the existence of the 
privilege in harmony with the rules on revendication designed to preserve it).  
 222. LA. DIGEST of 1808, supra note 52, art. 74. 
 223. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3196 (1825). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3229 (1870).  
 224. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232, at 463–64. A modern 
example of the requirement that the separate identity of the movable not have 
been lost is found in Aetna Business Credit Corp. v. Louisiana Machinery Co., 
409 So. 2d 1304 (La. Ct. App. 1982), in which the lessee of a drilling rig pump 
had caused a replacement engine to be bolted to the pump but the engine could 
be easily removed without damage to either the pump or itself. The court held 
that the rule of accession under Louisiana Civil Code articles 482 and 510 did 
not apply and that the seller of the replacement engine continued to have a 
vendor’s privilege upon the engine, which had retained its separate identity. 




D. Sale with a Mass of Things 
Civil Code article 3228 provides that the vendor’s privilege on a 
movable is lost when the vendor allows the thing to be sold 
“confusedly with a mass of other things belonging to the purchaser” 
without making his claim. At first blush, this article seems to be 
wholly unnecessary in light of the rule that any resale of a movable 
subject to an existing vendor’s privilege, if accompanied by delivery to 
the second buyer, causes a loss of the vendor’s privilege. As Professor 
Yiannopolous explains, this article can be viewed analytically as the 
combination of a loss of identity of the thing in tandem with a loss of 
the original purchaser’s possession.225 Professor Daggett argues that 
the article has effect only when the movable subject to the vendor’s 
privilege, though sold with a mass of other goods, remains in the 
hands of the original buyer or when a mass of property has been sold 
and the contest is over the proceeds of the sale.226 Thus, the article can 
be viewed as an exception to the general rule of Civil Code article 
3228, which ordinarily allows a vendor to proceed against goods that 
have been re-sold so long as they remain in the original buyer’s hands. 
Application of the article under these circumstances extinguishes the 
vendor’s privilege, even though the thing remains in the hands of the 
immediate buyer.227  
E. Incorporation into an Immovable 
When a movable burdened by a vendor’s privilege is incorporated 
into or attached to an immovable so as to become its component part, a 
number of difficult issues arise. Is the privilege lost by virtue of the 
attachment? Does the privilege remain enforceable against third 
persons, such as a mortgagee who holds or later acquires a mortgage 
on the immovable? Does it matter whether the vendor’s privilege was 
recorded? Will the vendor’s privilege survive an enforcement of the 
mortgage or other alienation of the immovable? 
                                                                                                             
 225. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 228.  
 226. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51.  
 227. Professor Daggett finds no policy justification for this exception. For 
modern cases involving contests over the proceeds from a sale in mass, see 
Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System v. Campo Realty Co., 380 So. 2d 
1377 (La. Ct. App. 1980), and Weber v. Press of H. N. Cornay, Inc., 144 So. 2d 
581 (La. Ct. App. 1962). Both cases cite Louisiana Civil Code article 3228 for 
the proposition that a vendor’s privilege is lost when the property subject to the 
privilege is sold in globo with other things unless the holder of the privilege 
demands separate appraisement of the property subject to the privilege prior to 
the sale. 




To understand the jurisprudence bearing upon these issues, it is 
important first to recall the rules of the 1870 Civil Code governing the 
classification of immovables.228 Under that regime, there were 
immovables by nature that served the use or convenience of a 
building,229 immovables by destination that were merely placed upon 
a tract of land for its service or improvement,230 and immovables by 
destination consisting of things that were permanently attached to a 
building.231 
The easiest case to consider is that involving a thing that becomes 
immovable by destination simply by virtue of its placement upon a 
tract of land for service or improvement. The case law has had no 
difficulty holding that, in this instance, the vendor’s privilege is 
unaffected.232 However, this rule is not particularly important today 
because of the suppression of this classification of immovable by 
destination, although the rule might be applied by analogy to 
things that are immovable by mere declaration under article 467 of 
the present Civil Code. 
                                                                                                             
 228. See generally Elizabeth Ruth Carter, Comment, Ghosts of the Past and 
Hopes for the Future: Article 466 and Societal Expectations, 81 TUL. L. REV. 
1665 (2007); John A. Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous 
Relationship Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision Jurisprudence 
as Seen Through the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 LOY. L. REV. 615 (2002); 
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component Parts, Societal Expectations 
and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 LA. L. REV. 1379 (2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra 
note 76, § 142.5. 
 229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 467 (1870). 
 230. LA. CIV. CODE art. 468(1) (1870). 
 231. LA. CIV. CODE art. 468(2) (1870). The type of attachment needed was 
explained in Article 469, which set forth something similar to the now familiar 
“substantial damage” test: The owner was supposed “to have attached to his 
tenement or building forever such movables as are affixed to the same with 
plaster, or mortar, or such as can not be taken off without being broken or 
injured, or without breaking or injuring the part of the building to which they are 
attached.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 469 (1870). The 1978 revision of the Civil Code 
replaced the 1870 Code’s classification scheme with three articles: article 465, 
dealing with movables that are incorporated into an immovable; article 466, 
dealing with movables that are permanently attached to an immovable; and 
article 467, dealing with movables that are made immovable by declaration. 
Over the ensuing years, article 466 has seen substantial revision, the last 
occurring with the enactment of Act No. 632, 2008 La. Acts 2573. The author 
was the reporter of the Louisiana State Law Institute Committee that drafted the 
most recent revision to article 466. 
 232. Shelly v. Winder, 36 La. Ann. 182 (1884) (“This Court has adopted the 
view of Troplong, to the effect: ‘That the purchaser of such movables as mules, 
agricultural implements, etc., cannot affect the rights of the vendor thereof by 
impressing upon them the purely metaphysical quality of immovables. The thing 
sold subsists in all its parts just as it was when sold, without any change in its 
nature, or otherwise, except in its destination; and such destination is considered 
as imperfect and subordinated to the rights of the vendor.’”). 




The issue becomes more difficult when the thing is physically, 
rather than just intellectually, attached to an immovable.233 In the 
1857 case of Gary v. Burguieres, involving an engine that had been 
attached to a sugar mill, the Supreme Court held that the mortgagee 
foreclosing on the immovable took free of a vendor’s privilege on 
the engine because the contract giving rise to the vendor’s privilege 
had not been recorded.234 A few decades later, the Court in Carlin v. 
Gordy235 was presented with a case in which the contract establishing 
the vendor’s privilege on the movable had in fact been recorded. 
Critical of its own prior holding in Gary, which was in any event 
readily distinguishable on account of the lack of recordation in the 
earlier case, the Court formulated the rule that the vendor’s privilege 
should continue notwithstanding the attachment of a movable to an 
immovable if the movable can be removed without damage to the 
structure to which it is attached.236 
The Supreme Court further refined the governing rule in two cases 
decided in the 1930s. In Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co.,237 the Court 
reaffirmed earlier holdings to the effect that a movable remains subject 
to a vendor’s privilege notwithstanding its immobilization by 
attachment, so long as the movable can be identified and reclaimed in 
substantially the same condition as when sold and without material 
injury to the structure to which it is attached, even though use of the 
structure may be temporarily impaired. The movables in Caldwell 
consisted of railroad materials that had been used in the construction 
on a mortgaged plantation of a railroad track that could be removed 
                                                                                                             
 233. Some French writers view the ultimate issue to be whether the thing has 
been incorporated into an immovable so as to become an immovable by nature, 
rather than being immobilized by the legal fiction of destination. However, even 
in the latter case, they assert that the vendor’s privilege cannot be exercised to 
the prejudice of a mortgagee, just as it cannot be exercised to the prejudice of a 
pledgee. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET AL., supra note 26, Nos. 502–504; 
BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 512; HUC, supra note 42, No. 95. 
 234. Gary v. Burguieres, 12 La. Ann. 227 (1857). 
 235. 32 La. Ann. 1285 (1880). 
 236. See In re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co., 64 So. 870 (La. 1914); 
Pratt Eng’g & Mach. Co. v. Cecelia Sugar Co., 65 So. 100 (La. 1914). However, 
neither of these opinions reflects whether the contract establishing the vendor’s 
privilege was recorded or discusses any recordation issue. A pair of decisions in 
the second decade of the twentieth century held that gears and shafts, and 
railroad ties, lost their character as movables and lost their identity when 
incorporated into an immovable. See Milliken v. Roger, 70 So. 848 (La. 1916); 
Morgan’s La. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting & Mfg. Co., 78 So. 735 
(La. 1918). These holdings were, however, overruled in Caldwell v. Laurel 
Grove Co., 144 So. 718 (La. 1932). 
 237. Caldwell, 144 So. at 718.  




without any injury at all to the plantation.238 The vendor of the railroad 
materials was thus allowed to assert its privilege against the holder of a 
mortgage on the plantation. In Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. 
Bell,239 which involved an automatic sprinkler system that had been 
installed in a factory, the Court held that the vendor’s privilege 
remained intact, summarizing the law as follows: 
And the uniform jurisprudence of the state is where 
machinery or mechanical equipment is installed in a building 
by the owner but can be removed without substantial injury 
to the structure to which it is attached, even though it is 
necessary to temporarily destroy part of the building, the 
vendor’s lien attaches and is enforceable.240  
Another issue presented in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. was 
whether the vendor’s privilege on a movable that had become attached 
to an immovable could survive the buyer’s transfer and delivery of the 
immovable to the mortgagee under a giving in payment. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the Court held that the privilege survived. The Court’s 
reasoning was that, if the mortgagee had been relegated to enforcing 
its rights judicially, protections would have been available to the 
unpaid vendor. According to the Court, “[t]he parties’ substitution of a 
non-judicial proceeding for a judicial proceeding cannot have the 
extraordinary effect of obliterating all claims and privileges acquired 
by third persons against the property while it was in the possession of 
the purchaser.”241 Thus, the Court seemed to afford the vendor with a 
right of pursuit after dation en paiement, as opposed to after any 
other sort of voluntary alienation or a judicial sale.242 
                                                                                                             
 238. The Court expressly overruled its prior contrary holding in Morgan’s 
Louisiana & T.R., which had presented “practically similar” facts. The holding 
in Caldwell was itself later overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Am. 
Creosote Co. v. Springer, 241 So. 2d 510 (La. 1970); see also discussion supra 
Part VIII.E. 
 239. 165 So. 150 (La. 1935). 
 240. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Cf. Royal Oldsmobile Co. v. Yarbrough, 425 So. 2d 823 (La. Ct. App. 
1983). In that case, an attorney’s client, in the attorney’s presence, purchased an 
automobile that the client immediately gave to him in payment of his fee. Id. at 
824. The client paid for the automobile with a check that was ultimately 
dishonored by the drawee bank. Id. Holding that the dealership’s vendor’s 
privilege was lost when the vehicle left the hands of the immediate purchaser 
(the client), the court found that, even though the attorney was present at the 
dealership to help select the car and had the title placed directly in his name, he 
did not undertake to buy the automobile or to pay the purchase price; rather, he 
simply agreed to accept the car in payment of the debt due him by his client. Id. 
at 825. 




The Court also addressed in Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co. the 
issue of recordation, which Gary and other earlier cases seemed to find 
necessary to enable the vendor to assert his rights against third 
persons. Even though the vendor’s contract in Globe Automatic 
Sprinkler Co. had in fact been recorded, the Court expressed its view, 
albeit in what certainly appears to be dicta, that the vendor’s privilege 
was not destroyed “[i]rrespective of whether the recordation of a 
contract between the Globe Automatic Sprinkler Company and [the 
original buyer] was sufficient to bind the [mortgagee accepting the 
giving in payment].”243 
Thus, the jurisprudence established the rule that the test of 
whether the vendor’s privilege is lost is not whether the thing has 
been converted into an immovable by nature or destination but 
rather whether it can be removed without substantial injury to the 
immovable to which it is attached.244 As settled as this rule might 
have appeared by the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court 
appeared to chart an entirely new course in American Creosote Co. 
v. Springer,245 a case that did not even involve a claim of a vendor’s 
privilege but, instead, presented a contest between a railroad 
company that had leased a railroad track to the owner of an 
immovable under an unrecorded lease and a third-party purchaser to 
whom this owner later sold the immovable. Deciding the contest in 
                                                                                                             
 243. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., 165 So. at 152. Several years later, a 
court of appeal case lent further reinforcement to the principle that so long as 
“the movable has not lost its identity, and can be separated from the land, 
tenement, or building to which it has been attached without injury to the 
immovable, as to the vendor it remains a movable, and he may subject the same 
to his vendor’s privilege, the registry of the same being immaterial.” Cristina 
Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685, 690 (La. Ct. App. 1951). An earlier 
appellate court case had also reached the conclusion that recordation was 
unnecessary to protect the vendor, though by somewhat strained logic. See 
Hamilton Co. v. Med. Arts Bldg. Co., 135 So. 94 (La. Ct. App. 1931). Because 
it had previously been held that an unrecorded vendor’s privilege outranks a 
subsequently recorded chattel mortgage, the court in Hamilton deduced that the 
unrecorded vendor’s privilege on a movable must necessarily prime a later 
recorded mortgage on the building to which the movable is attached:  
It follows from this decision and others on the same subject that, if 
property has become immovable by destination and its identity is 
preserved, and it may be removed without material injury to building to 
which it is attached, and thereafter a chattel mortgage is placed on it, 
still the unrecorded vendor’s lien may be enforced against to the 
prejudice of the chattel mortgage. A fortiori, it follows that a mortgage 
on the building wherein the immovable by destination is located does 
not prime the unrecorded vendor’s lien. 
Id. at 99. This reasoning implicitly assumes that a component part of a building 
could be subjected to a chattel mortgage after it had already been immobilized. 
 244. See DAGGETT, supra note 32, § 51.  
 245. 241 So. 2d 510 (La. 1970). 




favor of the purchaser, the Court held that the railroad track was an 
immovable by nature and passed with the sale. In support of this 
holding, the Court cited its previously overruled holding in 
Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Himalaya Planting & 
Manufacturing Co.,246 in which the Court had held that ties, rails, 
spikes, irons, plates, and ballasts lost their character as movables for 
purposes of the vendor’s privilege “since such privileges can no 
more be enforced with respect to its several constituents without 
destroying the thing into which they have thus been merged than it 
can be enforced with respect to the canvas upon which a picture has 
been painted without destroying the picture.”247  
Even though American Creosote Company did not involve an 
unpaid vendor asserting a vendor’s privilege, the Court nonetheless 
expressly overruled Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., which itself had 
overruled Morgan’s Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. The Court 
intentionally chose not to distinguish Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co. 
on the basis of the status of the parties involved or other facts, 
because it felt that such a distinction would be invalid as to the 
“real” issue of whether the rails constructed into a railway became 
immovable by nature. As to that proposition, the Court found that 
the two cases were irreconcilable, for if “a thing is immovable by 
nature, it is immovable as to everyone.”248 What American Creosote 
Company implies with respect to the continued existence of a 
vendor’s privilege on a movable following immobilization is not 
entirely clear. Given its most expansive interpretation, the case 
supports the proposition, albeit in dicta, that the vendor’s privilege is 
irretrievably lost upon immobilization, regardless of whether the 
                                                                                                             
 246. 78 So. 735 (La. 1918). 
 247. Id. at 736. 
 248. American Creosote Company, 241 So. 2d at 515. The Court’s premise 
that if “a thing is immovable by nature, it is immovable as to everyone” is 
questionable, specifically where security rights are concerned. Id. At the time 
the case was decided, the Chattel Mortgage Law provided that a thing subject to 
a chattel mortgage remained movable following attachment to an immovable 
insofar as the chattel mortgage was concerned. This provision, which was first 
enacted by Act No. 166, 1932 La. Acts 539, and later appeared as Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:5357, represented a legislative reversal of the Court’s 
prior contrary holding in Baton Rouge Rice Mill v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 114 
So. 633 (La. 1927). Thus, it certainly was possible at the time of the decision in 
American Creosote Company for a thing to be movable as to certain persons but 
immovable as to all others. Another example of a thing being considered 
movable only as to designated persons is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 
474, which provides that unharvested crops and ungathered fruits encumbered 
with security rights of third persons are movables by anticipation “insofar as the 
creditor is concerned.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 474 (2015).   




movable subject to the privilege has retained its identity or can be 
removed without substantial injury to the immovable. 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in American Creosote 
Company, the law governing component parts of an immovable has 
undergone at least three substantive changes.249 If, as that case 
suggests, immobilization imports a loss of the vendor’s privilege, then 
each of these changes might have had some effect upon the rights of 
the unpaid vendor of a movable that becomes attached to an 
immovable. The courts have had occasion to revisit this issue only 
rarely. In Hyman v. Ross,250 perhaps the only case to consider the 
issue since the revision of Civil Code article 466 in 1978,251 the 
court applied the “societal expectations test”252 under article 466 to 
find that heating and air conditioning units sold to the owner of a 
hotel had become its component parts and were therefore encumbered 
under a mortgage previously granted upon the immovable. Although 
the seller of the heating and air conditioning units had moved for 
separate appraisal prior to the foreclosure sale of the immovable, the 
court found that the pre-existing mortgage attached to the units and 
therefore outranked the vendor’s privilege, with no citation to the 
previous jurisprudence involving vendor’s privileges or any 
reasoning other than that the units had become component parts of 
an immovable that was subject to a previously recorded mortgage. 
Without specifically citing American Creosote Company, the court 
appears to have followed its implication that the immobilization of a 
thing subject to a vendor’s privilege necessarily implies a loss of the 
privilege.253 
                                                                                                             
 249. See supra note 231. 
 250. 643 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 251. See Act No. 728, 1978 La. Acts 1900. 
 252. See Equibank v. U.S. IRS, 749 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 253. If the attachment or incorporation of the movable occurs as a result of 
work for the improvement of the immovable, the seller does not lose all security, 
for he becomes entitled to a privilege upon the immovable as a seller of 
movables under the Louisiana Private Works Act. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:4801(3) (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(A)(3) (Supp. 2015); RUBIN, 
supra note 82, § 37.11, at 252. Outside of situations covered by the Private 
Works Act, if the seller obtains a purchase money security interest in the thing 
sold and perfects this security interest by making a fixture filing in the Uniform 
Commercial Code records before attachment of the thing to an immovable, the 
purchase money security interest not only will survive attachment but will have 
priority over even a previously filed mortgage burdening the immovable. See 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-334(d) (Supp. 2015). A “fixture” is defined to be a 
thing that, after placement on or incorporation in an immovable, or on account 
of a declaration of immobilization, has become a component part of the 
immovable under the Civil Code. Id. § 10:9-102(a)(41). A security interest 
cannot exist in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on 
land. Id. § 10:9-334(a). 




The present rule is far from clear. Insofar as it purported to 
address vendor’s privileges, the decision in American Creosote 
Company was dicta. Professor Yiannopolous, acknowledging that 
the “test of loss of identity involves difficulties,” cites Hyman for the 
proposition that a vendor loses his privilege when the thing subject 
to the privilege becomes a component part of an immovable under 
Civil Code articles 465 or 466. However, after reviewing the 
jurisprudence under the 1870 Code, which had established the rule 
that the vendor’s privilege was lost only when the thing subject to 
the privilege had become incorporated to such an extent that its 
removal was physically impossible or economically unfeasible, he 
states that “whether the vendor’s privilege primes a real 
mortgagee’s right to claim things that become component parts of 
an immovable is ordinarily determined by reference to the test of 
facility of removal.”254 Support can, of course, be found in the 
jurisprudence for all of these propositions, though they do not 
seem to be entirely consistent with each other. Until the Supreme 
Court rules again on the issue, uncertainty will likely persist.255 
In those cases in which the vendor’s privilege remains intact 
notwithstanding the attachment of the thing to an immovable, the 
vendor has two alternative remedies available to vindicate his 
rights and only a limited period of time within which to exercise 
them, as the court explained in Walburn-Swenson Co. v. Darrell.256 
One remedy is to intervene seeking a separate appraisement of the 
movable and proportionate payment from the entirety of the 
proceeds from the sale of the immovable. The other remedy is to 
seize and sell the movable on which the vendor’s privilege rests in 
the enforcement of a judgment recognizing the privilege, even 
though the movable has become attached to an immovable. In 
Walburn-Swenson Co., the remedy of separate appraisement was 
                                                                                                             
 254. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 76, § 232, at 465.  
 255. It should be remembered that both American Creosote Company and 
Hyman involved claims by third persons having an interest in the immovable of 
which the thing subject to a vendor’s privilege had become a component part. 
Perhaps there is still room for application of the “substantial injury” test that 
existed before American Creosote Company if the thing subject to a vendor’s 
privilege becomes a component part of an immovable but the vendor is not in 
conflict with a third person having or acquiring an interest in the immovable. 
The approach of permitting a vendor’s privilege to survive immobilization if the 
thing remains identifiable, yet refusing to allow it to be asserted after 
immobilization against a mortgagee or other third person having rights in the 
immovable, has been espoused by some French writers. See supra note 233.  
 256. 22 So. 310, 311 (La. 1897). The plaintiff in the case was the unpaid 
vendor of machinery that had been installed on a plantation. Mortgage creditors 
seized the plantation and, on the eve of its sale, the unpaid vendor applied for 
the separate appraisement and sale of the machinery. Id. at 310. 




refused in view of the untimeliness of the unpaid sellers’ request 
just over an hour before the scheduled sheriff’s sale to be held in 
enforcement of a mortgage upon the immovable; however, the 
Court held that the lower court should have granted injunctive 
relief to the sellers so that they could pursue the second remedy of 
provoking their own seizure and sale of the movable. The Court 
rejected the mortgagee’s argument that the vendor’s right to a 
separate sale was lost after the mortgagee had seized the property. 
As Professor Yiannopoulos explains the holding, the vendor can 
seize the movable as long as it remains in the hands of his vendee, 
and his right of seizure is not defeated because the mortgage 
creditor has seized the property or the judicial sale of the 
immovable is close at hand.257 If the vendor fails to exercise either 
remedy before the foreclosure sale of the immovable, the vendor’s 
privilege is lost.258  
IX. RANKING OF THE VENDOR’S PRIVILEGE ON MOVABLES 
The articles found in the Louisiana Civil Code on ranking of 
privileges on movables originated in the Projet of 1825; they were 
not taken from the Code Napoléon. Planiol noted that the absence 
of a legislative ranking of privileges had the fortunate result of 
allowing time for “the doctrinal writers to study this matter and to 
arrive at scientific solutions.”259 He asserted that the special 
privileges can be placed into three principal categories: those based 
on the preservation of the thing, those based on an implied pledge, 
and those based on augmentation of the patrimony.260 His 
arguments concerning the ranking of the privileges within each 
                                                                                                             
 257. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights, supra note 138, at 227–28; YIANNOPOULOS, 
supra note 76, § 232, at 465. 
 258. See Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynaud, 4 La. App. 290 (Ct. App. 1926) 
(holding that the holder of a vendor’s privilege upon a movable lost his privilege 
when he allowed the immovable to which it was attached to be sold at a 
foreclosure sale instituted at the request of a second mortgagee, without 
provoking a separate appraisement of the thing on which he claimed a 
privilege). Moreover, once the privilege was destroyed, a foreclosure upon the 
same immovable by the first mortgagee did not have the effect of reviving the 
privilege nor permitting the privileged creditors to ask for a separate 
appraisement in connection with the later foreclosure sale. 
 259. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, No. 2622, at 460. 
 260. Id. No. 2637, at 465. Cf. AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 289 
(concluding, based on inferences drawn from the few express ranking rules 
found in the French Civil Code, that special privileges on movables rank in the 
following order: (1) privileges based on the notion of an express or implied 
pledge; (2) preservation privileges; and (3) the vendor’s privilege). 




class and among classes have largely been accepted by modern 
French writers,261 whose views might be summarized as follows: 
1. Preservation privileges rank in inverse chronological 
order, because the preservation performed by each of them 
inures to the benefit of all who have come before.262 
 
2. Among creditors holding an implied pledge, there is 
little opportunity for conflict unless a third party holds the 
thing for the benefit of more than one creditor. In that case, 
the rule of first in time, first in right applies.  
 
3. Among two creditors whose privileges are based on 
augmentation of patrimony, such as two successive 
vendors, the first to arise primes, for the reason that the first 
seller is the creditor of the second seller for the unpaid 
price due to him. Also, this principle draws by analogy 
upon the rule ranking successive vendor’s privileges upon 
immovables. 
Between two privileges found within different classes, ranking 
is as follows: 
a. Preservation versus pledge. Preservation privileges 
arising after the pledge prime, because they inured to the 
benefit of the pledgee. Preservation privileges arising 
before the pledge are inferior if the pledgee was unaware of 
them, because the pledgee is entitled to the benefit of the 
doctrine of la possession vaut titre.263 
 
b. Preservation versus augmentation of patrimony. The 
preservation privilege primes, regardless of when the 
preservation occurred. If it occurred after the vendor’s 
privilege arose, it primes because the preservation inured to 
the benefit of the vendor as privilege holder. If it occurred 
beforehand, the preservation privilege still primes because 
it inured to the benefit of the vendor when he was owner.  
 
c. Pledge versus augmentation of patrimony. The pledge 
primes by operation of the doctrine of la possession vaut 
                                                                                                             
 261. See, e.g., SIMLER & DELEBECQUE, supra note 75, §§ 784–791, at 706–
10. 
 262. See also AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 20, § 289. 
 263. Id. 




titre, unless the pledgee was aware of the earlier privilege. 
In that event, the pledge is inferior.264 
In large measure, these principles find expression in a single 
ranking article of the French Civil Code adopted in 2006.265  
As mentioned above, the Projet of 1825 added specific ranking 
rules to Louisiana’s Civil Code, many of which are based upon this 
same logic. For example, the lessor’s privilege outranks the vendor’s 
privilege.266 This is because the lessor’s privilege, at least historically, 
was based upon the notion of an implied pledge.267 An instance in 
which the Supreme Court applied these principles to a privilege for 
which the Civil Code gives no ranking rule at all is the artisan’s 
privilege.268 In Cozzo v. Ulrich,269 the court held that the artisan’s 
privilege has priority over the vendor’s privilege, because the vendor 
has a mere privilege, while the artisan is entitled to a right of pledge, 
including the right to retain the object until payment. Interestingly, 
the statutory repairman’s privilege,270 which does not carry with it 
any right or requirement of detention, is by the express wording of 
the statute subject to a vendor’s privilege. Thus, the repairman has 
priority over the vendor so long as he retains possession and can 
claim an artisan’s privilege under the Civil Code. If he relinquishes 
possession, he retains, for a short period of time, a statutory 
repairman’s privilege that is subordinate to the vendor’s privilege.  
It is well known that there are myriad vicious circles in the 
ranking of privileges on movables.271 The classic example of a 
                                                                                                             
 264. Id. 
 265. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2332–3 (Fr.). 
 266. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3263 (2015). For an application of this rule, see 
Interstate Electric Co. v. Tucker, 2 So. 2d 56 (La. 1941) (holding that a lessor’s 
privilege primed a vendor’s privilege on equipment, despite contentions by the 
vendor that the lessor and vendee were actually co-partners in a commercial 
partnership). 
 267. In the 2004 revision of the Louisiana Civil Code articles governing 
lease, the notion of an implied pledge was eliminated; thus, the superior ranking 
given to the lessor’s privilege no longer has any doctrinal basis in Louisiana. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2707 cmt. a (2015). However, comment (d) to article 2707 
observes that the change in the article “does not affect either the nature or 
priority of the privilege vis-à-vis other creditors of the lessee.” This is 
undoubtedly correct insofar as competition with the vendor’s privilege is 
concerned, even though its doctrinal underpinnings have been removed; 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3263 continues to rank the vendor’s privilege 
behind the lessor’s privilege.  
 268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3217(2) (2015). 
 269. 14 Teiss. 137 (La. Ct. App. 1916). 
 270. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007 & Supp. 2015). The 
statutory and code privileges are independent, and neither limits the other. 
 271. See Joseph Dainow, Vicious Circles in the Louisiana Law of Privileges, 
25 LA. L. REV. 1 (1964). The solution to vicious circles offered by Professor 




vicious circle involved competition among the vendor, the chattel 
mortgagee, and the lessor. A debtor purchased movable property 
on credit, executed and recorded a chattel mortgage bearing upon 
this property, and then brought the property upon leased premises. 
The Civil Code gives the lessor priority over the vendor.272 Under 
the former Chattel Mortgage Law, a chattel mortgage primed all 
privileges arising after the chattel mortgage was filed for public 
registry.273 Thus, under the facts assumed, the chattel mortgage 
would yield to the vendor’s privilege but would have priority over 
the lessor’s privilege.274 Fortunately, this vicious circle was 
eliminated by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
ranks security interests ahead of privileges held by both the vendor 
and the lessor.275 Thus, the priority of a modern day security interest 
                                                                                                             
 
Dainow is to give effect first to the ranking of competing privileges provided by 
the latest legislation, even if this had the effect of re-ordering the priorities of 
some of these privileges established under prior legislation. For criticism of this 
solution, see RUBIN, supra note 82, § 32.2, at 227 (“The problem with looking at 
the last amended statute is that often this will not resolve the vicious circle, for 
almost never does the ‘last’ amended statute expressly refer to the ranking of 
three or more privileges.”). 
 272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3263 (2015). 
 273. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5354, repealed by Act No. 128, 2001 La. Acts 
206.  Although not repealed outright until 2001, the Chattel Mortgage Law had 
already been superseded with respect to transactions occurring after January 1, 
1990 by the adoption of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
became effective on that date. See Act No. 135, 1989 La. Acts 417.  
 274. Noting the existence of this vicious circle, Professor Dainow concludes 
that, by application of the later legislation embodied in the Chattel Mortgage 
Law, the proper ranking is (1) vendor’s privilege, (2) chattel mortgage, and (3) 
lessor’s privilege. See Dainow, supra note 271, at 5. 
 275. Under section 9–322(h) of the Uniform Commercial Code and section 
10:9-322(h) of Louisiana Revised Statutes, security interests—whether perfected 
or not—outrank all privileges, unless the statute creating the privilege provides 
otherwise. See UCC § 9-322(h) (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-322(h) 
(Supp. 2015). The Civil Code articles providing for the vendor’s and lessor’s 
privileges do not provide otherwise, and indeed section 9:4770 of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes specifically provides that the privileges of both the vendor and 
lessor are subordinate to Chapter 9 security interests. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:4770 (Supp. 2015). As originally enacted, section 9:4770 expressly purported 
to subordinate even vendor’s privileges that were in existence at the time of its 
enactment. The constitutionality of this retroactivity has not been challenged in a 
reported case and, in view of the passage of over a quarter century since the 
enactment of the statute, likely will not ever be raised. For a case involving 
competition between a Chapter 9 security interest and vendor’s privileges, see 
Tetra Applied Tech., Inc. v. H.O.E., Inc., 878 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding a perfected security interest in the accounts of a manufacturer to be 
superior to vendor’s privileges claimed by the manufacturer’s suppliers). The 
court relied upon First National Bank of Boston v. Beckwith Machinery Co., 650 




against these two privileges would be certain but different from the 
ranking that existed under the Chattel Mortgage Law: the first 
priority would be the security interest, which would prime the 
lessor’s privilege, which would prime the vendor’s privilege.  
Numerous other vicious circles involving the vendor’s 
privilege have arisen, chiefly because the Legislature has often 
shown a propensity to protect the vendor when creating a 
competing privilege.  
A. Vendor/Widow/Lessor  
The needy widow’s privilege, which is a general privilege on 
both movables and immovables, was first established by Act 255 of 
1852 and later incorporated into the Civil Code of 1870 as article 
3252.276 The purpose of the privilege was poetically articulated in 
Succession of White:277 
[T]o ward off from the widow and young children of one 
recently dead, the misery of unmitigated destitution, and to 
cover, as with a shield, these helpless mourners from the 
pitiless shafts of poverty, at the moment when the protecting 
arm of the husband and father was made powerless by 
death.278 
The original text of the 1852 statute and of article 3252 of the 
1870 Code provided that the widow’s privilege was outranked by 
the vendor’s privilege but was superior to all other debts.279 This 
led to the obvious possibility of a vicious circle in the ranking of 
privileges affecting movables, because the Civil Code ranks the 
vendor’s privilege behind the lessor’s privilege. In order to avoid 
this vicious circle, the Court in Succession of Cooley280 held that 
the reference to the “vendor’s privilege” in article 3252 meant only 
                                                                                                             
 
So. 2d 1148 (La. 1995), in which the Supreme Court held that a previously 
perfected Chapter 9 security interest has priority over a non-possessory 
materialman’s privilege granted to a supplier of ship building materials under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3237(8). 
 276. The privilege is sometimes known as the “widow’s homestead” because 
the original purpose of the privilege, as stated in the title of the 1852 legislation, 
was to provide a homestead for the widow and children of deceased persons. 
However, the text of the statute did not tie the privilege in any manner to a 
homestead, thus leading to an unsuccessful constitutional challenge that the 
statute differed from its title. See Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. Ann. 329 (1854).  
 277. 29 La. Ann. 702 (1877). 
 278. Id. at 703. 
 279. See Act No. 255, 1852 La. Acts 171; LA. CIV. CODE art. 3252 (1870). 
 280. 26 La. Ann. 166, 166–67 (1874).  




the vendor’s privilege on immovables, for otherwise an “awkward 
confliction” would arise.281 The Court’s valiant attempt at avoiding 
a vicious circle was ultimately thwarted, however, by Act 242 of 
1918, which amended article 3252 to provide specifically that the 
widow’s privilege is primed by vendor’s privileges on both 
movable and immovable property. The 1918 Act also amended the 
article to provide that the widow’s privilege is primed by all 
conventional mortgages,282 thus, with apparent indifference to the 
consequences, establishing no fewer than four vicious circles 
through a single enactment of the Legislature.283  
B. Vendor/Repairman/Lessor 
The statutes creating the garageman’s and repairman’s 
privileges284 rank those privileges behind the vendor’s privilege but 
not behind that of the lessor. Thus, the vendor primes the mechanic, 
who primes the lessor, who primes the vendor.285  
                                                                                                             
 281. Succession of Thompson, 12 Teiss. 24 (La. Ct. App. 1914).  
 282. See Act No. 242, 1918 La. Acts 433. Act 17 of 1917 provided that the 
widow’s privilege would be outranked by conventional mortgages securing 
money lent for not less than one year at no greater than 6% per annum interest. 
These limitations were removed by the 1918 legislation. See Act. No. 17, 1917 
La. Acts 26. 
 283. The other vicious circles on immovables are (i) the widow primes 
general privileges, which prime conventional mortgages, which prime the 
widow; and (ii) the widow primes judicial mortgages, which prime a 
subsequently recorded conventional mortgage, which primes the widow. Putting 
these two together yields a vicious circle with four participants: widow primes 
general privileges, which prime judicial mortgages, which prime a subsequently 
arising conventional mortgage, which primes the widow. By 1932, the Supreme 
Court seemed to have lost its desire to interpret the law in order to avoid vicious 
circles. In Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., 141 So. 368 (La. 1932), the 
Court was faced with the problem of ranking the vendor’s privilege on movables 
against a privilege created under the corporate receiver statute in favor of those 
creditors lending money to the receiver. The receiver’s certificates evidencing 
these loans were given a privilege over all other creditors of the corporation 
“save the vendor’s lien and privilege.” Id. at 372. Citing Cooley, the Court 
originally ruled that the vendor’s privilege in question was limited to that on 
immovables. Id. On rehearing, the Court held that this exception applied to the 
vendor’s privilege on both movable and immovable property, notwithstanding 
arguments that the holding would create the possibility of a conflict among the 
holders of the receiver’s certificates, the lessor and the vendor. Id. 
 284. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007). 
 285. Since the repairman’s statute is newer legislation, Professor Dainow 
concludes that the proper ranking is (1) vendor’s privilege, (2) mechanic’s 
privilege, and (3) lessor’s privilege. See Dainow, supra note 271, at 6–7. 




C. Repairman/Unperfected Security Interest/Vendor  
As mentioned above, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial 
Code eliminated a common vicious circle involving chattel mortgages, 
but it also created at least one new vicious circle. When the Uniform 
Commercial Code was enacted, the statute creating the repairman’s 
privilege was amended to provide that the repairman’s privilege is 
subject to previously perfected security interests.286 This created a new 
vicious circle where an unperfected security interest is involved. 
Suppose that a debtor has granted a security interest in all of his 
present and future equipment, and this security interest is not properly 
perfected. He purchases an item of equipment on credit from a vendor 
who does not obtain a consensual security interest and therefore holds 
only a vendor’s privilege. The debtor then causes the equipment to be 
repaired by the repairman. Under the repairman’s statute, the 
repairman would have priority over the secured party, because the 
secured party does not have a previously perfected security interest. 
The secured party, even though his security interest is unperfected, 
would have priority over the vendor.287 But, the vendor would have 
priority over the repairman by the express command of the 
repairman’s statute.288  
D. Vendor/Widow/Repairman/Lessor  
In a four-way contest among the widow, the vendor, the lessor, 
and the repairman, the vendor can claim priority over both the 
repairman and the widow, for the reasons mentioned above. By 
operation of the repairman’s statute, the repairman is inferior to the 
vendor but can claim priority over the widow and the lessor.289 
Under article 3252, the widow is superior to all but the vendor. The 
                                                                                                             
 286. See Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
9:4501, 4502 (2007).  
 287. See supra note 274. 
 288. Using Professor Dainow’s solution of following the latest enacted 
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RUBIN, supra note 82, § 32.2, at 226. 
 289. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501, 4502 (2007). 




lessor can claim preference over the vendor by operation of article 
3263.290  
E. Vendor/Funeral Charges/Lessor 
Professor Dainow identifies one vicious circle arising under the 
unamended Civil Code itself.291 Under article 3257, the general 
privilege for funeral charges primes the lessor. Under article 3263, 
the lessor primes the vendor, but the vendor’s privilege primes the 
privilege for funeral charges. Professor Dainow argues that there 
was no intent to create a vicious circle in this instance but rather 
simply an express subordination of the lessor’s privilege to the 
general privilege for funeral charges. Thus, he concludes that the 
proper ranking is the vendor’s privilege, the privilege for funeral 
charges, and the lessor’s privilege. 
Professor Dainow observes that the lessor once had one of the 
most favored privileges, but later legislation seems to have 
consistently preferred the vendor, but not the lessor, over special 
statutory privileges, while leaving intact the ranking rule under the 
Civil Code preferring the lessor over the vendor.292 We have gone 
even further in this evolution in recent years, since the doctrinal 
basis for the superiority of the lessor’s privilege has been removed, 
though the lessor’s privilege nonetheless remains superior to that of 
the vendor.293 More importantly, the privileges of both the lessor 
and the vendor upon movables, each of which under former law 
primed later-arising chattel mortgages,294 have seen their ranking, 
and therefore their overall importance, greatly reduced by the 
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under its provisions, 
both of these privileges rank behind all Chapter 9 security 
interests, irrespective of the order in which the competing rights 
arise and apparently irrespective of whether the security interest is 
even perfected.295 Whatever it might once have meant, the idea of 
                                                                                                             
 290. Professor Dainow concludes that the repairman’s statute, as the latest 
enacted legislation, governs, with the result that priority is (1) vendor’s 
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adheret visceribus rei has itself been eviscerated, at least insofar as 
the vendor’s privilege on movables is concerned. 
X. RANKING OF THE VENDOR’S PRIVILEGES ON IMMOVABLES 
The Civil Code lists very few special privileges on immovables; 
chief among them are that of the vendor and those in favor of 
contractors, subcontractors, laborers, materialmen, and others 
supplying goods, labor, and services in constructing, rebuilding, or 
repairing buildings or other work.296 The latter category of special 
privileges has been effectively supplanted by the Louisiana Private 
Works Act.297 The following discussion addresses the ranking of a 
timely filed vendor’s privilege on an immovable against the 
general privileges arising under the Civil Code, its ranking against 
previously filed general mortgages, the ranking of vendor’s 
privileges held by building and loan associations, the ranking of a 
vendor’s privilege that is not filed in a timely manner, and the 
ranking of a vendor’s privilege against privileges arising under the 
Private Works Act. 
A. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege Against General Privileges  
The first few words contained in article 3267 of the Civil Code 
give the impression that the article is designed to rank the vendor’s 
privilege on movables against other privileges: 
If the movables of the debtor are subject to the vendor’s 
privilege, or if there be a house or other work subjected to 
the privilege of the workmen who have constructed or 
repaired it, or of the individuals who furnished the materials, 
the vendor, workmen and furnishers of materials, shall be 
paid from the price of the object affected in their favor, in 
preference to other privileged debts of the debtor, even 
funeral charges, except the charges for affixing seals, 
making inventories, and others which may have been 
necessary to procure the sale of the thing.298  
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However, when the entire article is read, it is readily apparent that 
the word “movables” at the beginning of the article must mean 
“immovables.” If the article were applied as written, then the vendor’s 
privilege on movables would be ranked quite unnecessarily against 
general privileges on immovables.299 This article was not borrowed 
from the Code Napoléon, and for that reason, the error cannot be 
attributed to a fault in translation.300 If this error is corrected in the 
interpretation of the article, its meaning is that special privileges on 
immovables, including the vendor’s privilege, outrank general 
privileges other than those for fixing seals, making inventories and law 
charges for things necessary to procure the sale of the thing subject to 
the special privilege.301  
                                                                                                             
 299. Professor Dainow wrote an entire article dedicated solely to the proof 
that the word movables in Article 3267 should be immovables. See Joseph 
Dainow, Art. 3267 and the Ranking of Privileges, 9 LA. L. REV. 370 (1949). He 
observes that, at the time of his writing, there was not a single decision 
predicated upon the application of the article to a vendor’s privilege on 
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since the time of his writing.  
 300. Both the French and English versions of the 1825 Code, which 
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from the French version of the 1825 Code: “privileged debts” should be 
“privileged creditors.” The words “créanciers privilégiés” were used in the 
French version of the 1825 Code.  
 301. See Salaun v. Their Creditors (In re Contonio), 30 So. 696 (La. 1901); 
Marcelin v. His Creditors, 21 La. Ann. 423 (1869); Monrose v. His Creditors, 2 
Rob. (La.) 280 (1842). In Marsh v. His Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 469 (1856), the 
Court explained that the charges superior to the vendor’s privilege should be 
restricted to those charges without which the sale could not have taken place 
(and in that case, it was conceded that the sheriff’s, clerk’s, notaries’ and 
appraiser’s fees were necessary charges in procuring the sale), but following 
Monrose, the Court also held that the syndic’s commission upon the property 
sold was an expense of administration inuring to the benefit of the vendor and 
therefore priming the vendor’s privilege. In Succession of Lauve, 18 La. Ann. 
721 (1866), the Court observed that, even though succession charges inuring to 
the benefit of all parties concerned are of higher dignity than debts of the 
deceased, article 3234 of the 1825 Code (article 3267 of the 1870 Code) is an 
exception to this rule, and the holder of the vendor’s privilege cannot therefore 
be charged with general privileges or succession charges. A more recent claim 
of priority under article 3267 over a vendor’s privilege appeared in Norvell v. 
Crichton, 150 So. 2d 621 (La. Ct. App. 1963), in which, following the credit 
sale of an immovable, the buyer’s attorney exerted efforts to have the property 
declared the buyer’s separate property. Finding that this attorney’s services were 
not rendered “to procure the sale of the thing” within the meaning of article 
3267, the court held that his privilege for his fees was subordinate to the 
vendor’s privilege. Id. at 623. 




B. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege Against Previously Filed 
General Mortgages  
Pedesclaux v. Legare302 is an illustration of the preference of a 
timely filed vendor’s privilege over a previously recorded general 
mortgage. That case involved a contest between a wife’s legal 
mortgage upon her husband’s property and a vendor’s privilege 
arising out of his subsequent purchase of an immovable. Curiously, 
both counsel argued the case on the basis of the supposition that 
the law in force in April 1869, when the vendor’s privilege arose, 
required recordation of the vendor’s privilege on the very day of 
the passage of the act. However, that law did not come in force 
until the adoption of the 1870 Code a year later. Article 3240 of the 
1825 Civil Code had imposed a time limitation for recordation of a 
vendor’s privilege, but an 1868 statute removed the time limitation 
altogether. Thus, the Court held that the vendor’s privilege, by its 
very nature alone and irrespective of the time of its recordation, 
outranked the legal mortgage.303   
Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation involved a contest between 
the holder of a judicial mortgage and a third person who had 
purchased an immovable from the judgment debtor.304 Under the facts 
of the case, the judicial mortgage was recorded long before the 
judgment debtor acquired the immovable in question and even longer 
before he sold it to the third person.305 However, the act of credit sale 
by which the judgment debtor acquired the property was not 
recorded until three days after recordation of the judgment debtor’s 
sale of the property to the third person.306 The third person cleverly 
contended that the judicial mortgage never attached to the 
immovable, on the theory that a judicial mortgage cannot attach 
until the judgment debtor’s title has been recorded and in this case, 
by the time the judgment debtor’s title was recorded, he had 
already alienated the property in favor of the third person.307 
Rejecting this contention, the Court held that the Civil Code 
provides that no act affecting immovable property shall have any 
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 303. Id. The Court observed that, even if it were to apply the period that had 
applied under article 3240 of the 1825 Code before the 1868 amendment, the 
same result would obtain, since the vendor’s privilege was recorded in a 
seasonable manner based upon the time originally given for recordation under 
the 1825 Code. Id. 
 304. Gallaugher v. Hebrew Congregation, 35 La. Ann. 829 (1883). 
 305. Id.  
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effect against third parties until deposited for registry.308 The law 
requiring registry is intended to protect the vendor’s creditors and 
other third persons who do not know of the existence of an 
unrecorded transfer; it was never designed to prevent property 
from passing from vendor to purchaser or to prevent general 
mortgages from reaching and encumbering immovables acquired 
under an unrecorded title. Thus, judicial and legal mortgages 
recorded against the purchaser encumber immovables from the 
very instant of purchase whether the title is recorded or not but 
rank subordinate to encumbrances existing on the property against 
the vendor at the moment of transfer.309  
A sequel to Gallaugher, Givanovitch v. Hebrew Congregation,310 
arose from the same set of facts and addressed the issue of whether 
the privilege of the unpaid vendor under the late-filed act of credit 
sale had priority over the pre-existing judicial mortgage against his 
purchaser. In holding the vendor’s privilege to be inferior, the Court 
followed previous authorities to the effect that previously recorded 
general mortgages will take precedence over a vendor’s privilege 
unless the contract from which the vendor’s privilege arises is 
seasonably recorded in the mortgage records.311 The reverse set of 
circumstances involving a timely filed vendor’s privilege was 
presented in the much more recent case of Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corp. v. Valteau,312 which is discussed more fully in the following 
section of this Article. In that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the principle that a timely filed vendor’s privilege outranks a 
previously recorded judicial mortgage against the vendee.313  
                                                                                                             
 308. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2264 (1870). See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839 
(2015). 
 309. To the extent the Court’s prior holding in Rochereau v. Colomb, 27 La. 
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35 La. Ann. at 832. 
 310. 36 La. Ann. 272 (1884). 
 311. In Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U.S. 212 (1888), the United States Supreme 
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required by article 3274. Id. at 223–24. For a more recent case holding that a 
vendor’s privilege that is not timely recorded does not outrank a previously 
existing judicial mortgage, see Commissioner of Insurance v. Terrell, 647 So. 2d 
445 (La. Ct. App. 1994). 
 312. 558 So. 2d 1319 (La. Ct. App. 1990). 
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Planiol enunciates essentially the same conclusion that the 
Supreme Court reached in Valteau:  
Because of its nature, the privilege necessarily ranks all 
mortgages established on the same immovable, although 
anterior to it. This is what Art. 2095 provides: “The privilege is 
the right to be preferred to the other creditors, even 
mortgages.” It is clear that a privileged creditor cannot acquire 
on the property which is subject to it, a mortgage which will 
rank those which already exist on his own account or on 
account of his authors; the debtor, who sells his property and 
becomes privileged as a vendor, is necessarily primed by his 
own creditors. A vendor can prime only the creditors who 
acquire mortgages against the purchaser: they are like him 
creditors of such purchaser, and they will be paid 
proportionately if no cause of preference intervenes.314  
. . . . 
The vendor, creditor of the price, conflicts not only with the 
creditors of the buyer who will in the future obtain mortgages 
but also with creditors having pre-existing general mortgages. . 
. . The latter will have a mortgage on the immovable on the 
very day of the purchase. On the property sold their mortgage 
right is therefore of the same rank as the right of the vendor. 
The vendor is nevertheless preferred over such prior creditors 
because he is “privileged.” Such was already the language of 
Pothier: . . . he who has sold the heritage should be preferred to 
all the other creditors, for as this owner has acquired the 
heritage with the charge of the mortgage which his vendor has 
reserved on it in alienating it, he cannot mortgage it to his 
other creditors except subject to the charge of this mortgage, 
not being able to transfer to them a greater right than he had on 
it himself.315 
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C. Ranking of a Vendor’s Privilege in Favor of Building and Loan 
Associations316 
Over the course of time, building and loan associations 
developed the use of a sale/resale procedure to create a vendor’s 
privilege even in those cases in which a sale was not otherwise 
involved.317 This practice was made possible by the enactment of 
legislation in 1888 providing that “in case any such association 
shall purchase property from any person and shall afterwards sell 
the same property to the same person, then such association shall 
have the vendor’s lien and privilege upon the property so sold.”318 
As the Supreme Court later explained, this enactment was necessary 
in order to overcome prior jurisprudence that a transaction by which 
a borrower made a cash sale of his property to a lender, which then 
immediately resold the same property to the borrower on terms of 
credit, was a mere pignorative contract that did not create a vendor’s 
privilege.319 The policy reasons motivating this favored treatment 
for building and loan associations have been explained in the 
following terms: 
The purpose for which building and loan associations are 
established is to enable persons of small means and limited 
incomes to acquire homes and thus become better citizens 
and more identified with the welfare and growth of the 
community. Because of the advantageous results attending 
the operation of such associations and their beneficient [sic] 
purpose, they have been favored and granted special 
privileges by various state Legislatures. Our own Legislature 
has deemed it to be in the interest of our people to encourage 
the formation and operation of building and loan 
associations, and has enacted special laws giving them 
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certain well-defined powers and privileges to be exercised in 
the promotion of their objects.320 
This legislation spawned a considerable amount of litigation in 
which the courts were called upon to determine the extent to which 
these sale/resale transactions would be treated as true sales.321 
In 1902, the Legislature reinforced the 1888 legislation, providing 
“that every loan [made by a building and loan association] on real 
estate shall be secured by vendor’s privilege and first mortgage upon 
real property.”322 This enactment not only made the vendor’s privilege 
mandatory, but it introduced into the law a certain ambiguity, for the 
act provided that “[s]uch vendor’s privilege and mortgage shall 
have priority over all other liens, charges, privileges, incumbrances 
[sic] and mortgages . . . which shall be recorded or claimed 
subsequent to the recording of such vendor’s privilege and 
mortgage.”323 The 1902 Act then repeated the provisions of the 
1888 legislation that allowed associations to enter into sale/resale 
transactions, stating that in such cases “such association shall have 
a privilege of equal rank as the vendor’s lien and privilege upon 
the property so acquired.”324 There is obvious tension between 
these two provisions, for a true vendor’s privilege outranks even 
pre-existing mortgages, as discussed in the preceding section of 
this Article. This tension persists in the law today. One paragraph 
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of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830 authorizes building 
and loan associations to enter into sale/resale transactions and 
provides that such a transaction is treated as a purchase and sale 
vesting in the association a privilege of equal rank with the vendor 
of immovable property.325 Another paragraph in the same statute 
provides that all mortgages in favor of building and loan 
associations “shall have a rank equal to that of a vendor’s privilege 
. . . and shall have priority over all other liens, privileges, 
encumbrances, and mortgages . . . which are recorded or arise in 
any manner subsequent to the date of recordation of the mortgage 
in favor of the association.”326 
Surprisingly, the courts have only rarely addressed the priority 
of a vendor’s privilege held by a building and loan association. In 
one early case, the Court held that a timely filed vendor’s privilege 
arising in favor of an association from a sale/resale transaction 
primed a conventional mortgage executed at the same time in favor of 
another creditor.327 The issue of whether a timely recorded vendor’s 
privilege in favor of a building and loan association outranks a pre-
existing judicial mortgage against the association’s borrower was 
addressed by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in Homes 
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Tri-Parish Ventures.328 Significantly, the 
building and loan association in this case was not a seller under a 
sale/resale transaction but instead claimed the ranking of a vendor’s 
privilege on the basis of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
6:830(H). The association’s mortgage was in competition with a 
judicial mortgage that had been filed against the association’s 
borrower before the borrower acquired the property and mortgaged 
it to the building and loan association. Citing Civil Code article 
3273 to the effect that privileges are effective against third persons 
from the date of recordation, the court held that article 3274 is 
simply a limited exception to this rule, “in which a grace period is 
given to the privilege holder over intervening mortgages only, 
where the act importing privilege is recorded within a very limited 
period after the date of execution.”329 The court observed that a 
similar grace period was created for mortgages in favor of building 
and loan associations pursuant to the savings and loan association 
law; “however, the special ranking date, as in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 3274, affects intervening mortgages only.”330 Later the court 
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remarked that “[a] vendor’s privilege which is preserved and 
perfected against third parties through recordation primes subsequent 
mortgages affecting the property.”331 The court thus found that the 
holder of the previously filed judicial mortgage had priority. What is 
surprising about the court’s holding is that it did not seem to be based 
upon an interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830 but 
rather upon an interpretation of those articles of the Civil Code 
applicable to all vendor’s privileges.332  
This rationale was called into question in Lawyer’s Title 
Insurance Corp. v. Valteau,333 in which the court was faced with a 
true credit sale in favor of purchaser against whom a judicial 
mortgage had been recorded five years earlier. No building and 
loan association was involved. In affirming a finding by the trial 
court that the vendor’s privilege outranked the previously recorded 
judicial mortgage against the purchaser, the Fourth Circuit went to 
great lengths to explain its prior opinion in the Home Savings case, 
maintaining that the building and loan association in that case was 
never a vendor and that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 6:830(H) 
does not actually afford building and loan associations a vendor’s 
privilege that outranks pre-existing interests.334 The Fourth Circuit 
in Valteau further explained that its holding in Home Savings was 
that mortgages and other encumbrances emanating from the vendee 
are primed by the vendor’s privilege even when recorded before a 
credit sale is consummated.335 In its opinion denying a writ 
application in Valteau, the Supreme Court limited the holding of the 
case to a mere statement that a vendor’s privilege arising from a sale 
to a vendee outranks a prior recorded judicial mortgage against the 
vendee.336 The Supreme Court explained that the decision in Home 
Savings involved a situation in which a judgment debtor already 
owned the property before mortgaging it to the building and loan 
association in a refinancing transaction.337 For that reason, the prior 
recorded judicial mortgage against that judgment debtor outranked 
any vendor’s privilege arising from his mortgage of the property in 
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favor of the building and loan association.338 Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court found that the Fourth Circuit’s observations 
concerning the nature and effect of the vendor’s privilege granted to 
building and loan associations under Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 6:830H were “clearly dicta” since there was no building and 
loan association involved in Valteau.339 
The courts have not since been called upon to determine whether, 
in the absence of a sale/resale transaction, Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 6:830 grants a building and loan association mortgage the 
ranking of a true vendor’s privilege that outranks pre-existing 
mortgages or whether, as the statute itself provides, this statutory 
vendor’s privilege outranks only later arising encumbrances. One 
Louisiana treatise argues persuasively that Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 6:830 cannot be construed to grant a building and loan 
association’s mortgage priority over a pre-existing mortgage in the 
absence of an actual sale, for that interpretation would grant the 
association priority any time it lent money.340 It seems to be a fair 
inference from the jurisprudence that, if a building and loan 
association enters into an actual sale/resale transaction, it enjoys a true 
vendor’s privilege that, upon timely recordation, will outrank any 
mortgage bearing against the vendee other than mortgages that 
burdened the property at the time it was conveyed to the association.341 
If, on the other hand, the building and loan association merely obtains 
a mortgage on the property without actually participating in the 
transaction as a vendor, its “vendor’s privilege” should outrank only 
later arising encumbrances. 
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 339. Id. 
 340. TITLE, supra note 85, § 15:7, at 1315–18. 
 341. With true sale and resale transactions, there are two different factual 
circumstances leading to wholly different results. If the property is burdened by 
a judicial mortgage before it is ever sold to the building and loan association, the 
association’s vendor’s privilege, even if timely filed, will not outrank the 
previously filed judicial mortgage. This occurs, for instance, when a borrower 
whose title to property is subject to a judicial mortgage sells the property to a 
building and loan association that then immediately re-sells the property to the 
borrower. If, on the other hand, the association acquires unencumbered title to 
the property from a seller who is not its borrower, and then immediately sells the 
property to its borrower, at which time a judicial mortgage previously filed 
against the borrower attaches, the building and loan association’s vendor’s 
privilege, if timely filed, will outrank the previously filed judicial mortgage 
against the borrower. These outcomes are not the result of any special legislation 
affecting building and loan associations; they result from the general rules 
applicable to vendor’s privileges as interpreted in the cases discussed above. 




D. Ranking of Vendor’s Privileges That Are Not Timely Filed 
Article 2113 of the Code Napoléon provides that all privileges 
which are required to be inscribed and as to which the conditions 
required to preserve the privilege have not been fulfilled do not 
cease to operate as mortgages, but the mortgage has effect as to 
third persons only from the time of the inscription. As Planiol 
explains,342 if a privileged creditor fails to inscribe his privilege 
within the time required by law, he does not lose his right to 
inscribe. The privilege can still be inscribed after the delay has 
elapsed, but its rank is diminished: Its ranking ceases to be 
regulated under the law as a privilege but instead depends upon the 
date of its inscription. Thus, if the inscription is made after the 
expiration of the delay given for recordation, the privilege as such is 
lost, and it “degenerates” into nothing more than an ordinary mortgage 
which is assigned its rank according to usual rules based upon the date 
of recordation.343 These concepts appeared in the 1825 Louisiana Civil 
Code,344 and their application is illustrated by Succession of 
O’Laughlin.345 In that case, the curator of a succession proposed to 
allocate the general law charges of the succession proportionately to 
two separate immovables, both of which were subject to untimely filed 
vendor’s privileges. Because the vendor’s privileges were not 
inscribed in a timely manner, their character as privileges had been 
lost, and the creditors were entitled only to the rights of mortgagees, 
with the result that one or both of them had to contribute to the 
payment of general privileges.346  
                                                                                                             
 342. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 10, Nos. 3149–3150. 
 343. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2379 (Fr.) (formerly article 2113). 
Interestingly, a vendor’s privilege could not originally degenerate into a mere 
mortgage because the French Civil Code did not at first prescribe a time during 
which its inscription was required. XIV BEUDANT ET AL., supra note 18, § 706. 
Currently, however, inscription of a vendor’s privilege is required within two 
months from the act of sale under French Civil Code art. 2108. CODE CIVIL [C. 
CIV.] art. 2379 (Fr.) (formerly article 2108). 
 344. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).  
 345. 18 La. Ann. 142 (1866). 
 346. The Court then addressed the issue of which of the two mortgages in 
question, bearing upon different immovables, had to bear the loss. Id. at 143–44. 
To answer this question, the Court turned to articles 3236 and 3277 of the 1825 
Code (substantially the same as the 1870 civil code articles 3269 and 3270). Id. 
at 143. The former article provides that if general privileges cannot be satisfied 
out of the movables, they are paid in preference to all mortgages and privileges 
other than special privileges in favor of the vendor and the workmen and 
furnisher of materials. The resulting loss falls upon the creditor whose mortgage 
is “the least ancient.” The Court found it significant that the former article 
makes no reference to the dignity of mortgages, but only to their dates. Id. at 
144. Thus, the Court rejected the argument that the reference to different 




The rules governing the effect of the untimely reinscription of a 
privilege were dramatically changed in the 1870 Code. Article 
3274 suppressed the “degeneration” concept, providing instead that 
an untimely inscribed privilege affords no preference over 
creditors who have previously acquired mortgages. In other words, 
the creditor in question still holds a privilege, but that privilege is 
robbed of its priority over mortgages that were recorded prior to the 
date the privilege was recorded. This is not a distinction without a 
difference, for the vendor’s privilege on immovables enjoys favored 
treatment over general privileges.  
The Court in Wheelright v. St. Louis, N.O. & O. Canal 
Transportation Co.347 seized upon the opportunity to explain the effect 
of the adoption of article 3274 of the 1870 Code. Under the facts of the 
case, the privileged creditor, who apparently claimed a mechanic’s 
privilege on an immovable, filed an affidavit of his privilege long after 
the registry of the plaintiff’s mortgage and after expiration of the time 
limitation for filing his privilege provided under article 3274.348 The 
Court examined differences existing between the 1825 and 1870 
Codes.349 Under the 1825 Code,350 a privilege was valid against 
third persons from the date of the act if recorded within a specified 
period of time. If not recorded within that time, it lost its effect as a 
privilege; that is to say, it conferred no preference over a creditor 
who had acquired a mortgage in the meantime. However, it was 
                                                                                                             
 
mortgages according to their dates must be taken to refer to different mortgages 
bearing upon the same thing. Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the later of the 
two mortgages had to contribute to the payment of the general privileges, and 
the earlier of the two was required to contribute only to the charges necessary to 
procure the sale of the property subject to the mortgage. Id. at 144–45. The 
result of the case would likely be different under the 1870 Code, since article 
3274 now provides that untimely inscribed vendor’s privileges do not lose their 
character as privileges and article 3269 takes specific exception to special 
privileges in favor of a vendor. See discussion supra Part VIII.D. 
 347. 17 So. 133 (La. 1895). 
 348. Id. at 137. 
 349. There was another change that the Court did not note: The statement in 
article 3240 of the 1825 Code that privileges are valid against third persons from 
the date of the act, assuming timely recordation, was suppressed in favor of a 
provision that privileges are not effective against third persons unless recorded. 
See discussion supra Part VIII.E (concerning the ranking of vendor’s privileges 
against Private Works Act privileges). Interestingly, the entire discussion by the 
Court in Wheelwright was dicta, because it held that the filing made by the 
purported privileged creditor was defective since it did not show the creditor’s 
claim on its face but rather made reference to documents to be found elsewhere. 
 350. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825). 




still valid as a mortgage.351 Under the 1870 Code, article 3273 
provides that privileges are valid against third persons from the date of 
the recording of the act of evidence of the indebtedness. Article 3274 
provides that no privilege affects third persons unless recorded in the 
manner required by law and that no privilege confers a preference on 
the creditor who holds it against other creditors who have acquired a 
mortgage unless that act is recorded within a specified delay after the 
contract is entered into.352 The Court in Wheelwright explained the 
difference between the 1825 Code and the 1870 Code as follows: 
under the 1825 Code, tardiness of inscription reduced the privilege 
forever to a mere mortgage.353 Under the 1870 Code, the character of 
the tardily inscribed privilege is not changed; however, its effect as a 
privilege, as to mortgagees only, is lost. As to other parties, the 
privilege retains its full effect.354  
                                                                                                             
 351. These concepts appear consistent with Planiol’s discussion concerning 
the “degeneration” of an untimely filed privilege into a mortgage. 
 352. Under the 1870 Code as originally written, the act of sale had to be 
recorded on the very day that it was adopted. By an amendment in 1877, the 
present delays of 7 and 15 days were inserted. See Act No. 45, 1877 La. Acts 59. 
 353. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Succession of O’Laughlin 
and article 2095 of the French Civil Code. See Wheelright, 17 So. at 138. 
 354. The holding of Wheelwright to the effect that the untimely inscription of 
a privilege does not cause it to lose its character as a privilege calls into question 
the Court’s earlier decision in Succession of Marc, 29 La. Ann. 412 (1877), 
which, like Wheelwright, purported to explain the differences between the 1825 
and 1870 Codes. In Succession of Marc, the estate consisted of two immovables, 
one of which was subject to a mortgage in favor of Soye and the other of which 
was subject to a later arising and untimely filed vendor’s privilege in favor of 
Gayarre. Id. Both immovables were sold, and the issue was which of the two 
creditors had to bear the widow’s privilege and the general privileges. Id. On 
original hearing, the Court held that the widow’s privilege had to be paid with 
the funds derived from the sale of the immovable subject to the Soye mortgage, 
since the widow’s privilege is inferior to the vendor’s privilege. Id. at 414–15. 
All general privileges were assessed against the fund derived from the sale of 
the Gayarre property, since that mortgage was the least ancient of the two. Id. 
On rehearing, however, the Court reassigned the widow’s privilege to the 
Gayarre fund in light of a “radical change” of two articles of the Civil Code. Id. 
at 415. Under the 1825 Code, the vendor had six days within which to record his 
privilege. However, under the 1870 Code as originally adopted, as against 
previously recorded mortgages, the vendor’s privilege had effect as such only 
when recorded on the very day of the contract creating it. Thus, the Court held 
that Gayarre had “no privilege whatever, as against third persons” since his 
vendor’s privilege was not recorded on the day the sale was made. Id. at 416. 
Gayarre’s mortgage, however, was not lost, but since Gayarre’s mortgage was 
the least ancient of the two, the Gayarre fund had to contribute to the widow’s 
privilege before the Soye fund. Id. This case appears to represent a classic 
application of Planiol’s “degeneration” concept, which the Wheelwright court 
would later reject. However, the holding of the case might nonetheless still be 
correct if article 3274 is applied not just as a ranking rule when a privilege and 




Another interesting issue that arises when the vendor fails to 
record his privilege in a timely fashion is whether the vendor’s 
exercise of his right of dissolution for non-payment of the purchase 
price will nonetheless cause title to the property to revert to the vendor 
free of a judicial mortgage or other general mortgage affecting the 
vendee. At least one case holds that, upon exercise of the right of 
dissolution, title is returned to the vendor unencumbered by a 
previously filed general mortgage; however, the case does not 
expressly mention whether the vendor’s privilege was recorded at 
all.355 In view of the well-established rules that the privilege and the 
right to dissolve are entirely independent rights and that the effect of 
the exercise of the right to dissolve is to return the property to the 
vendor free of encumbrances placed on it by the vendee,356 the 
vendor’s failure to record his privilege in a timely manner, or to record 
it at all, should not alter the result. 
E. Ranking of a Timely Filed Vendor’s Privilege Against Private 
Works Act Privileges  
The Civil Code does not purport to rank the vendor’s privilege 
on an immovable against the special privileges provided by the 
Civil Code in favor of those involved in performing work on the 
immovable. Instead, it provides for a separate appraisement 
procedure.357 In the 1871 case of City of Baltimore v. Parlange,358 
the Court observed that this separate appraisement procedure 
“exemplifies the intelligent sense of justice which distinguishes the 
civil law.”359 The rationale for the separate appraisement procedure 
                                                                                                             
 
mortgage exist on the same immovable but instead is given a more expansive 
effect to allow a mortgage holder to ignore entirely the status of a privilege as a 
privilege when it is not filed in a timely manner. In other words, even though the 
untimely filed vendor’s privilege would still count as a privilege insofar as the 
widow was concerned, it would not be a privilege—for any purpose—insofar as 
the creditor holding a mortgage on another immovable is concerned. Thus, the 
other mortgagee could force the unpaid vendor to share in the payment of 
general privileges under articles 3269 and 3270 as though the unpaid vendor 
held merely an ordinary mortgage. This argument may stretch article 3274 
beyond its plain meaning: The article does not provide that an unseasonably 
filed privilege is wholly without effect as a privilege as regards mortgagees, but 
rather provides simply that an unseasonably filed privilege “confers no 
preference” on the creditor who holds it against mortgagees. 
 355. Adler v. Adler, 52 So. 668 (La. 1910). 
 356. See discussion supra. 
 357. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3268 (2015).  
 358. 23 La. Ann. 365 (1871). 
 359. Id. at 366. 




is that the contractor, who through his work has increased the value 
of the thing, should not be omitted in the distribution of the 
proceeds of that thing and is therefore not primed by the privilege 
of the vendor.360 Instead, the contractor’s privilege is exercised in 
such a way as to give the contractor “the benefit of the increased 
value he has given to the property.”361  
The present-day Private Works Act seems to have abandoned 
this “intelligent sense of justice” in favor of a rule ranking Private 
Works Act privileges against vendor’s privileges and mortgages 
based strictly upon temporal priority. As revised in 1981, the 
Private Works Act362 provides that privileges in favor of claimants 
under the Act are inferior to mortgages and vendor’s privileges 
“that are effective against third persons before the privileges 
granted by [the Act] are effective.”363 The Official Comments to 
this provision of the Private Works Act observe that this provision 
is not intended to change the law and “leaves to the general law the 
matter of determining when a mortgage or vendor’s privilege is 
effective.”364 However, the formulation of the predecessor statute 
was different, and perhaps materially so. The privileges arising 
under that statute were ranked behind those bona fide mortgages 
and vendor’s privileges that had been “duly recorded before the 
work or labor is begun.”365 Thus, actual recordation at the moment 
of commencement of the work—rather than effectiveness against 
third persons—was the paramount consideration; the possibility 
that a vendor’s privilege might take effect against third persons 
from the moment of the act of sale, provided that timely filing later 
occurs, was unimportant. 
Under the present Private Works Act, if an act evidencing a 
bona fide vendor’s privilege is actually recorded before work 
begins on the immovable, there is little doubt that the vendor’s 
privilege will have priority. But, suppose that, on a Friday afternoon, 
a closing occurs in which a purchaser acquires an immovable under 
an act of credit sale that is not recorded in the conveyance or 
mortgage records until the following Monday morning. In the 
meantime, on Saturday, a contractor hired by the new owner begins 
                                                                                                             
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (Supp. 2015). 
 363. Laborer’s privileges under the Private Works Act outrank all mortgages 
and vendor’s privileges, irrespective of the order in which the competing rights 
arise or are made effective against third persons. Id. § 9:4821(A)(2). Thus, the 
issues discussed in this section are not applicable to laborer’s privileges. 
 364. Id. cmt. d.  
 365. Act No. 298, 1926 La. Acts 552, 559 (quoted in Hortman-Salmen Co. v. 
White, 123 So. 709, 710 (La. 1929)). 




work for the construction of a building upon the immovable. The 
roofing subcontractor, who is not paid for work performed many 
months later, timely files a Private Works Act claim within 60 days 
after the work is substantially completed the following year. In a 
ranking dispute between this subcontractor and the unpaid vendor, 
who wins? The vendor’s privilege was timely filed, but was it 
“effective against third persons” when work began? 
The case that most nearly answers this question is Security 
Homestead Ass’n v. Schnell.366 It should be borne in mind, however, 
that the case was decided under the former version of the Private 
Works Act, which, as pointed out above, required actual prior 
recordation in order for bona fide mortgages and vendor’s 
privileges to outrank Private Works Act privileges. Under the facts 
of that case, the defendant purchased an immovable under an act of 
credit sale that was recorded within the period prescribed by Civil 
Code article 3274.367 For reasons that were not entirely clear, he 
had apparently obtained materials from two materialmen prior to 
the time that he became the owner of the immovable.368 The court 
held that, with respect to materials supplied before the date of the 
act of credit sale, no materialman’s privilege could arise because 
the materialmen did not contract with the owner or lessee as 
required by the Private Works Act.369 However, with respect to 
purchases of materials made by the defendant on or after the date 
of execution of the act of credit sale, a materialman’s privilege 
arose and, by virtue of the clear language of the Private Works Act, 
that privilege was superior to the unrecorded vendor’s privilege.370 
The majority opinion did not cite or discuss Civil Code article 
3274 or its temporal filing requirement, though it is clear from the 
                                                                                                             
 366. 232 So. 2d 898 (La. Ct. App. 1970). See also Conservative Homestead 
Ass’n v. Boyle, 135 So. 663 (La. 1931). However, in Conservative Homestead 
Ass’n, the vendor’s privilege in favor of a building and loan association was 
acquired after work had begun, and the court had no difficulty ranking it behind 
privileges arising from a work that had already begun when the vendor’s 
privilege was acquired. No consideration was given to Civil Code article 3274, 
and the opinion did not discuss whether timely recordation of the vendor’s 
privilege would have given it priority. Based on the reasoning set forth in 
Lawyer’s Title Insurance Corp. v. Valteau, it appears that timely recordation 
would not have made a difference under article 3274 anyway, because the 
building and loan association’s (i.e., the vendor’s) own title was burdened by the 
inchoate liens arising from the work at the time of the vendor’s privilege was 
created. 
 367. Security Homestead Ass’n, 232 So. 2d at 899. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 900–01. 
 370. Id. at 901. 




facts of the case that the vendor’s privilege was recorded in a 
timely manner.371  
The dissent pointed out the incongruity in allowing a third 
person to benefit from an unrecorded sale while at the same time 
protecting the third person from the vendor’s privilege arising under 
the unrecorded sale.372 In the view of the dissent, where work is in 
continuous progress prior to the time the party contracting as owner 
actually becomes owner, the work is considered to have commenced 
at the moment that registry of his purchase in the conveyance 
records makes him owner quoad third persons.373 The only way the 
vendor’s privilege could prime the materialman’s privilege would be 
if the vendor could show that his privilege was recorded in the 
mortgage records before the moment of registry of the sale in the 
conveyance records. This is something the vendor could not do 
under the facts of the case, and perhaps cannot do under any facts 
unless he caused his act of credit sale to be recorded in the 
mortgage records before it is recorded in the conveyance records. 
The reason that the dissenting judge dissented is that he believed 
the materialman’s privilege should have been given effect only 
with respect to materials delivered after the date of recordation of 
the act of sale in the conveyance records.374 The dissent did discuss 
the effect of article 3274, but dismissed that article on the basis 
that it protects the vendor only against intervening mortgages, not 
against other privileges.375 
Of course, Security Homestead was decided under a prior 
version of the Private Works Act, which provided that prior 
recordation of a vendor’s privilege was the determining factor. 
Likely the reason that the current version of the Private Works Act 
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 372. Id. at 901–02 (Redmann, J., dissenting). 
 373. Id. at 903. 
 374. Id. at 902. 
 375. To the extent that the dissenting opinion suggests that Civil Code article 
3274 is the article that gives the holder of the vendor’s privilege priority over a 
mortgage, it seems incorrect. Quite to the contrary, article 3274 is a limitation 
upon the priority that a vendor’s privilege enjoys over a mortgage by virtue of 
article 3186, which ranks a creditor holding a privilege over other creditors, 
even those holding mortgages. The priority of one privilege over another is not 
dealt with by article 3274, or even article 3186, but rather by other articles of the 
Civil Code that provide no guidance on how to rank a Private Works Act 
privilege. The dissent is, however, correct both that the ultimate question is 
whether a vendor’s privilege outranks a materialman’s privilege and that this 
ranking is fixed by section 9:4812. At the time Security Homestead was decided, 
that statute resolved the priority based on whether the vendor’s privilege was 
recorded prior to the moment work began. Under the present version of the 
Private Works Act, the issue is whether the vendor’s privilege was effective 
against third persons before work began.  




shifted the focus from actual recordation of competing mortgages to 
their effectiveness against third persons was not any conscious 
consideration of the effective date of timely filed vendor’s privileges, 
but rather was a recognition of the rule that mere recordation is 
insufficient to make a collateral mortgage effective against third 
persons; issuance of the collateral note is also required.376 At the time 
of the 1981 revision of the Private Works Act, American Bank & Trust 
Co. v. F & W Construction377 had only recently been decided. 
Construing the former statute, which focused upon whether the 
competing mortgage was a bona fide mortgage or vendor’s privilege 
recorded before work began, the court held that a collateral mortgage 
recorded prior to the commencement of work but without 
contemporaneous pledge of the collateral note was not a bona fide 
mortgage that would prime privileges arising out of work begun before 
the collateral note was pledged.378  
There does not appear to be any case decided under the current 
Private Works Act considering the issue of whether a vendor’s 
privilege that arises before work begins and is filed timely after work 
begins is “effective against third persons” before work begins. The 
view that it is not would appear to be supported by a plain reading of 
article 3273, which provides that privileges are effective against third 
persons from the date of the recording of the act or evidence of 
indebtedness secured by the privilege. However, the apparent 
plainness of the language of article 3272 might be deceptive, for if it 
truly means precisely what it seems to say, Private Works Act 
privileges themselves would not be effective against third persons 
during the period before a statement of claim or privilege is filed of 
record.379 Ironically, the very principles by which the courts held that a 
timely but later filed Private Works Act privilege could 
constitutionally prime a pre-existing mortgage might now be used to 
support an argument that a vendor’s privilege that is recorded 
within the time set forth in article 3274 outranks Private Works 
Act privileges, even though the vendor’s privilege is not recorded 
at the time work began. To understand this point, a review of early 
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 377. 357 So. 2d 1226 (La. Ct. App. 1978). The case is specifically referred to 
in comment (d) to section 9:4821. 
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cases involving constitutional challenges to the Private Works Act 
is necessary. 
In Gleissner v. Hughes,380 the Court considered an objection to 
the constitutionality of the 1916 predecessor to the Private Works Act, 
which at the time provided that a privilege arising under its provisions 
and recorded within 45 days after the owner’s acceptance of the work 
had priority over all other privileges or encumbrances, even those that 
had been recorded before work began. At the time, the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1913381 provided that “[n]o mortgage or privilege on 
immovable property shall affect third persons unless recorded or 
registered in the parish where the property is situated, in the manner 
and within the time as is now or may be prescribed by law.”382 The 
Court held that, although there is no doubt that the privileges asserted 
by the Private Works Act claimants could not affect third persons 
unless recorded, the constitutional provision leaves to the Legislature a 
determination of the manner and time within which they must be 
recorded in order to bind third persons.383 Citing article 3274 of the 
Civil Code as an example of another instance in which the Legislature 
had allowed a delay for recording a privilege, the Court held that the 
1916 act was simply an enlargement of the filing period otherwise 
provided in the general rule expressed in article 3274.384 The 
Gleissner case was followed four years later in Capital Building & 
Loan Ass’n v. Carter.385 Citing its earlier holding in Gleissner and the 
                                                                                                             
 380. 95 So. 529 (La. 1922). 
 381. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921). 
 382. The identical provision had been contained in Article 176 of the 1879 
Constitution and later appeared in Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution 
of 1921. This provision was continued in force as a statute following the 
adoption of the Constitution of 1974 and still exists as statutory law today as 
Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution Ancillaries. It should be noted that 
the principle espoused in this provision, but without inclusion of the temporal 
element, appears in the 2005 enactment of Civil Code article 3338. Whether the 
omission of the reference to the time permitted for recordation is significant or 
even intentional, the 2005 revision of the law of registry did not purport to 
repeal or modify Article XIX, Section 19, of the Constitution Ancillaries. 
 383. Gleissner, 95 So. at 532. 
 384. Id. at 533. 
 385. 113 So. 886 (La. 1927). Under the facts of the case, the lot owner, 
acting as his own contractor, erected a residence on the lot using materials 
supplied by two materialmen. After completion, he sold the property to a 
building and loan association, which immediately resold the property to a third 
person, retaining a vendor’s privilege which was timely recorded. Three months 
after completion, the materialmen filed claims under the 1922 predecessor to the 
Private Works Act, which generally provided for a 30-day lien filing period but 
was unclear as to what the filing period was in the case of a work performed by 
the owner himself.  




analogous provision of the Constitution of 1921,386 the Court held 
that: 
Under this provision a lien or privilege may affect third 
persons during the period in which it is not of record, if, 
eventually, it is recorded in the manner and the time 
prescribed by law.387  
The Court found that the 30-day filing requirement that existed 
under the 1922 predecessor to the Private Works Act applied and 
that, because the materialmen did not file within it, they held no 
privilege on the property.388 Because the Court held that the 
materialmen had no privilege, what it said about the effect against 
third persons of unfiled privileges during the period prescribed for 
their filing might rightly be considered dicta; however, that 
objection cannot be raised to the nearly contemporaneous holding of 
the Court in Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder,389 in which the 
materialman did in fact file within the 30-day filing period. 
According to the Court, “since the privilege was recorded within the 
time and in the manner prescribed by law, it affected third persons 
during the period in which it was not of record.”390 As authority for 
this proposition, the Court cited the constitutional provision as well 
as its prior holdings in both the Gleissner and the Capital Building 
& Loan Association cases.391 Professor Daggett interprets these 
holdings as establishing that the principle that the Legislature has 
the prerogative of prescribing the time within which privileges on 
immovables must be recorded, and, if a privilege is recorded within 
the prescribed time, it is effective against third persons during the 
period of time that it is not of record.392 
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Interestingly, this line of cases impresses upon the 1870 Code a 
meaning that was explicitly stated in the 1825 Code393 but was 
removed in the 1870 revision, which substituted in place of that 
explicit statement a provision, found in article 3273, that privileges 
are valid against third persons from the date of the recording of the 
act or evidence of the indebtedness.394 That change might, however, 
be explained by the fact that the 1870 Code originally shortened the 
period for recording a vendor’s privilege to the very day on which 
the act of sale was passed; thus, there was no need for the 
provision on retroactivity of a timely filing. 
Prior to the 1981 revision of the Private Works Act, Gleissner 
and its progeny would have been unavailing to a vendor holding a 
privilege that was filed in a timely manner but was not of record at 
the moment work began because the Private Works Act 
specifically required that a mortgage or vendor’s privilege be of 
record at the time work began in order for the mortgagee or vendor 
to have priority over a Private Works Act claimant. However, since 
the 1981 revision to the statute, which now requires simply that the 
vendor’s privilege be effective against third persons at the time 
work begins, a vendor could seize upon these holdings and turn 
back around against a Private Works Act claimant the very 
reasoning that allowed the Private Works Act claimant to have 
priority over pre-existing interests in the first place. 
The 1981 revision was likely intended simply to confine the 
field of competing mortgages and privileges that would prime a 
Private Works Act privilege to those that are not merely of record 
but are also actually effective against third persons. Except in the 
case of a collateral mortgage, the two requirements are practically 
co-extensive anyway.395 Ironically, however, the formulation 
presently used in the statute may actually have increased the field 
of competing vendor’s privileges that will have priority to include 
both previously filed vendor’s privileges as well as those later filed 
vendor’s privileges whose period for filing under article 3274 is 
yet unexpired at the moment work begins.  
The vendor can make a convincing argument that the 
Legislature has already chosen to favor pre-existing vendor’s 
privileges over most Private Works Act privileges and that the 
Legislature’s policy choice is furthered, not frustrated, by 
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application of this rule to those vendor’s privileges that are filed 
within the short window of time permitted by article 3274. Even 
where the vendor’s privilege is unrecorded at the time work 
begins, the Private Works Act claimant would be hard-pressed to 
show that he relied on the absence of the filing of the vendor’s 
privilege in the mortgage records, because in modern times the 
absence of the filing of the credit sale in the mortgage records 
almost always implies a lack of recordation of the instrument in the 
conveyance records. If there is no recordation of an act translative 
of title in favor of the owner who has contracted the work, how can 
the claimant claim to be relying on the public records at all? 
Moreover, Private Works Act claimants themselves benefit from 
relatively long periods of time in which their privileges are 
effective against third persons without any recordation.396 Why 
should vendors, to whom the law also expressly gives a period of 
time for recordation of their privileges, not also be permitted the 
same benefit?  
On the other hand, the Private Works Act claimant seems to 
have the advantage in arguing the black letter of the law: His 
privilege is effective from the moment work begins397 and outranks 
all competing mortgages and privileges that were not effective 
against third persons at that moment.398 Article 3273, which 
applies to other privileges, provides that privileges are effective 
against third persons from the date of recording.399 The first 
sentence of article 3274 unqualifiedly states that privileges—
including vendor’s privileges—are not effective against third 
persons “unless recorded in the manner required by law.”400 A 
close reading of the article reveals that the second sentence of this 
article, which permits the privileged creditor a period of time to 
record his privilege after it has arisen, is not necessarily an 
exception to the rule espoused in the first sentence, but rather is an 
exception to the rule, expressed in article 3186, that privileges by 
their nature outrank mortgages.401 The second sentence says 
nothing about the ranking of privileges against other privileges and 
by its terms does not purport to make unfiled vendor’s privileges 
effective against third persons from the moment of the sale if 
recorded within the period of time allowed in the article.402 Though 
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that rule was found in prior codes, it was suppressed in the 1870 
revision.403 
If the law is that a timely but later filed vendor’s privilege is 
primed by Private Works Act privileges arising out of a work 
commenced during the period allowed by article 3274 for filing the 
vendor’s privilege, an anomaly results when there happens to be a 
pre-existing judicial mortgage against the vendee. The vendor’s 
privilege, even though filed in a timely manner, would nonetheless 
be primed by the pre-existing judicial mortgage against the vendee, 
contrary to the result that is otherwise mandated by Lawyer’s Title 
Insurance Corp. v. Valteau.404 The reason is that the previously 
filed judicial mortgage would attach at the instant the vendee 
acquires the property405 and would therefore prime Private Works 
Act privileges arising out of a work subsequently commenced by 
the vendee. Ordinarily, this judicial mortgage would, under the 
holding of Valteau and by operation of article 3274, be inferior to a 
later but timely filed vendor’s privilege. Unfortunately for the 
vendor, however, his priority would rank behind all Private Works 
Act privileges and also behind all mortgages that were effective 
against third persons before work began because, under the rule 
that we are assuming to exist, his privilege was not effective 
against third persons at the time work commenced. Thus, under the 
ranking provisions of the Private Works Act,406 his vendor’s 
privilege would be last in ranking. Though this situation might at 
first blush seem to constitute a vicious circle, it is actually a simple 
re-ordering of ranking based upon the priority rules contained in 
the Private Works Act. What makes the situation all the more 
anomalous is that this re-ordering of priorities results solely from 
the fortuity of whether, at the time of foreclosure, there happens to 
be an unpaid Private Works Act claimant who may be owed an 
insignificant amount of money. In the absence of such a claimant, 
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the Private Works Act has no application, and the vendor would 
rank ahead of the holder of the pre-existing judicial mortgage. Of 
course, if the rule is that the timely but later filed vendor’s privilege 
outranks Private Works Act privileges, the anomaly is avoided: the 
vendor’s privilege ranks first, followed by the pre-existing judicial 
mortgage, followed by the Private Works Act privileges. The 
vendor’s privilege and judicial mortgage would rank between 
themselves in the same order that would apply in the absence of a 
Private Works Act privilege.  
A similarly anomalous reordering of priorities would arise if an 
act of credit sale is recorded in the mortgage records within the 
period prescribed by article 3274 but, in the interim before its 
recordation occurs, the new owner records a conventional mortgage 
and begins work on the immovable, in that order. Under article 
3274, the vendor’s privilege would normally outrank the 
conventional mortgage, even though the mortgage was recorded 
first. However, application of the Private Works Act would re-order 
the priorities as follows: (1) laborer’s privileges, because the Private 
Works Act accords them priority over all other privileges and 
mortgages irrespective of any temporal consideration; (2) the 
conventional mortgage, because it was recorded and therefore 
effective against third persons before work began; (3) other Private 
Works Act privileges; and (4) the vendor’s privilege, because, based 
on the assumption we are making, it was not effective against third 
persons until the moment of recordation. Again, the anomaly is 
avoided if the rule is that the timely but later filed vendor’s privilege 
outranks non-laborer privileges under the Private Works Act. The 
ranking would be: (1) laborer’s privileges, for the same reason 
indicated above; (2) the vendor’s privilege because, under the rule 
we are assuming to exist, it was effective against third persons when 
work began and also because its timely recordation causes it to 
outrank the conventional mortgage; (3) the conventional mortgage, 
because it was recorded and therefore effective against third persons 
before work began; and (4) other Private Works Act privileges. The 
vendor’s privilege and conventional mortgage would rank between 
themselves in the same order that would apply in the absence of a 
Private Works Act privilege. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
So how do the two vendor’s privileges fare today? The older of 
them has atrophied; the younger remains nearly as vibrant as ever.  
From its inception, the vendor’s privilege on movables has 
afforded only precarious protection to the seller, given that it has 
always been a mere right of preference that is extinguished if the 




buyer alienates the thing subject to the privilege and delivers it to a 
third person. Jurisprudence that has evolved over the last few 
decades seems to dictate the conclusion that a vendor’s privilege is 
similarly extinguished if the thing subject to the privilege becomes a 
component part of an immovable, at least in cases where the 
privilege becomes in conflict with rights that third persons have or 
acquire in the immovable. Once favored by the legislator, who often 
statutorily subordinated other special privileges to it, the vendor’s 
privilege was dealt a double blow by Louisiana’s adoption of Article 
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. First, Article 9 made it quite 
easy for a vendor to obtain a purchase money security interest, 
through the simple expedient of having the buyer sign a short 
agreement stating that a security interest is granted for the unpaid 
purchase price. The purchase money security interest so created is 
accorded very favorable treatment, as it outranks most pre-existing 
security interests,407 and, in the case of consumer goods, is 
automatically perfected without the necessity of filing any 
financing statement.408 Of course, the mere creation of another 
convenient and powerful form of security would not, of itself, have 
caused the vendor’s privilege on movables to lose its allure. The 
second blow was the contemporaneous adoption of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 9:4770, providing that vendor’s privileges 
are subordinate to all security interests, even those arising later and 
those that are never perfected. Thus, the vendor’s privilege on 
movables is now an anemic form of security indeed. Nevertheless, 
it still allows the vendor to be preferred over unsecured creditors, 
and its existence permits the unpaid seller to obtain a pre-judgment 
seizure under a writ of sequestration.409 
In contrast, the vendor’s privilege on immovables remains as 
useful as ever. Though the preference that it affords the vendor over 
the general privileges arising under the Civil Code is perhaps now of 
only marginal benefit, because general privileges themselves have 
fallen into disuse, the ranking that the vendor’s privilege has over 
mortgages—particularly pre-existing judicial mortgages—continues 
to be substantially beneficial. Once recorded, the vendor’s privilege 
on an immovable is a powerful real right that follows the immovable 
into whatever hands it may pass. Its benefits and protections remain 
sufficiently attractive that, in recent years, proposals have been 
made to make them available even to creditors who are not 
sellers.410 Whether those proposals will continue to be made, or if 
                                                                                                             
 407. Id. § 10:9-324. 
 408. Id. § 10:9-309(1). 
 409. See supra note 99. 
 410. See supra note 75. 




made will ultimately succeed, will be known only with the passage 
of time. 
Perhaps our long experience with vendor’s privileges allows us 
to draw conclusions that are valid with respect to the concept of 
privileges in general. Where privileges, such as those on movables, 
are allowed to proliferate, and to exist without a system of registry 
with the result that their effectiveness against third persons is of 
necessity severely restricted, the security that they afford becomes 
so weak that the regime under which they exist is ultimately 
replaced by another system that more effectively protects the rights 
of the creditor and third persons alike. Accordingly, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, with its simplified form of a single security 
interest that is easily made effective against third persons through a 
mechanism of publicity, has nearly supplanted the law of privileges 
on movables, the vendor’s privilege included. On the other hand, 
where privileges, such as those on immovables, are relatively few in 
number, are subjected to a system of registry, and are granted the 
status of real rights, they can continue to serve as effective security 
for the privileged creditor without unfairly prejudicing the rights of 
third persons. The vendor’s privilege on immovables endures as a 
fitting example. Adheret visceribus rei.  
